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Abstract 
 
This report reviews patterns and trends in human development (HD) in East and Southeast 
Asia (ESA) since 1990, analyzes causes and consequences of this development, highlighting 
both  structural  and  institutional  factors,  and  identifies  the  basic  principles  for  durable 
enhancements in HD. The basic arguments are that most ESA economies have experienced 
rapid socioeconomic structural changes through industrialization and urbanization in the last 
two decades. From a HD perspective, these processes offer enormous room for expanding 
people's  capabilities.  However,  to  successfully  seize  such  opportunities,  appropriate 
institutions and public policies are needed, and so is public participation in policy making and 
implementation. Public policies are also important for equitable distribution of the expanded 
opportunities, which in turn contribute to the legitimacy of institutions and social cohesion. 
And  while  industrialization  does  often  cause  more  environmental  pollution,  technological 
advances also offer the means to reduce such pollution, so long as appropriate environmental 
policies  are  implemented  to  ensure  the  use  of  such  cleaner  technologies.  Subject  to  such 
appropriate  public  policies,  in  net  terms  industrialization  and  urbanization  should  expand 
people's capabilities and ensure sustainable HD. Six principles are critical to a successful HD 
strategy:  agricultural  and  rural  development  to  facilitate  structural  transformation  and  to 
increase  employment;  human  capital  accumulation  to  promote  continued  economic  and 
income  growth;  inclusive  urbanization  to  reduce  dualism  and  enhance  social  integration; 
cleaner industrialization to ensure sustainability; people's participation and empowerment to 
improve decision making and governance; closer regional and international cooperation to 
ensure a better future for all on our fragile planet. 
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The  Human  Development  Research  Paper  (HDRP)  Series  is  a  medium  for  sharing  recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually,  and further research in  the field  of human development. The HDRP Series is  a 
quick-disseminating,  informal  publication  whose  titles  could  subsequently  be  revised  for 
publication  as  articles  in  professional  journals  or  chapters  in  books.  The  authors  include 
leading academics and practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The 
findings, interpretations and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not 
be consistent with that presented in Human Development Reports. 3 
 
   
1. Introduction 
This  paper  reviews  the  patterns  and  trends  in  human  development  (HD)  in  the  East  and 
Southeast  Asian  (ESA)  region  in  the  past  20  years  since  1990,  analyzes  causes  and 
consequences  of  this  development  while  highlighting  both  the  structural  and  institutional 
factors, and identifies basic principles that can be used by societies to define strategies that 
generate durable enhancements in HD. The basic arguments are that most economies in the 
region  (except  Japan,  Singapore,  and  perhaps  South  Korea,  which  have  already  largely 
completed the process at the start of the period) have experienced rapid economic and social 
structural changes through industrialization and urbanization. From a HD perspective, these 
processes offer enormous room for expanding people's capabilities, both in terms of the usual 
three  dimensions  that  make  up  HDI,  and  beyond.  However,  to  successfully  seize  such 
opportunities,  appropriate  institutions  and  public  policies  are  needed,  and  so  is  public 
participation  in  the  making  and  implementation  of  these  policies.  Public  policies  are  also 
important for the equitable distribution of the expanded opportunities and benefits, which in 
turn  contribute  to  the  legitimacy  of  institutions  and  social  cohesion.  And  while 
industrialization does often result in more environmental pollution, technological advances 
also offer the means to reduce such pollution, so long as appropriate environmental policies 
are implemented to  ensure the use of such cleaner technologies and cleaner development. 
Subject to such appropriate public policies, in net terms industrialization and urbanization 
should expand people's capabilities and ensure sustainable HD. Six principles are critical to a 4 
 
successful  human  development  strategy:  agricultural  and  rural  development  to  facilitate 
economic  and  social  structural  transformation  and  to  increase  employment  opportunities; 
human capital accumulation to promote continued economic and income growth; inclusive 
urbanization  to  reduce  dualism  and  enhance  social  integration;  cleaner  industrialization  to 
ensure sustainability; people's participation and empowerment to improve decision making 
and  governance;  closer  regional  and  international  cooperation  to  ensure  a  better  common 
future for all on our fragile planet. 
 
In what follows, Section 2 reviews the patterns and trends of HD in the ESA region since 1990, 
where it will be shown that even though regionally imbalanced and with serious interruptions, 
in  HD  terms  rapid  progress  has  been  made.  Section  3  and  4  analyze  the  causes  and 
consequences of such development within a framework that recognizes the role of institutional 
and structural factors. Section 3 focuses on the unprecedented structural changes that have 
taken place in the region, propelled by the rapid industrialization in most ESA economies and 
the development of services in others, often through production agglomerations and clustering, 
which resulted in inevitable rapid urbanization in the region. All this, it must be said, has been 
further helped by an enhanced level of trade and investment, and in some cases the emergence 
of an ESA regional production network. Section 4 considers the role of national institutions 
and public policies. It could be said that it is the interplay of these institutions and policies, on 
the one hand, and the structural factors (the underlying forces that push for change), on the 
other, that has shaped the respective course of development in ESA economies and in the 
region. And while the ESA economies have been rather successful in applying public policies 5 
 
to  realize  their  chosen  developmental  objectives,  weaknesses  in  certain  important  public 
policy areas, from the viewpoint of better advancing the course of human development, will be 
identified. Section 5 then draws on these analyses to identify principles that should define 
successful, durable HD strategies for the future, and concludes this report. 6 
 
 
2. Patterns and Trends in HD in the ESA Region 
Although uneven and with serious interruptions (especially due to the East Asian Financial 
Crisis in the late 1990s, and more recently the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2008), 
progress in HD in the ESA region has been rapid and substantial in the past two decades. 
Below, we first review trends and patterns in the overall progress of HD by considering the 
records of the aggregate human development indices (HDIs) of the ESA economies, before 
examining the three traditional dimensions – per capita income, health, and education – that 
make  up  the  HDI.  We  also  examine  the  patterns  and  changes  in  inequalities  in  these 
component dimensions,  and the progress  in  governance  that  we believe has  underlain  the 
overall progress in human development in the region.   
2.1 HDI and ESA Economies 
While all economies in the region have recorded progress in HD in the last two decades (for 
those economies and periods for which we have data), they remain substantially different in 
the level of HD achieved. As can be seen from Table 2.1.1, Japan, Singapore, Korea (Rep) 
remain advanced in the level of HD they achieved, while Timor-Leste is at the bottom in the 
league in 2007. In that same year, the world's average level of human development was 0.753. 
Using this standard, eight ESA economies achieved a level of HD above the world's average in 
that year, while the other eight economies (for which we have data) had a level below it. China 
had just managed to surpass the world's average level.   
 7 
 
As well as being substantially different in the starting level of HD achieved, and although all 
have  made  substantial  progress  over  the  two  decades,  these  economies  show  marked 
differences  in  the  pace  of  this  progress.  Being  already  high-achieving,  Japan  recorded  a 
modest  rate  of  growth  of  0.26%,  Singapore  0.61%,  and  South  Korea  0.92%.This  pattern 
appears  to  exactly  mirror  the  pattern  of  difference  in  their  initial,  1990  level  of  HD.
1 
Improvements in other less developed ESA economies are mixed. While China was behind 
Indonesia and the Philippines in 1990, it overtook them in 2007. Viet Nam was behind China 
at the starting year, while its rate of growth is actually below that of China over the period. 
Malaysia was  ahead of  Thailand in  1990, but its  rate of growth  is  actually  above that of 
Thailand. These patterns indicate substantial differences in the progress in HD between the 
ESA economies. 
 
Figure 2.1.1 below further compares the HDI levels and growth rates of some ESA economies 
with other economies of the world. The horizontal axis measures the average level of HDI 
attained of an economy in 1980, while the vertical axis its average annual growth rate of HDI 
during the period 1980-2007. As can be seen, at the start of the period, HDI levels across the 
world varied widely from a lower value just above 0.2 to one above 0.9. While indicating 
enormous variations among themselves, the ESA economies as a group are situated in the 
higher range of the initial value of HDI. As expected, across the world, the higher is the initial 
level  of  HDI  of  an  economy,  the  slower  is  the  growth  rate.  The  ESA  economies  are  no 
exception to this general pattern. However, as a group, their growth rates are also at the higher 
                                                        
1  Understandably, the high is the level already achieved, the small is the extent of the progress we expect a country to achieve 
over a given period, other things being equal. 8 
 
end of the spread. 
 
Table 2.1.1 HDI Trends in the ESA Region 
Country 
Name 
1980  1990  2000  2007 
Annual Growth Rate 
Long Term  Medium-Term  Short-Term 
1980–2007  1990–2007  2000–2007 
Japan  0.887  0.918  0.943  0.96  0.29  0.26  0.25 
Singapore  0.785  0.851  --  0.944  0.68  0.61  -- 
Hong Kong, 
China 
--  --  --  0.944  --  --  -- 
Korea, Rep  0.722  0.802  0.869  0.937  0.97  0.92  1.08 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
0.827  0.876  0.905  0.92  0.39  0.29  0.22 
Malaysia  0.666  0.737  0.797  0.829  0.81  0.69  0.56 
Thailand  0.658  0.706  0.753  0.783  0.64  0.61  0.57 
China  0.533  0.608  0.719  0.772  1.37  1.4  1 
Philippines  0.652  0.697  0.726  0.751  0.53  0.44  0.49 
Indonesia  0.522  0.624  0.673  0.734  1.26  0.95  1.25 
Mongolia  --  --  0.676  0.727  --  --  1.02 
Viet Nam  --  0.599  0.69  0.725  1.16  1.13  0.71 
Lao PDR  --  --  0.566  0.619  --  --  1.26 
Cambodia  --  --  0.515  0.593  --  --  2.01 
Myanmar  --  0.487  --  0.586  0.79  1.08  -- 
Timor-Leste  --  --  --  0.489  --  --  -- 









Figure 2.1.1 HDI Growth in East and Southeast Asia, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2009, Table G. 
2.2 Economy 
2.2.1 Economic Growth 
Overall,  the  ESA  economies  achieved  economic  growth  at  a  rate  above  that  of  all  other 
regions in the world during the period. This progress was, however, severely interrupted in 
most of them during the regional financial crisis that started in 1997. In the ensuing few years, 
these economies took a severe nosedive, as shown in Figure 2.2.1. China largely escaped the 
impact of that crisis. The effect of the more recent international financial crisis on the region's 
economies is still not fully clear, but one expects it to be equally severe, if not severer.   
 
Among the ESA economies, Japan maintained a high rate of economic growth from 1955 to 
the 1980s, and subsequently became one of the world's most developed economies. Since the 
early 1990s, however, its growth rate has markedly slowed down, and even went into negative 
during the East Asian financial crisis and again in the current global financial crisis. Hong 10 
 
Kong  (China),  Taiwan  (China),  Korea  (Rep),  and  Singapore  are  the  so-called  four  Asian 
Dragons, as they had achieved very high rates of growth and had rapidly industrialized and 
even transformed themselves into services-oriented economies during the 1960s-1980s period, 
with rapid rises in per capita income. Entering the 1990s, these economies have by and large 
still maintained fairly high rates of growth (except during the two financial crises). Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia equally experienced strong economic growth in the 1990s, and they too 
were  severely  affected  (perhaps  worst  affected)  by  the  East  Asian  financial  crisis.  While 
recovery followed after the crisis, on the whole their rates of growth have not gone back to the 
same high levels as before the crisis. The Philippines appears to have largely escaped the 
severe impact of the crisis, but its rate of growth has always been low in the region. Lao PDR, 
Mongolia,  Myanmar,  Viet  Nam,  Cambodia  (countries  that  have  experienced  economic 
transition) suffered less severe negative impacts of the crisis, and have recorded no negative 





















































Source：Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, 
www.adb.org/statistics.   
 
It may be worth examining the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on the region's economies 
more closely. Figure 2.2.2 plots the average annual growth rates of the ESA economies for the 
pre-crisis  period  1990-1997  (horizontal  axis)  against  those  for  the  subsequent  period 
1999-2008 (leaving out year 1998, when the impact of the crisis was at its worst). As can be 
seen, the crisis left a deep mark on the growth rates of the economies severely affected by it: 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea (Rep), and to an extent also Singapore. On the other 
hand, the effect on other economies in the region is hardly noticeable.   
 
The most far-reaching change in the ESA region over the last two decades took place in China. 
Since the Reform and Opening-Up in 1978, through successive phases of reform policies, 
China has by and large been transformed from a planned economy to a market-oriented one. 
Its economy has seen remarkable growth, with the average annual rate reaching 9.8% for the 12 
 
last 30 years. Even during the two financial crises, growth remained strong. Today, China has 
become an important manufacturing base and a strong driving force for the world economy.   
 
Figure 2.2.2 GDP Growth Persistence in the ESA Region 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2009, Table M. 
2.2.2 Income Inequality 
Economic growth is an important dimension of and means to human development. However, 
as HDR (1991, p.13) points out, only when the following three conditions are met can it better 
and more effectively promote human development. They are: (1) participatory—allowing for 
private initiative and broad-based people's involvement; (2) distributed well—benefiting all 
people;  (3)  sustainable—since  raising  future  production  may  demand  current  sacrifice. 
Therefore, it is also important to examine whether the substantial economic growth achieved 
in the ESA region has also benefited the majority of people. 
 13 
 
Although income disparities between the region's economies may be shrinking, as implied by 
our  review  of  the  growth  rates  above,
2  disparities  within  an  economy  could  remain  high 
(indeed may even be rising). According to available evidence (Table 2.2.1), the Philippines, 
Thailand, China and Cambodia all had a Gini coefficient above 0.4 in the mid 2000s, implying 
an extremely high level of income inequality and above the internationally recognized warning 
level. Among them, the Philippines saw an increase in the value of the index from an already 
high level of 0.429 in the mid-1990s to a still higher level of 0.44 in the mid-2000s. Over 
roughly the same period, China experienced a similar increase in the value of the index, from 
0.407 in 1993 to 0.415 in 2005. The rise in inequality for Cambodia is particularly rapid, from 
a Gini value of 0.318 in 1994 to 0.407 in 2007. Indonesia similarly saw a rapid rise over the 
decade in the Gini value to close to 0.4. On the other hand, over roughly the same period, 
Malaysia  and  Thailand  underwent  a  rapid  fall  in  income  inequality,  with  the  fall  being 
particularly marked in the case of Malaysia. Other economies in the region for which a similar 
decadal comparison can be made experienced no marked change in their income inequality 
levels. While no strictly comparable data are available to allow a similar decadal evaluation 
for Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Korea (Rep), other studies (HDR, 2009) indicate that 




                                                        
2  However, regional income inequality within the ESA region may not necessarily fall, even if growth rates are converging, if 
the populations are pooled when measuring such inequality (see ADB, 2007). Pooled inequality estimates include both 
― within-―  and ― between-economy‖ inequalities, while judgements on trends of regional income inequality made on the basis 
of the region‘s converging growth rates only consider the ― between-economy‖ component.   14 
 
 
Table 2.2.1 Trends in Income Gini Indices in East and Southeast Asia 









Cambodia  1967-1985    1994  0.318  2007  0.407 
Thailand  1967-1985  0.47  1992  0.462  2004  0.425 
Singapore  1967-1985  0.42  1998  0.425     
Philippines  1967-1985  0.45  1994  0.429  2006  0.44 
Mongolia  1967-1985    1995  0.332  2005  0.33 
Malaysia  1967-1985  0.48  1993  0.485  2004  0.379 
Lao PDR  1967-1985    1992  0.304  2002-03  0.326 
Korea, Rep  1967-1985  0.36  1998  0.316     
Japan  1967-1985    1993  0.249     
Indonesia  1967-1985  0.31  1993  0.344  2005  0.394 
Hong Kong  1967-1985  0.45  1996  0.434     
China  1967-1985    1993  0.407  2005  0.415 
Viet Nam  1967-1985    1993  0.357  2006  0.378 
Taiwan, 
China 
    1993  0.313  2003  0.339 
Source: 1967~1989: Human Development Report 1990, p.158-159; other data are from 
PovcalNet  Database  Online,  World  Development  Indicators  Online  (World  Bank 
2009c). 
 
An Asian Development Bank study (ADB, 2007b) took a closer look at the trends of rising 
income/expenditure  inequality  in  the  1990s  and  at  around  the  turn  of  this  century,  in  the 
Asia-Pacific Region. According to its findings, income/expenditure inequalities measured by 
the Gini coefficient worsened in most economies in the region for the period for which there 
are data (see Figure 2.2.3). In the ESA Region, except for Thailand, Malaysia, Mongolia, and 
marginally Indonesia, other economies had seen a sharp rise in income inequality. The study 
also compares the rate and absolute size of increase in the per capita expenditure of the poorest 
and riches quintile of the population in selected economies (Figure 2.2.4). Except for Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand (economies that also recorded a fall in the Gini coefficient for the 15 
 
period), the rate of increase for the richest quintile exceeds that for the poorest quintile, in 
some cases by a huge difference. And even for these three countries, the absolute increase for 
the top quintile outpaces that for the bottom quintile, often by a huge margin. In the case of 
China, in absolute terms the rise of the per capita expenditure of the top quintile is close to 20 
times  that  of  the  bottom  quintile.  These  differences  in  the  growth  rates  of  per  capita 
income/expenditure for different income groups are even more worrisome, as they are telltale 
signs of further deteriorating income distribution situation to come in the region. 
 
Figure 2.2.3 Changes in Gini Coefficients in Selected Asian Economies, Expenditure and 




Figure 2.2.4 Changes in Per Capita Expenditures, Bottom and Top Quintiles, 
1990s-2000s (1993 PPP Dollars) 
 
 
The above concerns overall income inequality in an economy. Systematic inequality may in 
particular exist between particular sections of the population, sorted by region, the urban-rural 
divide, gender, education etc. It is not possible to consider all cases here (but see Section 4 for 
discussion of interactions of income, education and health inequalities). Below we consider 
regional income inequality. Using regional annual GDP per capita data, Hamaguchi (2009) 
calculates coefficients of variation for four economies: Japan, Korea, China and Thailand. The 
results are then plotted against the corresponding years for the period 1990-2004. Figure 2.2.5 
reports the results. It shows a very low and stable value for Japan. South Korea has a slightly 
high but equally stable value. China had a much higher starting value, and it increased even 
further over the period at a rather sharp rate. Thailand started the period at a value close to that 17 
 
of China and it climbed up over the period at an even sharper rate, in particular during the East 
Asian financial crisis. According to the author, these differences between Japan and Korean, 
on the one hand, and China and Thailand, on the other, are due to the fact that the latter group 
of economies were experiencing rapid economic growth and were being quickly integrated 
into a regional and world production network, inevitably with some regions undergoing the 
process ahead of others (an issue we will further consider in the next section), while Japan and 
Korea had already been mature industrial economies at the start of the period.   
 
Figure2.2.5 Regional Income Inequality Measured Using the Coefficient of Variation for 
Selected ESA Economies, 1990–2004 
 
Source: Hamaguchi (2009). 
2.2.3 Poverty Alleviation 
Since 1990s, the ESA region has made great strides in reducing poverty. From Table 2.2.2, we 
see that whether using the national poverty lines or the one dollar per person per day poverty 18 
 
Box 2.2.1 Changing Income Distribution Situations in China 
 
The particular case of China is of further interest here. At the start of the Reform and Opening-Up, 
income distribution in China had in fact been quite even, but the nation was generally poor, with a 
great many people in absolute poverty (by its own account, 250m, nearly a third of the whole rural 
population). Since the Reform and Opening-Up, the economy has grown remarkably rapidly, with 
rapid  rises  in  per  capita  income,  while  the  income  gap  has  also  sharply  expanded.  The  Gini 
coefficient rose from 0.28 in 1981 to 0.415 in 2007 (World Bank, 2009). China's post-1978 income 
distribution has two distinct characteristics: (a) a widening disparity between the incomes of urban 
and rural residents, and (b) a widening disparity within rural and urban area. First, the rural-urban 
income gap in fact narrowed during the early years of the Reform and Opening-up, thanks to a range 
of agricultural support policies. However, it thereafter rapidly risen. Between 1984 and 2007, the ratio 
of nominal mean urban income to mean rural income rose from less than 2 to 3.3. When adjustments 
are made for inflation and cost-of-living differences between rural and urban areas, the trend is less 
strong, but the rural-urban mean income gap still increased significantly over the period (see Figure 1 
below). Secondly, according to Chen and Ravallion (2007), as well as the rural-urban income gap 
increases, income inequalities within the rural and the urban sector also rapidly rose. Of these, the 
trend for the urban sector is particularly pronounced (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of Mean Urban Incomes to Mean Rural Incomes from 1980 to 2007 
 
 
Figure 2: Gini Index of Income Inequality within Rural and Urban Areas from 1981 to 2005 
 
line advanced by World Bank, the population below the poverty line in many economies in 
this region has substantially declined.19 
 
 
Table 2.2.2 Poverty Alleviation in ESA (%) 
 
Source: Key Indicator 2007(ADB, 2007b). 
 
Compared with other regions of the world, poverty has declined a lot more in the ESA region 
over the last three decades. Table 2.2.3 gives changes in the proportion of the poor in total 
population for some selected developing regions. In the Table, the East Asia and Pacific region 
predominantly  includes  all  ESA  developing  economies  but  excludes  high-income  ESA 
economies such as Japan and the Four Dragons. The overall level of poverty for this region 
can therefore be used as a close proxy for the poverty level in the ESA region. As can be seen, 
the overall level of poverty in the region has declined throughout the period. In 1981, the 
proportion of the poor in the region was as high as 77.67% of the total population, while in 
2005 it dropped to 16.78%, a fall of close to 61 percentage points. At the same time, the 
world's poor fell from 52% to 25% of the total population, down by 27 percentage points. Note 
also that while at the start of the period, the proportion of the poor in the ESA region exceeded 20 
 
the world average by a massive 25 percentage points, in around 2002 that proportion had 
fallen below the world's average. Thus, on the whole, the ESA region has changed over the 
period from being the largest concentration of the poor in the world to one with a relatively 
low rate of poverty. Section 4 discusses some of the public policies that have contributed to 
this rapid fall in poverty in the region. 
 
Table 2.2.3 Trends in the Proportion of the Poor in Some Developing Regions（%） 
  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
77.67  65.50  54.15  54.72  50.77  36.00  35.51  27.59  16.78 
South Asia  59.35  55.56  54.15  51.71  46.94  47.05  44.13  43.80  40.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa  53.37  55.84  54.49  57.58  56.87  58.78  58.37  55.03  50.91 
World  51.87  46.74  41.9  41.69  39.19  34.45  33.73  30.53  25.19 
Note: poverty line is ―$1. 25 a day‖ at 2005 purchasing power parity. 
Source: World Bank PovcalNet Report. http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet. 
 
2.3 Health 
2.3.1 Enhancement of the Health Level 
In the past two decades, the health level of the population in the ESA region has markedly 
improved, as measured by increases in life expectancy and declines in under-five mortality. 
Life expectancy at birth is widely used as a comprehensive measure of health development. 
Over  the  1990-2008  periods,  life  expectancy  at  birth  in  the  ESA  region  has  increased 
significantly (Table 2.3.1). Consistently above the global average, average life expectancy in 
the region in 2008 was 5 years longer than that in 1990, Except for North Korea, the other 
economies in the region all recorded a positive increase in life expectancy during this period. 
However, the increase varied in extent across the region. For understandable reasons, those 21 
 
with a higher starting value recorded a relatively low average annual rate of growth, while 
those with a lower starting value achieved a higher rate. Thus, over the period, the average 
annual rate of growth was 0.21 year for Japan, but 0.83 year for East Timor (which had the 
lowest starting value of 46.18 in 1990!). Among the higher starters (with a starting value 
above 70), in addition to North Korea which actually recorded a negative growth, Brunei had 
the lowest rate of growth, and was in 2008 behind South Korea even though it had a high 
starting value. Both Lao PDR and Indonesia recorded very marked rate of growth, followed by 
Viet Nam. Indeed Viet Nam had been behind China in 1990 by over 2.5 year, but it overtook 
China in 2008 by over a year. The lackluster growth of China over this period is in sharp 
contrast to its remarkable growth before the reform period, and raises serious issues about the 
nature of its healthcare system since the economic reform. It indeed has spawned prolonged 
and  widespread  discussions  and  debates  within  China  itself,  culminating  in  the  recent 
healthcare system reform initiative (Liu and Wang, 2009).   
 
Another widely used indicator for health development of a population is the proportion of 
children not surviving to the age five, and there are specific targets to reach on this for each 
country in the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4. Target 5 of that Goal calls for a 
reduction of the under-five mortality rate by two thirds between 1990 and 2015, and Table 
2.3.2 provides the specific target values for the ESA economies for the year 2006 and 2015. 
The value actually reached by 2006 for each economy is also included in the table, allowing an 
examination of the progress these economies have made to reach their respective targets for 
the year.   22 
 
Table 2.3.1 Life Expectancy in East and Southeast Asia 




Growth   
High HD 
Japan  78.93  80.01  81.22  82.26  82.73  3.8  0.21 
Hong Kong, China  76.78  78.79  80.87  81.93  82.29  5.51  0.31 
Singapore  74.7  76.52  77.98  79.45  80.05  5.35  0.30 
Korea, Rep.  71.05  73.45  75.91  77.94  78.76  7.71  0.43 
Brunei Darussalam  73.88  75  75.91  76.74  77.19  3.31  0.18 
Malaysia  70.12  71.32  72.5  73.66  74.33  4.21  0.23 
Medium HD 
Thailand  66.79  67.42  67.91  69.59  70.68  3.89  0.22 
China  67.98  69.55  71.29  72.54  73.08  5.1  0.28 
Philippines  65.3  67.56  69.49  71.04  71.83  6.53  0.36 
Viet Nam  65.32  69.36  71.99  73.73  74.4  9.08  0.50 
Indonesia  61.46  64.37  67.41  69.7  70.83  9.37  0.52 
Mongolia  60.78  62.43  64.37  65.91  66.96  6.18  0.34 
Lao PDR  54.14  57.84  60.75  63.19  64.63  10.49  0.58 
Cambodia  55.09  56.29  56.48  58.02  59.96  4.87  0.27 
Myanmar  58.78  59.92  60.03  60.77  62.27  3.49  0.19 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  70.6  68.89  66.98  66.82  67.34  -3.26  -0.18 
Timor-Leste  46.18  51.91  56.53  59.68  61.12  14.94  0.83 
Data source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
Statistic Division. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2.3.2, the starting values of the under-5 mortality rate in 1990 
varied widely between the ESA economies, with Japan at 5 but Timor-Leste at a massive 177 
per  thousand,  followed  by  Myanmar,  Cambodia  and  Mongolia,  all  reaching  over  100  per 
thousand. While Timor-Leste has made rapid progress since, already cutting the rate by over 
two thirds by 2006, Myanmar by the same year has made only very slow progress, and is the 
only country in the region to register a value over 100 in that year, failing to reach the target 
value for 2006 by a huge gap. Other economies that have failed to reach the 2006 target value 
included Cambodia, North Korea, Brunei and Japan, even though Japan‘s rate for 2006 was in 23 
 
fact already at a very low level of 4 per thousand.
3   
 
Aside from the MDG targets, when one examines the evidence as presented in Table 2.3.2, it 
can be seen that enormous differences still remain between the ESA economies at the end year 
2006, even though on the whole substantial progress was made in the region. It is urgent that 
not only Myanmar (which, with a very high starting rate, has even failed to meet the 2006 
MDG target value!), but also other economies in the region which continue to record rather 
unacceptable high rates, undertake a major effort to further significantly bring down their 












                                                        
3  The case of Japan shows, in fact, the inadequacy of the Millennium targets, to the extent that they apply a uniform reduction 
rate of two thirds of the starting value to all economies, when it should have made allowance for the fact that the lower is the 
starting value, getting it still lower by the same proportion would be a lot harder than if one had a higher starting value. It may 
be argued that if all human lives are treated equally, we should then expect those countries with a high starting value (and 
especially those outliers) to make much greater proportionate reductions than the average. 24 
 
Table 2.3.2 Under-Five Mortality Rate in ESA（Deaths Per 1000 Live Births） 





Expected Level In 
2006 Based On 
MDG** 
High HD               
Japan  6  6  5  4  4  2  3 
Singapore  9  5  4  3  3  3  5 
Korea, Rep  9  6  5  5  5  3  5 
Brunei Darussalam  11  9  9  9  9  4  6 
Malaysia  22  17  14  12  12  7  13 
Medium HD               
Thailand  31  20  13  8  8  10  18 
China  45  44  37  25  24  15  26 
Philippines  62  49  40  33  32  21  36 
Viet Nam  53  44  30  19  17  18  30 
Indonesia  91  66  48  36  34  30  52 
Mongolia  109  83  62  45  43  36  62 
Lao PDR  163  131  101  79  75  54  93 
Cambodia  116  123  104  85  82  39  67 
Myanmar  130  117  110  105  104  43  75 
DPR Korea  55  55  55  55  55  18  32 
Timor-Leste  177  154  107  61  55  59  101 
Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistic 
Division. 
* Under five  mortality  rate of 2015 (Target  5 of MDG4) = under five mortality rate of 
1990÷3. 
**  The  expected  MDG  level  in  2006  =  under  five  mortality  rate  of  1990  -  under  five 
mortality rate of 1990×(2/3)×(16/25). 
2.3.2 Health Inequality 
Overall,  the  evidence  presented  above  suggests  that  significant  health  improvements  have 
been made in the ESA region in the past two decades. However, significant health inequalities 
exist in the region (as already alluded to above). Below we further examine these inequalities, 
first between and then within some selected ESA economies. We also explore the possible 
causes of such inequalities.   
 25 
 
(1) Between-Country Inequality 
Figure 2.3.1 re-presents the achieved levels of life expectancy and under-5 mortality in the 
ESA economies in the year 2006, plotted against their corresponding per capita income. As 
can be seen, substantial inequalities exist between the ESA economies.   
 
In the existing literature on social and economic determinants of health, a factor which has 
been widely accepted to be of major importance is income. As can be seen from the figure, 
there exists a significant negative correlation between an economy's per capita income and its 
health level (as measured by the two indicators used here). Economies with high levels of per 
capita income tend to have both a higher life expectancy and a lower under-5 mortality rate, 
compared with those with a lower per capita income, in a non-linear fashion.   
 
However, one needs to hasten to add that a country's health level cannot be taken care of 
entirely by its income. Many other factors are involved, education, life style, an efficient and 
effective  healthcare  system,  etc.  It  so  happens  that  all  these  other  factors  also  strongly 
correlate with income, so that when these factors are missing from the equation, the role of 
income is magnified. But it would equally be a mistake to think that since all these other 
factors are associated with income, so all one has to do is, indeed, to wait for income to rise. 
An effective and efficient healthcare system is for one not entirely explained by income. Wang 
and Liu (2005) review the literature on social and economic determinants of health in some 
depth and discuss the underlying issues. In Section 4 below, we shall return to these issues. 
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Source:  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
Statistic Division. 
 
(2) Health Inequality within Economies   
Given the important role of income in determining health, it stands to reason that income 
disparities within a country can give rise to health inequality. Thus according to estimates 
provided  by  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
Statistic Division, for selected ESA economies, in Vietnam (2002), the Philippines (2003), and 
Cambodia (2005), infant mortality was 39, 42 and 101 per thousand, respectively, for the 
bottom income quintile of the population, and was 14,19 and 34, respectively, for the top 
quintile. Differences in access to certain key services between the rich and poor groups may be 
an  important  reason  for  the  observed  differences.  Figure  2.3.2  presents  evidence  on  the 
difference in access to birth attended by skilled health personnel and immunization against 
measles, between the top and bottom income quintiles in the same three economies. It is clear 
that  the  differences  in  the  former  case  are  particularly  pronounced,  by  as  much  as  70 
percentage points in the case of Cambodia.   27 
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Year of Data: Cambodia (2005), Philippines (2003), Viet Nam (2002) 
Source:  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
Statistic Division. 
 
As well as sharp differences in important health outcomes between income groups, there also 
exists  a  marked  rural-urban  health  gap  in  most  developing  ESA  economies.  Figure  2.3.3 
presents this health gap for some selected ESA economies, again using the under-5 mortality 
rate as a measure. Sharp differences in rural and urban income levels may have been a major 
cause  of  this  gap.  However,  differences  in  access  to  some  critical  public  health  services, 
including safe drinking water and modern sanitation, may also have significantly contributed 
to it. Figure 2.3.4 presents differences in access to improved water sources and sanitation 






Figure 2.3.3 Rural and Urban Under-5 Mortality Rates for Selected ESA Economies 
 
Note: Data for Cambodia (2005), Philippines (2003), Viet Nam (2002) and Indonesia 
(2003) are  from WHO  Statistical  Information System (WHOSIS). Data for China 
(2008) are from China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009.   
 
Figure 2.3.4 Share of Population with Access to Improved Water Sources and Sanitation, 
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Source:  United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
Statistic Division. 29 
 
2.4 Education 
2.4.1 Enhancement of Universal Education 
We consider the attainment of universal education in ESA economies by looking at two types 
of indicator. The first is the literacy rate, including the adult literacy rate and youth literacy 
rate,
4  and the second is the enrollment rate, including primary school, secondary school and 
college enrollment rates. 
 
Over the last twenty years or so, literacy rates in the ESA region have on the whole seen 
marked  improvements.  Table  2.4.1  provides  data  which  allows  a  comparison  of  the 
performance of the ESA economies over time. In the period 1985-1994, adult literacy rates in 
the  region  had  generally  been  below  90%  (except  for  Japan,  South  Korea,  Thailand  and 
Mongolia), while in the following period (1995-2005), in most economies the rate increased to 
over  90%  (except  for  Malaysia,  Lao  PDR,  Cambodia  and  marginally  Myanmar).  The 
Philippines started with a very high rate of 93.6%, but then actually had a marginal fall of one 
percentage point between the two periods, the only country in the region to do so. The other 
two countries that saw almost no improvement between the two periods are Mongolia and 
Thailand. Youth literacy rates in the region are generally higher than adult literacy rates, as 
they  should  be.  In  this  case,  however,  the  Philippines  again  recorded  a  small  fall  of  1.5 
percentage points, followed by Mongolia, which saw its youth literacy rate declining by 1.2 
percentage points. The same rate for Thailand and Viet Nam almost stayed put. Except for 
                                                        
4  Adult literacy rate is the proportion of the adult population aged 15 years and over who are literate. Youth literacy rate is the 
proportion of the population at and between the age of 15 and 24 who are literate. 30 
 
these economies, all other economies saw their youth literacy rates improving (unless it had 
already been close to its theoretical limit, as in the case of South Korea). Note that if compared 
with the world average, the ESA economies as a whole have nevertheless performed much 
better. 
 
Table2.4.1 Adult Literacy and Youth Literacy Rates in ESA Economies (%) 
HDI Rank 






High HD       
Japan  99.0
f  99.0
g     





Singapore  89.1  92.5  99  99.9 





Brunei Darussalam  87.8  92.7  98.1  98.9 
Malaysia  82.9  88.7  95.6  97.2 
Medium HD       
Thailand  92.4
c  92.6  98.1
c  98 
China  77.8  90.9  94.3  98.9 
Philippines  93.6  92.6  96.6  95.1 
Viet Nam  87.6  90.3  93.7  93.9 
Indonesia  81.5  90.4  96.2  98.7 
Mongolia  97.8
c  97.8  98.9
c  97.7 
Lao PDR  56.5
c  68.7  70.1
c  78.5 
Cambodia  62
c  73.6  73.5
c  83.4 
Myanmar  80.7
c  89.9  88.2
c  94.5 
East Asia and Pacific  90.7    97.8 
World  76.4  82.4  83.5  86.5 
Source:  Unless  otherwise  stated,  all  data  are  from  Human  Development  Report  2007, 
p.269-272.   
Note: a. National literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 1985 and 
1994,  unless  otherwise  specified.  Due  to  differences  in  methodology  and  timeliness  of 
underlying data, comparisons across economies and over time should be made with caution. 
For more details, see http://www.uis.unesco.org/. b. National literacy estimates from censuses 
or  surveys  conducted  between  1995  and  2005,  unless  otherwise  specified.  Again  due  to 
differences in methodology and timeliness of underlying data, comparisons across economies 
and over time should be made with caution. c. 1990 Data, source: HDR 2006, p.323, 325. d. 
1990 Data, source: HDR 2004, p.176. e. 2001 Data, source: HDR 2003, p.270. f. 1992 Data, 
source: HDR 1995, p.155. g. 1995 Data, source: HDR 1998, p.128. 31 
 
 
Table 2.4.2 provides data on enrollment. As can be seen, in respect of net primary school 
enrollment rate,
5  economies with high levels of HD (Japan and Korea, Rep) did not show 
much change between 1991 and 2005. The rate consistently stayed high for these economies. 
Economies with medium levels of HD, however, did show marked progress. In particular, net 
primary school enrollment rate for Lao PDR and Cambodia rose, respectively, from 63% and 
69% in 1991 to 84% and 99% in 2005. Over the same period, the percentage of first-grade 
pupils progressing to the fifth-grade in ESA economies also saw marked rises. In most ESA 
economies, this percentage exceeded 90% in 2004 (HDR 2007/2008, P269-272). 
   
In respect of secondary school enrollment, because of a large number of missing data for 1991, 
only few comparisons can be made. For the economies for which we have data for both years 
1991 and 2005, which include Japan, Korea (Rep), Brunei and Indonesia, net secondary school 
enrollment rates show significant increase. However, great disparities existed between these 
economies at the end as at the start of the period. Fuller data for 2005 enable us to see the 
extent of this  disparity. While Japan registered a net  enrollment rate  of 100%,  Cambodia 
recorded a mere 24%, and Myanmar and Lao's were only 37% and 38%, respectively. It needs 
to be noted that in 2005, the world's average secondary school net enrollment rate was 59%. 
Although the ESA regional average was 10 percentage points higher, this should not deflect us 
from the fact that there are economies in the region falling far behind even the world's average. 
 
                                                        
5  Net Primary/Secondary School Enrollment Rate = (Number of the enrolled primary/secondary school pupils in the age 
cohort/ Number of the total population in that age cohort) * 100%.   32 
 
 
Table2.4.2 Net Enrollment Rates of Primary and Secondary Schools and 
Gross College Enrollment Rates in ESA Economies（%） 












1991  2005  1991  2005  1991  2004 
High HD           
Japan  100  100  97  100  29.6  54 
Hong Kong, China    93    80    30.4 
Singapore  96c        20.5   
Korea, Rep  100  99  86  90  38.6  88.5 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
92  93  71  87  71  87 
Malaysia  94c  95    76  8.2  32 
Medium HD           
Thailand  76  88    64    41 
China  97  99
c  53    3  19.1 
Philippines  96  94    61     
Viet Nam  90  88    69  1.9  16 
Indonesia  97  96  39  58  9.2  16.7 
Mongolia  90  84    84     
Lao PDR  63  84    38     
Cambodia  69  99    24     
Myanmar  98  90    37     
Timor-Leste    98         
East Asia and Pacific  93    69     
World  83  87    59     










Table 2.4.3 Percentage of Trained Teachers in Primary and Secondary Schools, Selected ESA 
Economies 
          Primary          Secondary 
  2001  2008  2001  2008 
Hong Kong, 
China 
89.4    95.1      
Singapore    97.1     97.0   
Malaysia  96.6     52.7    
Philippines  100.0     100.0    
Vietnam  84.9    98.6    91.4    97.7   
Indonesia  93.5     53.0    
Mongolia  92.9    99.0     98.9   
Lao PDR  76.2    96.9    95.8    87.3   
Cambodia  95.9    98.2    99.6    99.4   
Myanmar  60.4    99.0    65.1    97.1   




As to college enrollment, the gross enrollment rate is generally used.
6  As may be expected, 
this rate is more varied between economies. As can be seen from Table 2.4.2, although college 
enrollment  rates  rose  in  all  economies  for  which  a  trend  can  be  established,  overall  the 
differences between economies in the ESA region are great. In economies with high levels of 
HD, college enrolments are generally higher than in economies with low levels of HD. Thus in 
Korea (Rep), its college enrolment rate in 2004 was 88.5%, while in Viet Nam it was a mere 
16%. 
 
Having reviewed the achievements (or lack of them) in respect of the ― quantity‖ of education, 
it is important also to examine its ― quality‖. Reliable measures of the quality of education are 
difficult to obtain. Most indicators used on this are only proxies, and sometimes rather remote 
proxies,  for  educational  quality.  Table  2.4.3  presents  data  on  the  proportion  of  ― trained‖ 
teachers in primary and secondary schools in some selected ESA economies for which data 
can  be  found.  As  can  be  seen,  except  for  secondary  schools  in  Lao  PDR,  marked 
improvements have been made in all cases in the last decade (2001-2008). Again except for 
secondary schools in Lao PDR, the proportion of trained teachers has reached over 95% in all 
the economies for both primary and secondary schools. 
2.4.2 Educational Inequality   
Educational inequality is an important issue, as it implies, from a HD viewpoint, that some 
                                                        
6  Gross enrolment rate refers to the ratio of the number of enrolled students at a certain level of education (regardless of their 
age) to the theoretical maximum number of students at that level. As to college education, the population applied is those who 
are theoretically expected to enter college from an age cohort, plus those who are up to five years older.   35 
 
sections of a population are discriminated against, on grounds of ability to pay or otherwise, in 
their acquisition of a basic capability—knowledge. And both historically and contemporarily 
one of the most pernicious forms of such discrimination is that based on sex. While other 
forms of education inequality are also important, below we focus on this particular form, by 
comparing levels of and changes in female and male literacy and enrollment rates.   
 
Over the last twenty years, female adult literacy rates and female youth literacy rates have 
generally improved in the ESA region. For example, according to the findings reported in 
HDR 2006, China's female adult literacy rate in 1999 was 78.5%, but it rose to 86.5% by 2004. 
Other economies experiencing a significant improvement over the period (for which a trend 
could be established) are Myanmar, Indonesia and Malaysia. Viet Nam and Thailand actually 
recorded a substantial fall. So the regional picture of female adult literacy appears to be mixed.   
 
Table 2.4.4 provides fuller evidence on the literacy rates. As can be seen, while China showed 
a significant increase in the female adult literacy rate over the 1999-2004 periods, the ratio of 
female to male adult literacy rate actually fell over the period. Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam 
recorded a similar fall in this ratio. Only Indonesia and Malaysia showed a rise (for those 
economies for which a comparison can be made). Since male and female adult literacy rates 
have  a  lot  to  do  with  what  happened  to  male  and  female  education  many  years  ago,  an 
explanation of the observed pattern of  change  would  require one to  examine the relevant 
factors over many past decades. However, this is clearly not the place to pursue that enquiry. 
Rather, a more indicative measure of what has happened to female vis-à-vis male education 36 
 
more recently is the youth literacy rate, and in terms of this indicator most economies appear 
to  have made significant  improvement, or at  least  have not  slid  back (except  perhaps  for 
Thailand;  the  change  for  Singapore  and  Malaysia  are  too  insignificant  for  drawing  any 
conclusion). So it looks that on this score gender equality in education has made progress. 
However, a value less than 100 percent for the ratio of female to male youth literacy rates for 
some economies, as can be seen from the table, also implies that gender discrimination against 
the female in education is still a problem (indeed, even a value of 100 percent for this ratio 
need not imply an absence of this discrimination).   
 
Table2.4.4 Female Adult Literacy Rate in ESA Economies（%） 
  Adult Literacy Rate (ALR)  Youth Literacy Rate (YLR) 
  Female ALR  Female 
ALR/Male ALR 
Female YLR  Female 
YLR/Male YRL 
HDI Rank  1999  2004  1999  2004  1999  2004  1999  2004 
High HD                   
Japan                 
Hong Kong, 
China 
89.7    96.5    99.8    1.0   
Singapore  88  88.6  95.7  92  99.8  99.6  99.8  100 
Korea, Rep  96.2    99.2    99.8    99.8   
Malaysia  82.8  85.4  91.0  93  97.4  97.3  97.4  100 
Medium HD               
Thailand  93.5  90.5  97.4  95  98.3  97.8  100  100 
China  78.5  86.5  94.6  91  96  98.5  100  99 
Viet Nam  91.5  86.9  96.3  93    93.6    99 
Indonesia  81.3  86.8  91.5  92  96.8  98.5  100  100 
Lao PDR    60.9    79    74.7    90 
Cambodia    64.1    78.9    90    96 
Myanmar  80.1  86.4    92  90.2  93.4  90  98 
Data Source: HDR 2006, p.371-373. 
 
Levels of female enrollment rates and the ratios of these to male enrollment rates for primary, 37 
 
secondary  and  tertiary  education  are  provided  in  Table  2.4.5,  for  three  consecutive  time 
intervals. As can be seen, net female primary school enrollment rates in all economies (for 
which we have data) reached 85% and above in 2007. In the same year, the ratio of female to 
male enrollment rates in these economies is at or very close to 1. As one turns to secondary 
school  net  enrollment  rates,  gender  inequalities  begin  to  emerge.  Thus  in  Lao  PDR  and 
Cambodia, the ratio of net female to male secondary school enrollment rate in 2007 was a 
mere 0.87 and 0.88, implying a net female enrollment rate much lower than that for the male, 
which in turn suggests the presence of significant gender inequality in secondary education. 
As to female tertiary enrollment, again there appears to be a significant gender bias in favor of 
male enrollment in Lao PDR and Cambodia. However, even in these economies, over time 
(roughly over the past decade), there appears to have been a significant reduction in the extent 
of  gender  discrimination  in  respect  of  both  secondary  and  tertiary  enrollment.  In  other 
economies, such a gender bias has been largely absent over the period. 
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Table 2.4.5 Female Enrollment Rates, Level and as a Ratio to Male Enrollment Rates, ESA Economies 
  Net Primary Enrolment  Net Secondary Enrolment  Gross Tertiary Enrolment 
  Female Ratio (%) 
Ratio of Female to 
Male 
Female Ratio (%) 
Ratio of Female to 
Male 
Female Ratio (%) 
Ratio of Female to 
Male 
HDI Rank  1999  2003  2007  1999  2003  2007  1999  2003  2007  1999  2003  2007  1999  2003  2007  1999  2003  2007 
High Human 
Development                                     
Japan                  98.18      1.00  100.38  102.16  100.95  1.02  1.01  1.00 
Hong Kong, 
China    92.34      0.97      74.38  76.31    1.01  1.02    66.03  74.98    1.00  1.05 
Korea, Rep  97.97  96.64  97.44  1.00  0.97  0.98  96.94  89.41  94.65  0.99  0.98  0.97  99.95  90.03  94.73  0.98  0.98  0.98 




                                   
China                            38.92  58.62    0.91  1.05 
Indonesia    93.76      0.98      55.61  69.86    0.99  1.01    45.31  57.81    0.93  0.98 
Lao PDR  74.08  76.72  77.76  0.92  0.93  0.95  22.74  30.78  33.46  0.79  0.83  0.87  15.9  25.56  30.01  0.66  0.70  0.76 
Cambodia  79.29    87.78  0.91    0.96  10.77  19.86  31.82  0.54  0.64  0.88  7.28  9.13  19.07  0.53  0.51  0.70 
Myanmar              30.56  36.1  46.42  0.98  0.93  1.00  29.14  31.69  35.54  1.15  0.98  1.05 
Philippines  90.05  91.83  91.47  1.00  1.02  1.02  52.03  62.94  65.53  1.09  1.19  1.20  69.41  69.74  77.55  1.19  1.19  1.21 
Mongolia  94.18  81.02  87.02  1.02  1.00  0.99  64.38  84.13  85.01  1.26  1.15  1.09  51.09  81.29  93.16  1.52  1.28  1.16 




The term environment here is used in a broad sense to refer to both the ecological environment 
and the natural resources. Correspondingly, by ― environmental sustainability‖ is meant not 
only the sustaining of the ecological environment but also a certain natural resource base, 
often for some purpose other than the sustaining of the environment itself, for the benefit of 
future generations. Below we first provide a brief review of the extent of the environmental 
problems that have accompanied rapid economic growth in the ESA region in the foregoing 
decades. This is then followed by a quick look at the discriminatory impact these problems 
have had on different sections of the population. Policies that ESA economies have or have not 
adopted to address these problems will be considered subsequently in Section 4.   
2.5.1 Emerging Environmental Problems 
Environmental problems are often caused by economic activities of the human society. In 
recent years, along with rapid economic growth in the ESA region, problems of environmental 
pollution and ecological destruction have been rapidly rising. Below we briefly review the 
extent of the emerging environmental problems in the region from both a local and global 
perspective.   
 
(1) Local environmental problems 
In  recent  years,  rapid  economic  growth  along  with  population  growth  has  brought  about 
serious environmental problems in the ESA region, including land degradation, deforestation, 
loss of biodiversity, air and water pollution and other problems. 40 
 
 
Forest area losses. Factors including population pressure, heavy dependence on fuel wood, 
timber and other wood products, and conversion of forests to agricultural, urban and industrial 
land have resulted in widespread deforestation in the region. Figure 2.5.1 shows the change in 
forest area from 1990 to 2005. As can be seen, with the exception of China and Vietnam, most 
ESA economies experienced extensive deforestation.   
 
Figure 2.5.1 Change in Forest Areas between 1990 and 2005 
(Thousand square kilometers) 
 
Source: ADB (2009). 
 
Biodiversity losses. According to WDI (1998 and 2009), the number of animal species on the 
brink of extinction has been on the increase. Thus over the period of 1996-2007, in all the 
economies reported in Table 2.5.1, there was a significant rise in the number of endangered 
animal species. The same period also saw the number of endangered plant species rising in 
China,  Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  Singapore,  while  that  number  fell  in  other  economies. 
Deforestation, environmental pollution and climate change are the main factors that lead to 41 
 
loss of biodiversity.   
 
Table 2.5.1 Number of Endangered Animal and Plant Species 
Country 
Endangered Animal Species  Endangered Plant Species 
1996  2007  1997  2007 
China  165  351  312  446 
Indonesia  232  464  264  386 
Japan  62  190  707  12 
Korea, Rep  25  54  66  0 
Malaysia  76  225  490  686 
Philippines  135  253  360  213 
Singapore  15  44  29  54 
Thailand  79  157  385  86 
Data source: WDI (1998, 2009).   
 
Water and Air pollution. Problems of water pollution have been on the rise in the region, and 
in many cases have seriously threatened human and animal life and health. Although through 
various policy measures some economies (including China, Japan, South Korea, Philippines) 
have in recent years managed to keep the problems under control, as a result of which total 
emissions  of organic wastewater have somewhat  declined, there are still  many economies 
whose emissions of such organic wastewater have risen. They include Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand (Table 2.5.2).   42 
 
 
Table 2.5.2 Emissions of Organic Wastewater in Major ESA Economies 
Country  Emissions of organic wastewater (Kg / day) 
  1990  1993  1998  2003  2005 
China  7038131  5339072  8491856  6088663  6088700 
Indonesia  495594  537142  347083  720326  731000 
Japan  1556648  1548021  1391281  1279287  1133100 
Korea, 
Rep 
369193  358610  317903  309517  317000 
Malaysia  104728  136055  166577  170662  187600 
Philippines  228301  181714  178239    98500 
Singapore  32400  32410  28558  33644  34300 
Thailand  291552  256930  213271  291552  333800 
Source: WDI (1998, 2001, 2006, 2009). 
 
As for air pollution, according to WDI (2009), even though emissions of most air pollutants 
decreased, including the total suspended particulates and the sulfur dioxide, a result which 
may be attributed to the control of emission source, changes in fuel consumption patterns, 
closure of old factories and so on, the concentrations of air pollutants in many urban areas are 
still quite high in the region (Table 2.5.3).





                                                        
7  According to Imura (2003), which provides a comparative assessment the air quality of 4 mega-cities in the ESA region, 
Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Shanghai, even though the concentration of some air pollutants (SOx, dust, PM and CO) has to 
some extent declined in the past decades, the NOx concentration, largely discharged from automobile exhaust gases, still 
remains at a substantial level. The municipal governments in these cities have made great efforts to encourage people to use 
public transportation and reduce the use of private passenger cars, but public transportation policy measures have had only a 




Table 2.5.3 Air Pollutants Concentration in Main Cities of the ESA region 




(micrograms per cubic 
meter ) 
SO2 
(micrograms per cubic 
meter ) 
1995  2002  2006  1995  1998  2001 
China 
Beijing  377  99  90  90  90  90 
Shanghai  246  81  74  53  53  53 
Tianjin  306  139  126  82  82  82 
Indonesia  Jakarta  271  115  84       
Japan 
Osaka  43  37  33  19  19  19 
Tokyo  49  42  38  18  18  18 
Yokohama    32  29  100  100  100 
Korea, 
Rep 
Pusan  94  44  35  44  60  60 
Seoul  84  46  37  60  44  44 
Daegu  72  50  40  81  81  81 
Malaysia 
Kuala 
Lumpur  85  28  23  24  24  24 
Philippines  Manila  200  42  28  33  33  33 
Singapore  Singapore    48  41  20  20  20 
Thailand  Bangkok  223  83  76  11  11  11 
Source: WDI (1998, 2001, 2006, 2009). 
 
(2) International environmental problems: climate change 
The main cause of climate change is excessive green house gas (GHG) emission, which results 
from increased consumptions of fossil fuel. The main type of greenhouse gases is carbon 
dioxide (CO2). With the exception of North Korea, Mongolia and Cambodia, most economies 
in the region have had rising amounts of CO2 emission since 1990, among which China, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have figured particularly importantly. Across the world, per capita 
CO2 emissions of developed economies have still far exceeded those in developing economies, 44 
 
in terms of increases in the total world emissions, developing economies have nevertheless 
accounted for a disproportionately large share. Thus although China‘s per capita CO2 emission 
has  been  low,  its  contribution  to  worsening  global  warming  problems  is  nevertheless 
substantial (Table 2.5.4). Still, future increases in per capita CO2 emissions by ESA economies 
would seem inevitable as the economies grow and their living standards rise. 
 
Table 2.5.4 CO2 Emissions in ESA Economies 
Country 
CO2 Emissions 
(Total, Million Metric Tons)  (Per Capita, Metric Tons) 
1990  2005  1990  2005 
Cambodia  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.1 
China  2398.9  5547.8  2.1  3.2 
Hong Kong, 
China  26.2  38.6  4.6  2.1 
Indonesia  165.7  419.6  0.9  1.9 
Japan  1070.9  1230  8.7  9.6 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  244.6  82.6  12.4  3.5 
Korea, Rep  241.2  452.2  5.6  9.4 
Lao PDR  0.2  1.4  0.1  0.3 
Malaysia  55.3  239.8  3.1  9.3 
Mongolia  10  8.8  4.7  3.4 
Myanmar  4.3  11.3  0.1  0.2 
Philippines  43.9  75  0.7  0.9 
Singapore  45.1  56.3  14.8  13.2 
Thailand  95.7  270.9  1.8  4.3 
Viet Nam  21.4  101.8  0.3  1.2 
Source: WDI (1998, 2009). 
 
According to HDR (2007/2008), climate change can lead to human development reversals 
through the following channels: (1) reduced agricultural productivity; (2) heightened water 
insecurity; (3) increased exposure to coastal flooding and extreme weather events; (4) collapse 45 
 
of  ecosystems;  (5)  increased  health  risks.  Moreover,  these  five  drivers  for  major  human 
development reversal cannot be viewed in isolation. They will interact with each other, and 
with  pre-existing  human  development  problems,  creating  powerful  downward  spirals. 
Therefore,  climate  change  has  become  one  of  the  most  severe  environmental  problems 
confronting all of the human society. 
 
There are two major factors causing the rise of GHG emission in the region. The first is the 
increasing demand for energy. Rapid population growth, rapid economic development and 
urbanization have brought about an ever-increasing demand for energy. According to the data 
from World Bank Development Indicators (2009), the demand for energy in the ESA region 
substantially increased from 1990 to 2006. Compared with 1990, a number of economies in 
the region, including China, Korea (Rep), Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, had 
more than doubled their amount of commercial energy use by 2006. All indications are that 
the region's demand for energy will further grow. In per capita terms, in 2006 the region's per 
capita energy consumption was still far below the world‘s average level, which was 1820 
kilotons of oil equivalent in that year. As can be seen from Table 2.5.5, except for Hong Kong, 
Japan,  Korea  (Rep),  Malaysia  and  Singapore,  per  capita  consumptions  of  energy  in  other 
economies in the region were below the world‘s average level in that year. However, if one 
looks at the trend changes over the 1990-2006 period, even with the severe interruptions to 
energy use due to the East Asian Financial Crisis, with the exception of North Korea, per 




Table 2.5.5 Per Capita Commercial Energy Use in ESA Economies 
(Kiloton of Oil Equivalent) 
Country  1990  1995  1998  2003  2006 
China  775  707  830  1094  1433 
Hong Kong, 
China 
1869  2212  2497  2428  2653 
Indonesia  539  442  604  753  803 
Japan  3605  3964  4035  4053  4129 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  1670  1113    896  913 
Korea, Rep  2161  3225  3519  4291  4483 
Malaysia  1269  1655  1967  2318  2617 
Myanmar  262  50  307  276  295 
Philippines  428  307  526  525  498 
Singapore  4384  7162  2656  5359  6968 
Thailand  803  878  488  1406  1630 
Viet Nam  367  104  364  544  621 
Data source：WDI (1998, 2001, 2006, 2009). 
 
The second factor is the structure of the energy demand. The region has mainly depended on 
fossil fuels, especially the use of coal and oil, which has caused severe strains to the local and, 
indeed, global environment. In 2005, coal accounted for 66.3% of the total energy use in the 










Table 2.5.6 Structure of Energy Consumption in Major ESA Economies 
Country 














1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005 
China  61.2    63.3    12.8    18.5    1.5    2.3    1.3    2.0    23.2    13.0   
Indonesia  3.8    14.2    33.2    36.6    17.9    17.1    1.5    3.7    43.6    28.5   
Japan  17.4    21.1    57.4    47.4    9.9    13.3    2.3    2.0    1.1    1.2   
Korea, 
Rep 
27.4    23.1    53.6    45.0    2.9    12.8    0.6    0.2    0.8    1.0   
Malaysia  4.4    9.6    55.8    43.3    29.2    41.8    1.5    0.8    9.1    4.5   
Singapore  0.2       99.8    80.3    0.0    19.7    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0   
Thailand  8.7    11.2    45.2    45.5    11.6    25.9    1.0    0.5    33.4    16.5   
Data source: (UNDP, 2008). 
 
The worsening situation of CO2 and other GHG emissions is deeply worrying, as it threatens 
to cause widespread human development reversals (HDR, 2007/2008). One hopes that a set of 
common but differentiated commitments to reduce such emissions can soon be accepted by all 
nations, although the recently convened Copenhagen Climate Change Conference does not 
appear to offer much optimism. But before we move on to look at ways and means to tackle 
these global and local environmental challenges, it is also important to recognize that the 
impact of such problems by no means falls uniformly on everyone, but in fact discriminatorily 
on those who are already vulnerable in other important respects. This both underlines the 
urgency to tackle the problems at hand, and forewarns the difficulties of doing so. 48 
 
2.5.2 Discriminatory Impact of Environmental Pollution 
Most environmental problems are a public bad, that is, the reach of their impact can be far and 
wide, if not globally then at least locally. But the capability of the people to combat these 
problems can differ widely. Thus a richer person may have the means to move away from the 
affected area of an environmental accident, but a poor person is unable to. Incomes are but one 
factor  causing  such  differences  in  capability,  status,  gender,  position,  occupation  can  be 
important factors too. It is not possible to review how each of these factors causes or does not 
cause important differences in people‘s capability to combat environmental problems. In what 
follows we shall only consider a selected few of these.   
 
(1) Environmental Pollution and the Poor 
Environmental  damage  almost  always  hits  those  living  in  poverty  the  hardest.  The 
overwhelming majority of those who die each year from air and water pollution are the poor in 
developing countries. So are those most affected by desertification, floods, storms, and harvest 
failures caused by global warming. Across the world, the poor generally live nearest to dirty 
factories, busy roads and waste dumps (UNDP, 1998, p.66). Poverty reduces the ability of 
individuals to respond and adapt to environmental change (NEAA, 2007). 
 
The impacts brought about by environmental pollutions in the ESA region are particularly 
severe on the poor. According to one study (Wagstaff, 2001), in Cebu City, the Philippines, a 
significant poor-nonpoor inequality existed in child mortality from communicable diseases. 
Over the period 1981-1991, the poorest 20% of children accounted for 31% of the deaths from 49 
 
four  main  communicable  diseases,  while  the  richest  20%  accounted  for  only  10%. 
Environmental  pollutions  were  an  important  cause  of  such  deaths.  Diarrhea,  a  water-born 
disease, was the second largest cause of child death, accounting for nearly 12% of total child 
deaths over the period. Malnutrition, and lack of access to proper medical care, were important 
contributing factors, both a consequence of poverty. 
 
The reason why environmental pollutions impact the poor the hardest is easy to see. In the 
process  of  industrialization,  the  number  of  factories  increases,  multiplying  the  potential 
sources of air, water and soil pollution; the roads also become busy. At the same time, the poor 
tend to live, disproportionately, in such industrial areas or by the road side, thus falling victims 
to such industrial emissions and car exhaust.   
 
But  not  only  do  the  poor  living  in  urban  areas  tend  to  suffer  more  from  environmental 
pollutions, those who live in rural areas also do. Thus in the case of indoor air pollution, 
because they are poor, they tend to live at the bottom rung of the energy ladder,  burning 
traditional  fuels  such  as  animal  wastes,  wood  and  crop  residues  for  cooking  and  heating. 
Burning such fuels spreads the smoke with suspension of many toxic substances all over the 
room. According to an early study, this killed 2.2 million people every year, most of whom 
lived in rural areas (Streeten, 1994). 
 
(2) Environmental Pollution and Women and Children   
Other things being equal, the impact of an environmental pollution tends to be greater on 50 
 
women, children, and the elderly. When this is combined with poverty, its effect can only be 
far worse. And yet the majority of ESA economies are still developing economies, with large 
sections of poor population. When a pollution occurs, the women, children and the elderly 
from  these  social  groups  are  likely  to  be  the  worst  affected  (Dankelman  et  al.,  1988; 
Hombergh, 1993; UNDP, 1998). 
 
Generally, deterioration of the environment is likely to bring a disproportionate burden on 
women.  Their  social  and  economic  roles  force  them  to  face  more  environmental  hazards 
(UNDP, 1998). Thus, because of the gender division of labor, women tend to be more engaged 
in  household  chores,  collecting firewood and water, and other tasks. However, as  women 
prepare food for the family, they are exposed to high concentrations of smoke and dust over a 
long duration. Colleting water increases their health risks caused by exposure to contaminated 
water (Hombergh, 1993). In addition, physiological factors make women more susceptible to 
environmental impacts.  Women during pregnancy  and just after childbirth  are particularly 
vulnerable  to  hazards,  when  they  are  more  easily  infected  with  diseases  such  as  malaria 
(UNDP, 1998). 
 
Children are another social group vulnerable to various hazards. According to Gordon et al. 
(2004), over ten million children under five years of age die every year, 98 per cent of them in 
developing countries. Widespread malnutrition hampers children‘s growth and makes them 
vulnerable to other risks: perinatal diseases, pneumonia, diarrhoea, and malaria. Among the 
risks that children face are fluoride and arsenic in drinking water, and the ingestion of lead. 51 
 
Lead is still found as an additive to gasoline, an ingredient of paint and pottery glaze, and in 
old water pipes. Children are at the greatest risk because lead is more readily absorbed by their 
growing bodies while their tissues are more sensitive to damage. The threshold above which 
irreparable damage occurs is still exceeded around the world, particularly for children in cities 
in the developing world.   
2.6 Governance 
― Governance for human development‖, according to HDR 2002 (p.51), ― is partly about having 
efficient  institutions  and  rules  that  promote  development  by  making  markets  work  and 
ensuring that public services live up to their name, which includes transparency, participation, 
responsiveness, accountability and the rule of law. But it is also about protecting human rights, 
promoting  wider  participation  in  the  institutions  and  rules  that  affect  people's  lives  and 
achieving  more  equitable  economic  and  social  outcomes.  Thus  governance  for  human 
development  is  concerned  not  just  with  efficient,  equitable  outcomes  but  also  with  fair 
processes.  Governance  for  human  development  must  be  democratic  in  substance  and  in 
form—by the people and for the people.‖ It may be added that since from the perspective of 
human development, the end of development is to expand people's capabilities to lead the lives 
they value, autonomy, agency and having control of one‘s own life are at the core of the ideal 
of  human  development.  That  being  so,  civic  and  political  participation  in  major  public 
decisions is crucial for this to happen, and empowerment of people to be able to do so is, 
therefore, fundamental to the process of human development.   
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At the start of the 1990s, an influential World Bank Report (1993, p.159) presented evidence 
that the leaders of the  High Performing Asian Economies  (HPAEs) ― have been unusually 
successful  in  achieving  shared  growth,  Growth-rate  and  income-distribution  performance 
measures  show  that  the  HPAEs  significantly  outperformed  other  low-and  middle-income 
economies.‖ They did this partly because they have institutions and mechanisms to share the 
benefits of growth. ― To win the support of non-elites, the leaders of the HPAEs introduced 
mechanisms that drastically increased opportunities to share the benefits of growth. These 
mechanisms varied from economy to economy but included education (in all the HPAEs); land 
reform (in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, China); support for small and medium-size industries 
(Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,  and Taiwan, China);  and  government  provision  of such basic 
amenities as housing and public health services (Hong Kong and Singapore). Nearly all HPAE 
governments  walked  a  delicate  line  regarding  labor  by  limiting  the  power  of  unions  and 
intervening  to  check  labor  radicalism,  while  at  the  same  time  encouraging  a  cooperative 
climate in which labor was rewarded for increases in productivity‖ (World Bank, 1993, p.160). 
These systems and measures by the ESA economies in question before the 1990s can be seen, 
in  a  broad  sense,  as  governance  improvements,  but  they  were  mainly  related  to  the 
management of the economy and other supporting policies, and not so much in terms of civic 
and political participation, empowerment and agency. 
 
Major strides have been made in the region since then, in the direction of good governance. 
While the last two decades have been a turbulent time for many economies, major progresses 
were  achieved  in  the  process  of  political  democratization.  And  even  in  economies  where 53 
 
political democratization has not formally happened, important steps have also been taken in 
the direction of greater participation by civil society in policy making, better transparency of 
policy making rules and processes, better accountability of policy makers for their decisions, 
and a due emphasis on fairness and efficiency. Below, we first provide a broad review of the 
democratization process in the region, followed by an assessment of the achievements (or lack 
of them) in other major dimensions of governance.   
2.6.1 Process of Democratization in ESA 
The process of democratization in ESA may be divided, in general, into four phases. In the 
first phase, one witnesses a gradual collapse of the former authoritarian rule in an economy 
because of a legitimacy crisis. The second is a political transition phase in the narrow sense, or 
the phase that sees the initial establishment of a democratic system. At this stage,  general 
forces for change subvert the authoritarian regime. This is followed by the third phase of 
democratic restructuring and consolidation. Consolidation of a democratic system involves a 
broad acceptance of the democratic ideals, and smooth operations of democratic institutions 
and mechanisms. The final phase is that of democratic maturity. After some periods of unrest 
and instability associated with democratic consolidation, many economies would then accept 
democracy as the proper regulatory mechanisms for various social groups and strata to resolve 
their differences of interests and of views.   
 
Quite a few ESA economies underwent a critical transition from their former authoritarian 
systems to democratic ones in the 1980s and 1990s. Due to their different economic, political, 54 
 
cultural, and historical conditions, these processes have demonstrated enormous differences. 
At the same time, there are also important common characteristics. Three types of transition 
can be identified: the bottom-up type involving a sudden collapse of the former authoritarian 
rule; the compromise type involving concessions and collaborations between the top and the 
bottom of the political pyramid; and the top-down type involving reforms by existing regimes 
in  the  direction  of  greater  participation  by  the  population  in  the  economic  and  political 
decisions of the economy. Note that this classification provides only broad characterizations 
with serious simplifications. In reality, most transition processes are of a mixed form, with 
important features from each of the above type, but a particular set of features would stand out 
which places a particular transition process in one type or another.   
 
Of the first transition type are economies of the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, where 
some major economic, political and social crises took place, causing large scale street protests 
and  mass  resistance.  Under  immense  pressures  from  the  democratization  movement,  the 
former  authoritarian  government  fell.  The  opposition  came  to  power  through  democratic 
elections, and then began to fundamentally change the country's political system and embark 
on the transition to democracy. The political transformations in the Philippines and Indonesia 
had this characteristic. The situation in Thailand was somewhat more complicated, with more 
mixed features, but it also involved large-scale mass pro-democracy movements, which forced 
the military to give up power, to be replaced by democratically elected governments. 
 
Belonging to the second, compromise type are economies of South Korea and Taiwan. Along 55 
 
with the rise of the more mature market economies, the socio-economic structure there had 
undergone significant changes in the early decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Civil society had 
grown, and democratic movements had waxed and waned. The opposition and its political 
elite  had  gradually  matured.  The  legitimacy  of  the  authoritarian  rule  was  significantly 
challenged subsequently. In order to re-consolidate its legitimacy, those in power were forced 
to negotiate with the opposition to reach compromises with them, paving the way for their 
entry into political power. Competitive elections and political liberalization then followed, 
opening the road to democratization. South Korea and Taiwan (China) basically demonstrated 
this feature in their transition process. 
 
The third-type economies include Singapore and Malaysia. Their transition paths can generally 
be described as follows: When faced with the pressure for democratization from home and 
abroad, the authoritarian regime either took the initiative and carried out democratic reforms 
itself, or was forced to open to democratization, but the government then set the rules and took 
firm  control  of  process.  Such  transitions  from  the  authoritarian  rule  proceeded  within  the 
framework of ― state corporatism‖, with the ruling party acting as the core, and are relatively 
stable  but  progress  can  be  slow.  Singapore  and  Malaysia's  transitions  from  the  former 
authoritarian rule show major features of this type.   
 
Democratic political transitions in the narrow sense in the ESA region started in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and have been under way for more than 20 years. Most economies in the region 
have now basically completed this transition, and have entered into the phase of consolidation. 56 
 
Even  in  those  economies  which  have  not  yet  completed  this  transition  phase,  democratic 
elements  within  the  political  system  have  also  greatly  developed.  However,  because  of 
differences  in  economic,  political,  cultural,  and  historical  conditions,  the  phase  of 
consolidation  has  displayed  even  greater  differences  between  economies  than  the  earlier 
transition phase.   
 
Among  the  ESA  economies,  Korea's  democracy  consolidation  process  has  been  relatively 
stable. A multi-party democratic system has been established rather smoothly. The effective 
functioning  of  the  democratic  system  has  not  met  much  resistance;  democratic  ideas  and 
principles continue to penetrate people's social life. On the other hand, in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand, although progress has been made in democratic consolidation, the 
process has experienced turbulent ups and downs, causing and aggravating deep social crises. 
The new democratic system is therefore facing major challenges.   
 
In  Taiwan  (China),  the  democratic  consolidation  process  has  been  characterized  by  a 
combination of progress and deterioration. On the one hand, the election into power of the 
Democratic Progressive Party in 2000 marked the establishment of a multi-party democracy in 
Taiwan,  and  the  start  of  the  democratic  consolidation  period.  Although  this  process  did 
encounter  some  setbacks,  overall  it  followed  the  basic  democratic  rules,  procedures,  and 
results, and regime changes have essentially been stable. Civic and political rights have also 
been, by and large, guaranteed and protected. The top leader is elected by universal suffrage 
through a competitive election, and electoral disputes are resolved in a rational manner. On the 57 
 
other hand, Taiwan's democracy has basically been confined to the formal forms of democracy, 
including elections, checks and balances, and so on. The true ― quality‖ of its democracy has 
not been much improved. Indeed, in recent years, there has even been a serious deterioration, 
as  reflected by  its  frequent  "constitutional  reforms",  social  strife,  ethnic tensions, rampant 
populism, etc., undermining the long-run foundation of a successful democracy.   
 
Singapore and Malaysia both initiated the government led political transition processes in the 
1990s, with a view to achieving a smooth transition to democracy within the current system. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  political  processes  of  the  two  economies  have  not  yet  entered  the 
democracy consolidation phase. Nevertheless, important progresses towards democracy have 
been made. For example, in Singapore, the government took the initiative for political reform, 
established the Government Parliamentary Committee for non-cabinet members' participation 
in decision making, and reformed the political power structure towards the separation of three 
powers among the ruling party leader, the prime minister, and the head of state. Oppositions 
have become increasingly active, and individuals and various social groups' enthusiasm for 
political participation have increased, and so has their spirit of autonomy.   
 
Generally speaking, consolidation of democracy in the ESA region still faces many challenges, 
and full democratization is still a long way off. Below, we consider advances in other aspects 
of governance other than full and complete democratization. 58 
 
2.6.2 Progress in Governance 
A wide range of indicators have been used to measure a country's state of democratic and 
political rights, and the level of freedom. However, unlike the measurement of income, health 
or education, measurement of governance has few standard, widely recognized measurable 
indicators. Most researchers adopt two kinds of measure, objective ones such as voter turnouts, 
the existence of competitive elections, women's seats in Parliament, and so on, or subjective 
ones such as through consulting experts on the degree of democracy in an economy, level of 
freedom, and so on. Objective indicators, while desirable, often could not reflect all important 
aspects of governance. For example, there may be elections in an economy, but the ruling 
party has never been changed. Or there may be both elections and a change of the ruling party, 
but press freedom and freedom of religion are somehow seriously restricted. Good governance 
demands broad and substantive participation of the public in state decision making, which can 
be difficult for objective indicators to capture. Subjective indicators can more widely measure 
various  aspects  of  governance.  However,  being  subjective,  they  can  be  subject  to  wide 
disagreement.   
 
In respect of objective indicators, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has undertaken long-term 
data collection and collation. We present some measures of governance in the ESA region 






Table 2.6.1 Some Objective Measures Of Governance in the ESA Region 
   
Latest Election For Lower 







Women    Year    Voter Turnout 
Cambodia  2008  75.21%  1955  16.26% 
China  2008  ..  1949  21.33% 
Indonesia  2009  70.99%  1945  18.21% 
Japan  2007  58.63%  1945  21.49% 
Korea, Rep          1948     
Lao PDR  2006  99.76%      25.22% 
Malaysia  2008  74.72%  1957  10.81% 
Mongolia  2008  74.31%  1924  3.95% 
Myanmar  ..  ..  1935   
Philippines  2007  70%  1937  20.42% 
Singapore  2006  94.01%  1947  24.47% 
Thailand  2007  74.45%  1932  11.67% 
Timor-Leste  2007  80.54%      27.69% 
Viet Nam  2007  99.64%  1946  25.76% 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm. 
 
As can be seen, voter turnouts in most recent elections in the ESA region have been quite high; 
the turnout in Japan is in fact the lowest. As a measure of the level of good governance in an 
economy, this produces a rather odd result, as Japan is widely seen to have a most clean and 
efficient government in the region. This shows that objective indicators may not produce an 
accurate measure of the aspects of governance that they are supposed to capture. In almost all 
ESA economies, women had won their right to vote by the 1950s. However, the proportion of 
seats in parliament they hold is mostly around just 20%, and in all cases below 30%, which 
suggests that women and men do not yet enjoy the same political rights. On the other hand, 
note that the average ratio of seats in parliament held by women worldwide in 2009 is 18.7%. 
Judged against this average, it appears that most ESA economies have in fact performed quite 60 
 
well.  Only  Mongolia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Cambodia  and  Indonesia  have  seen  their  ratio 
significantly below the world average.
8   
 
There is also a wide range of subjective data designed to measure the status of governance in 
an economy.  Better and well-known databases include the Polity  IV (Center for Systemic 
Peace), Freedom House, World Bank Governance, and Transparency International Databases. 
The Polity IV project codes the authority characteristics of the states in the world for purposes 
of comparative, quantitative analysis. Each economy's polity score is based on a linear scale 
from autocracy to democracy. This indicator measures the institutional factors necessary for 
democracy—whether laws and institutions allow democratic participation—but not the actual 
extent of political  participation. Freedom  House, on the other hand,  surveys  the extent of 
political rights and civil liberties around the world. A World Bank team further constructs six 
aggregate  indices  based  on  numerous  indicators  from  more  than  a  dozen  sources.  The 
indicators  are  combined  in  different  groupings  to  create  aggregate  indices  for  democracy 
(titled ― voice and accountability‖), political instability and violence, rule of law, control of 
corruption,  government  effectiveness,  and  regulatory  quality.  These  databases  can  be 
downloaded from the Internet. 
 
Since each database provides a wealth of information, we select and present below some of the 
more  important  information  for  examination.  Table  2.6.2  provides  findings  on  a  range  of 
subjective indicators. In the past two decades, except for Indonesia and Taiwan which have 
                                                        
8  Needless to say, the value of the proportion of women's seats in parliament as a useful indicator of women's empowerment 
crucially depends on the genuine power that parliaments have over government policy making, which concerns more 
generally the nature of the democratic system in an economy.   61 
 
made great strides in moving towards a democratic governance system, the Polity Scores (-10 
to 10) for most economies have remained the same or have only slightly improved. In 2008, 
North Korea scored -9, Burma -8, and China, Lao PDR and Vietnam all scored -7. Using these 
ratings,  one  may  conclude  that  the  problem  of  centralized  authoritarianism  in  some  ESA 
economies remains serious.  In the press freedom ratings (100 to 0), only  four economies, 
namely, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong, have a relatively free press. Furthermore, 
press freedom in 9 economies has even worsened in the last 10 years. In respect of voice and 
accountability, the state of democracy in about half of the ESA economies (for which a trend 
analysis  can  be  made)  has  improved,  while  in  the  other  half  it  has  actually  worsened. 
Significant improvements were made in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea (Rep) and Japan, while a 
significant  worsening  took  place  in  Thailand,  the  Philippines,  Mongolia,  Malaysia  and 
Singapore. 
 
In  respect  of  rule  of  law  and  government  effectiveness,  the  majority  of  developing  ESA 
economies is assigned a negative score, indicating that they have generally had problems with 
the  rule  of  law  and  endemic  corruption.  Since  the  start  of  the  rule-of-law  score  in  1996, 
Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand have all had a significant step back, deteriorating by 
more than 0.5 on the rule of law score, followed closely by Indonesia and Malaysia. On the 
other hand, significant improvements have been recorded in Hong Kong and Lao PDR. In 
respect of corruption, the ratings indicate widespread improvements in the region (for those 




Table 2.6.2 Subjective Indicators of Governance in the ESA Region 
   
Democracy  Rule of Law and 
































1990  2008  2000  2009  1996  2008  1996  2008  1996  2009  2001  2009  1996  2008 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
    74  75  -1.10  -1.00  1.11  1.22  0.62  0.51  ..  5.50  0.37  0.51 
Cambodia  1  2  61  61  -1.00  -0.94  -1.37  -0.27  -1.19  -1.08  ..  2.00  -1.17  -1.14 
China  -7  -7  80  85  -1.70  -1.70  -0.25  -0.32  -0.22  -0.33  3.50  3.60  -0.08  -0.44 
Hong 
Kong,China 
      33  0.21  0.49  0.37  1.09  1.20  1.56  7.90  8.20  1.48  1.88 
Indonesia  -7  8  47  54  -1.20  -0.14  -0.85  -1.00  -0.31  -0.66  1.90  2.80  -0.51  -0.64 
Japan  10  10  23  21  0.87  0.95  1.01  0.94  1.48  1.40  7.10  7.70  1.14  1.25 
Korea,DPR  -9  -9    98  -2.00  -2.21  -1.69  0.35  -1.25  -1.06    ..  -0.34  -1.74 
Korea,Rep.of  6  8  27  30  0.50  0.59  0.26  0.41  0.78  0.79  4.20  5.50  0.43  0.45 
Lao PDR  -7  -7  69  86  -1.10  -1.71  1.02  -0.01  -1.85  -0.90  ..  2.00  -1.18  -1.23 
Macao            0.13  ..  0.46  ..  0.45  ..  5.30  ..  -0.03 
Malaysia  4  6  70  65  -0.30  -0.58  0.67  0.13  0.80  0.49  5.00  4.50  0.54  0.14 
Mongolia  2  10  28  41  0.46  0.24  0.58  0.35  0.06  -0.54  ..  2.70  0.37  -0.62 
Myanmar  -7  -8  100    -2.10  -2.24  -1.30  -1.56  -1.29  -1.48  ..  1.40  -1.23  -1.69 
Philipines  8  8  30  45  0.17  -0.20  -0.42  -1.41  0.05  -0.49  ..  2.40  -0.31  -0.75 
Singapore  -2  -2  68  68  -0.20  -0.41  1.16  1.33  1.71  1.73  9.20  9.20  2.23  2.34 
Taiwan 
(China) 
-1  10    23  0.59  0.70  1.08  0.72  0.90  0.77  5.90  5.60  0.71  0.55 
Thailand  3  4  29  57  0.29  -0.56  0.10  -1.19  0.63  -0.03  3.20  3.40  -0.34  -0.38 
Timor-Leste        37    0.15  ..  -1.13  ..  -1.15  ..  2.20  ..  -0.89 
Viet Nam  -7  -7  80  83  -1.50  -1.62  0.34  0.32  -0.59  -0.43  2.60  2.70  -0.55  -0.76 
Notes:  a.  Developed  by  the  Polity  IV  Project,  this  measure  reflects  the  presence  of 
institutional  factors  necessary  for  democracy—whether  laws  and  institutions  allow 
democratic participation—but not the extent of political participation. Scores range from –10 
(authoritarian) to 10 (democratic). b. Freedom House designates  economies with a score 
between 0 and 30 as having a free press, those with a score between 31 and 60 as having a 
press that is partly free and those with a score between 61 and 100 as having a press that is 
not free. c. This indicator, developed in World Bank researches, is based on a statistical 
compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance. The data are from a survey covering 
a large number of respondents, including non-governmental organizations, commercial risk 
rating agencies and think tanks in industrial and developing economies. The index ranges 
from –2.50 to 2.50 (higher is better). d. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions 
Index. Scores range from 0 to 10 (higher is better); see www.transparency.org. 63 
 
2.7 Summary 
Overall,  our  review  indicates  that  in  the  three  traditional  dimensions  of  HD,  the  ESA 
economies have made significant progress in the last two decades. Already performing overall 
a lot better that the world average at the start of the period (World Bank, 1993), most of these 
economies have managed to achieve further rapid progress in the ensuring two decades. These 
economies had taken a severe beating from the East Asian financial crisis in the final years of 
the last century. However, they quickly recovered from that crisis, a testimony to the strengths 
and  resilience  of  these  economies.  For  some  of  them,  however,  their  subsequent  rates  of 
economic growth did appear to suffer, thus the financial crisis does appear to have left a 
permanent  mark.  In  terms  of  health,  except  for  North  Korea,  all  ESA  economies  have 
increased their life expectancy over the last two decades, and some of them by a huge leap. 
Their under-five mortality rates also significantly improved (even though the improvement 
was rather disappointing in the case of some economies). Significant progress was made in 
education,  both  in  terms  of  literacy  rates  and  enrollment  rates.  However,  here  again  the 
progress  was  rather  uneven.  Income  inequality  appears  to  have  fallen  for  most  of  the 
economies  although it actually  worsened in  others. Even with  improvements,  the level  of 
income inequality in some of the economies is still dangerously high, which may in the long 
run undermine the legitimacy of the government and the stability of the society. And although 
progress has also been made in reducing health and educational inequalities, the level of these 
inequalities  appears to  remain high.  In short, while the ESA  economies  have made much 
progress in the three traditional dimensions of HD, major challenges still lie ahead. And it will 
be interesting to see how these economies fare in these respects in the coming years as they 64 
 
battle against the consequences of the current global financial crisis. 
 
Additionally,  we  also  reviewed  the  environment  and  governance  situations  in  the  region. 
While experiencing improvements in some respects (e.g. in terms of air quality in the region‘s 
major cities) in the last two decades, on the whole the region‘s environmental problems have 
taken a further turn for the worse, for example, in terms of water pollution, biodiversity losses, 
resource  depletion,  and  GHG  emissions.  Urgent  measures  are  called  for,  both  as  an 
economy-wide or as part of an international effort, to deal with these worsening situations.   
 
The last two decades have also seen major advances on the governance front in the region. 
Thus significant moves were achieved towards full democratization in some ESA economies. 
And while formal democracy has not yet been established in all the economies in the region, a 
wide  range  of  indicators  suggest  that  improvements  in  governance  were  nevertheless 
significant and widespread in other respects (e.g. corruption), even though here again major 
differences remain between the economies. On the whole, Japan, Korea (Rep), Taiwan and 
Hong Kong are the region‘s higher performers in almost all aspects of governance, while 
North Korea, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam are comparatively the poor ones. Singapore has 
had one of the world's cleanest governments, while Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and North 
Korea have notorious corruptions. However, in spite of these differences, on the whole most 
economies in the region appear to have made important progress towards good governance, 
even though at times this progress may seem to be haphazard.   65 
 
3. Structural Factors 
Section 2 reviewed the patterns and trends of the progress of HD in the ESA economies. In 
this and next sections, we analyze the causes and consequences of these. In this section, we 
consider the structural factors that we believe have partly been responsible for these observed 
patterns and trends. By structural factors we mean those forces that work in the long run, that 
are not entirely within human control, and that appear to have an internal logic and historical 
inevitability to them. To think of structural factors in this way does not mean that we as human 
beings are completely governed by them, over which we have absolutely no influence, but that 
our influence over them is limited. We would do better to work along with them, rather than to 
resist them.
9  Indeed, the kind of structural factors that we have in mind happen, in this case, to 
offer enormous potentials for expanding human capabilities. But for these potentials to be 
realized, public policies are also crucial. These structural factors include the forces that push 
for an economy‘s industrialization and closer international economic integration through trade, 
FDI and indeed partaking in regional or even global production networks; forces that push for 
urbanization; and the implications of these for income inequality, environmental quality and 
sustainability.   
3.1 Trade, FDI and International Economic Integration 
Clearly, for any economy of a reasonable size to achieve economic growth and, indeed, human 
development, industrialization is a necessary stage it has to  go through. Those economies 
                                                        
9  Admittedly, this definition of 'structural factors' is rather broad. Path-dependency involving past human actions constraining 
present and future courses of action may be considered also as a case of structural factor. Of course, in the very long run, if 
history could be repeated, it may be argued that such constraints on human action would not have existed. But history is a fact 
of life and should better be taken that way, that is, as constraints limiting our choice, rather than as a choice to be made. 
Viewed in this way, 'structural factors' are really about constraints, and 'public policy' is about choice.   66 
 
where  services  have  now  become  a  dominant  sector  are  mostly  those  where  successful 
industrialization has already taken place, and they have now entered the post-industrialization 
age.
10  Without external trade, in principle industrialization should still be possible through 
local  technological  innovation.  However,  its  pace  will  surely  be  limited.  This  is  because 
industrialization  necessarily  implies  specialization  and  division  of  labor,  and  the  need  for 
increased  demands  for the manufactured  goods  that  are  produced.  External  trade  helps  to 
expand that demand. When an economy imports manufactured goods or inputs from another 
industrializing/industrialized economy, or receives FDI from it, it may also be able to obtain or 
learn about new skills and technologies, especially if the firms involved are actually part of a 
regional or international production network.   
 
Table 3.1 reveals the extent to which the ESA economies depend on trade. The combined 
value of imports and exports of an economy in current prices as a percentage of its GDP shows 
a consistent rise for nearly all ESA economies in the 1990s, and it continued to rise in the first 
decade of this century for the majority of these economies. Furthermore, intraregional trade 
(trade within the ESA region) accounts for by far the greatest portion of total trade for most 
ESA  economies,  as  shown  in  Table  3.2,  which  gives  the  share  of  exports  of  each  ESA 
economy listed, as accounted for by the five major trading partners in the region: Japan, China, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Note that the total share of exports of an economy to 
these five listed major regional trading partners by no means covers total intraregional trade 
                                                        
10  It may be pointed out that services can vary enormously in job and income opportunities they offer, ranging from the very 
high-end financial services where millions and sometimes billions may be won and lost, to street selling by a migrant worker 
who just manages to scrape for a living. Most existing statistics, however, do not allow us to do a fine breakdown such as this. 
Thus the Philippines may have a very large services sector (accounting for over 53% of GDP in 2008), but its services are 
unlikely to be anything comparable to those thriving in Japan or even South Korea. See Section 3.2 below for more detail.   67 
 
within the ESA region.   
 
Table 3.1 Combined Value of Exports and Imports as % of GDP at Current Prices 
Country  1990  1995  2000  2005  2008 
Japan  19.89  16.92  20.52  27.28  34.72 
China  34.6  38.81  44.24  63.51     
Korea, Rep  56.98  58.75  74.27  75.83  106.96 
Hong Kong  121  130.3  184.6  214.1     
Taipei, China    86.54  92.8  105.32  124.24  143.57 
Singapore  358.3  377.7  423.6  444.32  449.61 
Indonesia  49.01  53.96  71.44  63.99  58.39 
Malaysia  146.9  192.1  220.4  212.1  184.1 
Philippines  60.8  80.54  108.9  99.3  75.56 
Thailand  75.8  90.4  124.9  148.3  150.1 
Vietnam  81.3  74.7  112.5  142.9  173 
Brunei  99.1  115.5  103.2  97.5     
Cambodia  121  130.3  184.6  214.1     
Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2009. www.adb.org/statistics 
 
While these numbers are revealing, they by no means indicate the full extent of integration of 
the ESA economies with the international market in general, and within the ESA region in 
particular. A key driver behind these rising trade and FDI volumes is, in fact, the formation and 
expansion  of  an  ESA  regional  production  network,  in  a  manner  which  many  Japanese 
economists have called the ― flying geese pattern‖ (Kojima, 2000; Fujita et al., 2004). Thanks 
to  the  bringing  down  of  trade  barriers  through  various  bilateral  and  multilateral  trade 
agreements,  improved  transportation  and  communication  networks  and  reduced  costs  of 
transport, moving goods across the border and within the ESA region has never been cheaper. 
The flying geese pattern speaks of a form of vertical division of labor among ESA economies. 
Being  technologically  more  advanced,  Japan  very  much  takes  the  role  of  the  lead  goose, 68 
 
followed by a succession of ― following geese‖ at heterogeneous technological levels, each 
specializing itself in a particular stage of production appropriate to its level of technology and 
competence, out  of an  entire chain  of production stages  that makes  for  the final  product. 
Through  such  division  of  labor,  Japan  itself  can  become  more  specialized  in  certain 
technologically advanced industries or parts of production, while successively shed those in 
which  it  no  longer  holds  a  comparative  advantage.  These  industries  are  then  relocated  to 
nearby less-developed economies. Over time, the ― following geese‖ upgrade their industrial 
structures and, following the ― lead goose's‖ trajectory, shed their ― outdated‖ industries to still 
other less-developed neighboring economies. Provided that these less-developed economies 
have appropriate conditions, this pattern of division of labor relying on international trade will 
provide  them  with  opportunities  to  industrialize  much  more  quickly  than  otherwise,  and 
enables a sequential takeoff of these economies (World Bank, 2009a). 
 
Another important aspect to this vertical international division of labor is a phenomenon called 
in  the  literature  the  ― fragmentation‖  of  a  production  process.  Reductions  in  costs  of 
communication and transportation have enabled firms to cut an otherwise integral production 
process into pieces of tasks, and to allocate each of these tasks to the most suitable location of 
production given factor price differences. This Phenomenon has been especially widespread in 
the ICT industry, where traditional scale economies are not too great. 
 
All this implies that much of the trade across the border could be in intermediate goods, rather 
than final products. Indeed, this is so. Close to 60% of intraregional trade in the ESA region is 69 
 
in  intermediate  goods.  It  has  also  to  be  noted  that  another  ― engine‖  driving  the  above 
mentioned pattern of ― sequential‖ industrialization is the flow of FDI. Not all ― local‖ firms 
taking  part  in  the  regional  production  network  are  set  up  by  local  capital  with  local 
entrepreneurs. Many are in fact funded by foreign capital, and may well be subsidiaries of 
some foreign parent company. These foreign-funded firms further play an important role of 
transmitting crucial knowledge and skills, new management concepts and styles, labor and 
environmental standards, and indeed a whole new enterprise culture to their respective host 
economies and communities, bringing these economies and communities still closer to the 
― outside world‖ and international community. In the process, the international community also 
enriches itself with improved access to and communication with these communities.
11 
                                                        
11  See, for example, Liu et al. (2001) and Xu et al. (2004) for studies of local technological spillovers and linkages due to 
foreign-funded firms in Guangdong, China, and Liu et al., (2003, 2004, 2006) on how these same firms influenced local labor 
standards and facilitated local labor market reforms. 70 
 
 
Table 3.2 Intraregional Trade to Five Major Regional Trading Partners (Export Share) 
    Japan  China 
South 
Korea 
Hong Kong  Singapore  Total* 
  1990  2008  1990  2008  1990  2008  1990  2008  1990  2008  1990  2008 
Japan      0.02  0.16  0.06  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.16  0.32 
China  0.15  0.08      0.01  0.05  0.43  0.14  0.03  0.02  0.62  0.29 
Korea, Rep  0.19  0.06    0.25      0.06    0.03  0.04  0.27  0.36 
Hong 
Kong 
0.06  0.04  0.25  0.51  0.02  0.02      0.03  0.02  0.36  0.59 
Taipei, 
China 
0.12  0.07  0.13    0.02  0.03  0.13  0.13  0.03  0.05  0.43  0.28 
Singapore  0.09  0.04  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.11      0.19  0.28 
Indonesia  0.43  0.19  0.03  0.09  0.05  0.06      0.07  0.1  0.58  0.45 
Malaysia  0.15  0.1  0.02  0.13  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.23  0.16  0.48  0.46 
Philippines  0.2  0.16  0.01  0.11  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.1  0.03  0.05  0.3  0.47 
Thailand  0.17  0.11  0.01  0.09      0.04  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.3  0.32 
Lao PDR    0.02  0.09  0.11    0.02    0.01    0.01  0.09  0.18 
Vietnam  0.13  0.14  0  0.07  0.01  0.02      0.08  0.04  0.23  0.26 
Brunei  0.58  0.44  0  0.02  0.12  0.1      0.07  0.02  0.78  0.58 
Cambodia  0.08  0.02          0.01  0    0.02  0.08  0.04 
Myanmar  0.07  0.04  0.08  0.09  0.02  0.01      0.11  0.01  0.29  0.16 
Mongolia  0.18    0.11  0.76    0.02          0.29  0.78 
* indicates total exports by a country to the five economies listed in column.   
Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, 
www.adb.org/statistics. 
3.2 Industrialization and Economic and Social Structural Changes 
Table 3.3 reveals important economic structural changes that occurred in the last twenty years 
across the major economies in ESA. As can be seen, China demonstrates by far the most rapid 
change. In 1990, the start of the period under enquiry, the share of agriculture in China‘s total 
GDP stood at 27.1%. This fell to 11.3% in 2008, a massive fall of 15.8 percentage points. This 
fall gave way to rises in the share of GDP of both industry and services, with the former rising 
from 41.3% to 48.6%, and the latter 31.5% to 40.1%, over the same period. Indonesia shows a 71 
 
similar rise in the industry's share over the period, from 39.1% to 48.1%, while its services' 
share did not rise but actually fell by 4 percentage points over the period. Agriculture saw a 
much smaller fall of 5 percentage points. Malaysia and Thailand display a similar pattern to 
that of Indonesia, with the share of industry rising but that of agriculture and services falling. 
The services sector in these three economies (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) appears to 
have been particularly hit by the East Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. The share of 
services of South Korea, on the other hand, experienced a rapid rise of 10.8 percentage points, 
at the expenses of the other sectors, as did Japan, although a difference of 10 percentage points 
exists between these two  economies  in  favor of Japan. The Philippines  presents  a similar 
pattern of change to that of Japan and South Korea, although one doubts that it was for the 
same reason of ― industrial upgrading‖. Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s and the turmoil that followed across the Soviet block, Mongolia demonstrates a totally 
different case, with the share of agriculture actually rising by a huge margin in the first few 
years following the Soviet collapse, and then falling, but in 2008 still above its initial level, 
while industry shows an exactly opposite trend, with the services sector first rapidly falling 
and then rapidly rising in the first decade following the Soviet collapse.   
 
In a successfully developing economy, while the share of agriculture in GDP may fall during 
the course of industrialization and economic structural change, its absolute value should grow, 
to  provide  industry  with  food  and  other  agricultural  raw  materials,  and  indeed  the  much 
needed foreign exchange. So while its share of GDP may fall, its role in development is by no 
means diminished. Most ESA economies have experienced both a fall in the GDP share of 72 
 
agriculture and generally a good growth in its output value (Figure 3.1).   
 
The rapid growth of industry must of course draw labor into the sector, in general away from 
agriculture, so shares of employment by the two sectors will also change. Table 3.4 provides 
data on the ratio of agricultural to industry employment. As one can see, in most economies 
the ratio consistently fell over the period. 
 
The rise of industry not only depends on an adequate labor flow into the sector, but historically 
and empirically, it has also, almost always, given rise to urbanization. While agriculture has to 
happen  over  large  tracks  of  land,  productivity  of  industry  can  often  be  enhanced  if  the 
activities  are  geographically  concentrated  in  small  areas,  called  agglomerations  or  urban 
centers. Urban enclaves had of course appeared very early on in human history, but generally 
only as the seat of political power or trading center. The rise of industry enables it also to 
become  a  center  of  industrial  activity.  And  with  urbanization  so  the  services  sector  also 
expands, initially principally the low value-added kind, but as an economy further enters into 
the  post-industrialization  era,  the  services  sector  often  overtakes  industry  as  the  dominant 
sector, as is true in Japan and South Korea. 
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Table3.3 Structure of Output, ESA Economies (Percent of GDP at Current Market Prices) 
Economy  Sector  1990  1995  2000  2005  2008 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Agriculture  1.0  1.2  1.0  0.9  … 
Industry  61.6  54.3  63.7  71.6  … 
Services  37.5  44.6  35.3  27.5  … 
Japan  Agriculture  2.4  1.8  1.7  1.5  … 
Industry  38.2  32.9  31.1  29.1  … 
Services  59.4  65.3  67.2  69.4  … 
Malaysia  Agriculture  15.0  12.7  8.3  8.2  10.1 
Industry  41.5  40.5  46.8  48.7  47.6 
Services  43.5  46.8  44.9  43.1  42.3 
Philippines  Agriculture  21.9  21.6  15.8  14.3  14.9 
Industry  34.5  32.1  32.3  31.9  31.6 
Services  43.6  46.3  52.0  53.8  53.5 
China  Agriculture  27.1  20.0  15.1  12.2  11.3 
Industry  41.3  47.2  45.9  47.7  48.6 
Services  31.5  32.9  39.0  40.1  40.1 
Thailand  Agriculture  12.5  9.5  9.0  10.3  11.6 
Industry  37.2  40.7  42.0  44.0  45.1 
Services  50.3  49.7  49.0  45.8  43.3 
Indonesia  Agriculture  19.4  17.1  15.6  13.1  14.4 
Industry  39.1  41.8  45.9  46.5  48.1 
Services  41.5  41.1  38.5  40.3  37.5 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Agriculture  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  … 
Industry  24.4  15.2  13.4  9.3  … 
Services  75.4  84.7  86.5  90.6  … 
Korea (Republic 
of) 
Agriculture  8.9  6.3  4.6  3.3  2.5 
Industry  41.6  41.9  38.1  37.7  37.1 
Services  49.5  51.8  57.3  59.0  60.3 
  Mongolia  Agriculture  15.2  38.0  29.1  21.9  18.8 
Industry  40.6  27.5  21.9  33.5  38.1 
Services  44.2  34.5  49.0  44.6  43.1 
Data source: Asian Development Bank (ADB). Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2009. http://www.adb.org/statistics. 74 
 
Figure 3.1 Production Indices of Agriculture of Selected ESA Economies: 1995-2005 
 
Source: Based on Major Agricultural Statistics 2008, Table 7. Indices of 
Agricultural Production, http://www.agnet.org/situationer/stats/07.html. 
 
Table 3.4 Agriculture-Industry Employment Ratio, ESA Economies   
Economy  1990  1995  2000  2005  2008 
Japan  0.30  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.23 
Malaysia  1.30  0.86  0.71  0.74  0.77 
Philippines  4.46  4.26  3.71  3.77  4.25 
China  2.81  2.27  2.22  1.88  1.52
a 
Thailand  6.50  3.12  2.97  2.44  2.70 
Indonesia  5.51  3.48  3.49  3.54  3.29 
Hong Kong, China  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.05 
Korea (Republic of)  0.66  0.50  0.52  0.44  0.43 
Mongolia  1.97  3.28  4.32  3.39  3.04 
Note: a: 2007 data from China Statistical Year Book 2008. Except for Mongolia, the 
number of employment in industry is given by manufacturing employment. 
Source：Asian Development Bank (ADB), Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2009, www.adb.org/statistics; and China Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
 
Table 3.5 provides data on changing levels of urbanization in most major economies in the 
region. As can be seen, among the newly industrializing economies, China and Indonesia lead 75 
 
the process. The ― level of urbanization‖, measured by percentage of urban population in total 
population, rose in China and Indonesia from 27.4% and 30.58 percent, respectively, in 1990 
to 44.93 and 53.69 percent (estimated) in 2010, a rise of 17.5 and 23.11 percentage points, 
respectively. Most other economies record a modest rise in the ratio, while Mongolia indicates 
almost  no  change.  For  understandable  reasons,  the  ratio  for  Singapore  is  100  percent 
throughout the period.   
 
Table 3.5 Urbanization Ratio, ESA Economies, 1990 to 2010   
1.  Country  2.  1990  3.  1995  4.  2000  5.  2005  6.  2009  7.  2010 
8.  China  9.  27.4  10.  31.35  11.  35.78  12.  40.42  13.  44.04  14.  44.93 
15.  DPR Korea  16.  58.38  17.  59.14  18.  60.18  19.  61.6  20.  62.99  21.  63.37 
22.  Japan  23.  63.07  24.  64.63  25.  65.18  26.  65.82  27.  66.59  28.  66.82 
29.  Mongolia  30.  57.03  31.  56.81  32.  56.58  33.  56.71  34.  57.26  35.  57.46 
36.  Korea, Rep  37.  73.84  38.  78.24  39.  79.62  40.  80.79  41.  81.71  42.  81.94 
43.  Brunei Darussalam  44.  65.83  45.  68.64  46.  71.15  47.  73.51  48.  75.24  49.  75.65 
50.  Cambodia  51.  12.6  52.  14.16  53.  16.91  54.  19.72  55.  22.16  56.  22.8 
57.  Indonesia  58.  30.58  59.  35.55  60.  42  61.  48.14  62.  52.63  63.  53.69 
64.  Lao PDR  65.  15.44  66.  17.21  67.  18.86  68.  20.62  69.  22.19  70.  22.61 
71.  Malaysia  72.  49.82  73.  55.62  74.  61.79  75.  67.33  76.  71.02  77.  71.84 
78.  Myanmar  79.  24.87  80.  26.13  81.  28.03  82.  30.65  83.  33.24  84.  33.91 
85.  Philippines  86.  48.78  87.  54.02  88.  58.55  89.  62.71  90.  65.68  91.  66.38 
92.  Singapore  93.  100  94.  100  95.  100  96.  100  97.  100  98.  100 
99.  Thailand  100.  29.42  101.  30.28  102.  31.14  103.  32.3  104.  33.59  105.  33.96 
106.  Timor-Leste  107.  20.84  108.  22.65  109.  24.52  110.  26.49  111.  28.22  112.  28.68 
113.  Viet Nam  114.  20.26  115.  22.21  116.  24.28  117.  26.41  118.  28.32  119.  28.83 
Source: World Population Prospect: The 2006 Revision Population Data Base. 
 
3.3 Migration, Urbanization, and Rural Non-farming Activities 
The foregoing outlines major patterns of change in the economic and social (urbanization) 
structures of the economies in the region. However, because of the particular characteristics of 76 
 
the rural and farming sectors in the region, there are important underlying relationships that 
require examination, before a full understanding of the nature of these processes could be 
arrived at.   
3.3.1 Urbanization and Rural Non-farming Activities in the ESA Region 
While  industry  and  services  normally  take  place  in  urban  agglomerations,  they  can  also 
happen in rural areas as non-farming activities. Whether and how labor that exits agriculture 
moves  away  from  rural  into  urban  areas  depends  on  the  income  opportunities  and  other 
attractions  offered  by  these  destinations.  In  most  ESA  economies,  agricultural  land  is 
traditionally densely populated, which means rather limited income opportunities for farmers. 
When industries rise in cities, they often provide strong attractions for rural people to migrate 
there. However, the densely populated nature of agricultural land in these economies could 
also provide rich non-farming opportunities in rural areas. And the proximity of many rural 
areas to urban centers further enables them to be sub-contracting sites for urban firms. This is 
further  helped  sometimes  by  the  fragmentation  of  the  production  processes  in  some  new 
industries such as the ICT industry discussed earlier. If a production network can be formed on 
an international scale across the ESA region, surely rural areas neighboring a leading urban 
center thriving on a new industry need not be left out, so long as basic conditions are met. 
 
Rural non-farming activity has been a rapidly growing and particularly important phenomenon 
in many ESA economies. Table 3.6 indicates its extent and rapid growth in China. As can be 
seen, still at a fairly low level in 1990, the combined share of income from wages and salaries 77 
 
and other non-farming operations of a rural household (i.e. excluding agriculture, forestry, 
herding and fishing) rapidly rose, and by 2000 it already almost matched the income share of 
farming; by 2005 it further surpassed the latter by a small margin. The same rapid rise of 
non-farming  activities  can  be  observed  across  the  ESA  region  in  economies  with  a  large 
traditional  agriculture  (Liu  et  al.,  1998;  Yamauchi  et  al.,  2009;  Ohno, 2009).  Indeed,  one 
would not be able to obtain a proper understanding of the rural-urban migration process, the 
urbanization process, and the vitality of agriculture in this region if insufficient regard was 
given to it. Below in order to analyze the intricate interrelationships involved in some depth, I 
present a three-activity model. That will also help our discussion in the next section of the role 
of public policy related to agriculture in ESA economies.   
 
Table 3.6 Per Capita Annual Net Income of Rural Households by Source, 1990-2005 
(CNY) 
 
3.3.2 A Three-Activity Model
12 
Let there be a farmer with three economic activities: farming (A); rural non-farming (B); 
                                                        
12  This part of the report draws heavily on Liu et al. (1998). 78 
 
urban employment (C). The important thing to note here is that while the farmer can engage, 
simultaneously, in both activity A and B, taking up an urban job C would mean that he leaves 
farming A altogether, because the geographical distance between his village (where farming A 
must occur) and the urban place where he pursues C, is too great for him to engage in both. 
Having abandoned A while pursued C, he cannot engage in B either. Traditional migration 
models do not consider B, and traditional rural employment models do not contain activity C. 
The model here integrates these two strands of the literature.   
 
Figure 3.2 provides one possible situation of the income opportunities these activities might 
each offer, as indicated by the three schedules A, B and C, corresponding to the activity they 
each represent. The schedule AB is the income function for the combined activities A and B, 
when a farmer simultaneously engages in both.
13  Note that in drawing these schedules, we did 
not assume a fixed wage rate for any activity. While an externally given wage rate may be a 
realistic case in respect of C (a situation which we will shortly consider), the same cannot be 
said of A and B. Under the condition of small family farms, it is hard to think that there can 
ever exist a competitive labor market to set an equilibrium wage rate for A and B, at which one 
can supply as much labor as one wants. For generality, we have assumed all three activities not 
to be governed by a fixed ruling wage rate.   
                                                        
13  These schedules, and the fourth schedule AB, are a kind of maximum value function, and are here 'income functions' of the 
associated activities. They are to be derived as follows. Let the farmer maximize his income with respect to each of these 
activities subject to a constraint on his total labor time supply, while allowing him to use whatever other non-labor resources 
at his command (if there exist markets for land lease and credit, he may lease in additional land and/or borrow capital from 
these markets). The solution to this problem should define a maximum level of income for the assumed total constrained labor 
time. Now let the constraint on labor time change. The maximally achievable level of income will then also change. Schedules 
A, B and C respectively trace out this relationship in respect of the activity in question. The same principle holds in respect of 
the combined activities A and B, when a farmer simultaneously engages in both these activities. The only difference is that, in 
this case, the farmer faces a further choice between allocating an additional unit of time to A or B. Optimization requires that 




There can, of course, be many possible juxtapositions of these schedules, and in combination 
with the farmer's tastes, these could give rise to many different cases of the farmer's decision. 
Figure 3.1 depicts a particular possibility where, without activity B, the farmer chooses C and 
leaves A, that is, abandoning farming altogether and migrating to cities. However, with both A 
and B, the combined income opportunities enable him to reach a still higher level of welfare 
than C could offer him. He therefore chooses to engage in A and B, simultaneously.
14   
 
The ability of the farmer to be able simultaneously to engage in both A and B makes these two 
activities  at  once  complementary  to  and  competing  with  each  other.  It  is  clear  from  the 
situation given in Figure 3.1 that without B, A would also disappear, that is, the survival of A 
actually depends on B, and vice versa. Separately, the income opportunities of either A or B 
are dominated by those of C, but when combined, they dominate those of C. This also suggests 
that in policy terms, supporting either A or B may induce a farmer to remain in agriculture and 
                                                        
14  One might want to consider the risk or probability of a farmer, having left agriculture to migrate to cities, not being able to 
find an urban job. In Harris and Todaro (1970), this risk is given by the rate of urban unemployment, which allows them to 
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in the rural area. 
 
On the other hand, the two activities do also compete with each other for the farmer's time. 
Unless the marginal income of B is consistently below that of A (i.e., no segment of the B 
schedule in Figure 3.1 has a slope steeper than that of any part of schedule A), B will compete 
with A for the farmer's time. However, should the marginal income of B indeed be always 
below that of A, schedule A in Figure 3.1 is then the combined AB income schedule, which 
also means that B can no longer be supporting and complementing A.   
 
An implication of the above is that the presence of B, if it is to effectively complement A, must 
take at least some labor time away from the farmer that might otherwise be spent on A. In such 
cases, if no additional labor force enters into agriculture (generally an unlikely situation), or if 
agricultural labor productivity does not improve, agricultural output must fall.   
 
Before one can fully exploit policy implications of the model, a few extensions are in order. 
First, it is possible to relax the assumption of no fixed urban wage rate (so that schedule C in 
Figure 3.2 becomes a straight line with a constant slope indicating the wage rate). However, 
associated with a fixed wage rate related to an urban (formal) job is also a fixed work schedule, 
whereby a person cannot freely decide to supply more, or less, time to paid work. That is, in 
these cases, there often exists a ceiling to the total time one can expend on paid work. One 
possible situation of this is depicted by Figure 3.3, where both a fixed wage rate and a time 
ceiling exist. In this case, even though the urban sector income function consistently has a 81 
 
slope  higher  than  that  of  AB,  because  of  the  paid  work  time  ceiling,  the  person  actually 
chooses AB. The implication is that because of the particular institutional restrictions related to 
urban work, to induce a farmer to remain in the rural sector, the support that one has to give to 
rural activities A and B need not be as great as the apparent difference in the rate of pay 
between rural and urban sectors might appear to demand. 
 
 
Secondly, any activity would imply a sequence of tasks to be undertaken at different points in 
time.  Thus  any  activity  would  imply  a  sequence  of  labor  time  allocations  (devoted  to 
performing these tasks) across time. In some cases, the timing of each of these labor time 
allocations is very strict; in other cases, only the timing of some of them is; in still other cases, 
the timing of none of them is. When assuming that activities A and B can simultaneously be 
undertaken by a farmer, we considered mainly the fact that these two activities could take 
place more or less at the same location (or at very close locations), so that travelling between 
the  locations  where  these  activities  are  performed  is  not  an  issue.  However,  when  one 
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considers the timing of the sequence of time allocations of the two activities, conflicts or time 
clashes may nevertheless arise between these two sequences or activities. When the timing of 
all the time allocations in the sequence of an activity is highly strict, there may exist little 
room of postponing or bringing forward the undertaking of any task. However, generally for 
most of farming and non-farming activities in rural areas, some such room does exist, although 
it may well entail a cost, defined by the loss of the product value due to such postponement or 
bringing forward. (Harvesting and sowing may be extremely demanding in terms of the timing 
to the performance of these tasks, but even so a postponement or bringing forward by a day or 
two is still possible, without sacrificing the whole crop, but it may well entail a high cost.) So, 
while there may well be problems of time clash in attempting to undertake both activities, we 
would not generally expect these problems to be so serious as to rule out the possibility and 
rationality  of  simultaneously  undertaking  them.  But  the  cost  of  postponement  or  bringing 
forward the performance of a task from its ― natural‖ time of performance is an important issue, 
and is one that is not considered in our basic model.   
 
Finally, throughout our analyses above we assumed the decision maker to be a farmer. In the 
rural sector of many ESA economies, however, the more relevant decision making unit may, in 
fact, be the family. Replacing the decision making unit with family has immediate implications. 
It  means  that  the  time  clash  problem  discussed  above  associated  with  simultaneously 
undertaking more than one activity at a time need not be as serious as we had feared. Family 
members together might be able simultaneously to undertake them without facing too serious 
time clash problems. While it would not be possible for one and the same person to perform 83 
 
different tasks at the same point in time, it should be possible for a multi-laborer family to do 
so. Indeed, should we consider different family members to have different skills and physical 
stamina,  optimal  division  of  labor  and  specialization  may  also  emerge.  In  some  ESA 
economies,  thanks  to  the  massive  agricultural  infrastructural  investments  related  to  land, 
irrigation  and  road  systems  (to  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  section),  which 
permitted mechanization of many farming tasks that had previously required great physical 
stamina to perform, and which generally saved farming labor time, agricultural tasks are now 
typically undertaken by the old-aged, the young, and women in the family. Able-bodied family 
laborers usually only devote as much as their spare time, if at all, to farming, giving rise to a 
widespread phenomenon known as ― part time farming‖. In the next section, we will consider 
an exact case of this from an ESA economy, Taiwan. 
 
Clearly, the above three-activity model has strong implications for our thinking about issues of 
rural-urban migration, the vitality and changing nature of agriculture, and indeed even the 
urbanization process. Some of these implications we will pursue in the next two sections.   
3.4 Kuznets Curve 
In this subsection, we discuss the long-run relationships between economic growth and income 
inequality. Ever since the publication of Kuznets‘ now famous essay in 1955 on the subject 
(Kuznets, 1955), discussions of this relationship have come under the name Kuznets Curve. 
The difference between the discussion we have had just above of the role of non-farming 
activities in an economy attempting to emerge out of its agrarian past, and the relationship that 84 
 
the Kuznets Curve addresses, is this: while in the former case we were still thinking about the 
earlier phases of the industrialization and urbanization processes, with one of our feet still 
firmly in that past, when thinking about the Kuznets Curve, we need to leave that past behind 
and firmly sail into the future. That is, we need to think in even longer terms of how economic 
growth  may  impact  income  inequality,  and  what  factors  may  or  may  not  influence  this 
relationship.   
 
According to the KC hypothesis, as an economy grows (measured by per capita income), 
income  inequality  is  likely  first  to  worsen,  and  then  level  off  at  some  turning  point,  and 
thereafter improve. When Kuznets  (1955) initially presented this  hypothesis, it was  based 
merely  on  the  observations  of  the  association  between  income  inequality  and  per  capita 
income  in  a  few  developed  and  developing  economies.  Subsequently,  the  hypothesis  has 
spawned an enormous body of literature and controversy. At the heart of the issue is not so 
much whether the hypothesized inverse-U relationship might or might not exist. There are 
clear forces which could cause it to happen, which have to do with the general nature of the 
structural transformations that a country must undergo in the course of its development (as 
noted previously). Rather, at the heart of the issue is how these forces might be managed to 
produce a better trajectory of growth and income inequality for an economy. On this, in fact, 
the ESA economies have generally performed well, when judged against international records. 
In particular, Korea (Rep) and Taiwan (China) have stood out among the ESA economies as 
successful examples that have managed to achieve rapid economic growth with fairly low 
levels of income inequality in their developmental phase of the 1960s-1980s (World Bank, 85 
 
1993). In what follows, we consider what fundamental forces there are which might cause an 
inverse-U  relationship  to  arise,  and  what  might  be  done  to  change  the  character  of  that 
relationship, leaving the more specific policies adopted by some ESA economies to be looked 
at in Section 4. 
 
By definition, as an economy undergoes economic structural changes, the modern sector will 
grow,  attracting  entrepreneurs  with  financial  capital  and  workers  with  the  right  skills  and 
educational background to enter into the sector. These people will earn a higher income. On 
the other hand, the traditional agricultural sector may at this time be burdened with surplus 
labor, low productivity, and in some cases also high birth rates. The presence of a possibly 
large income differential in favor of a relatively small section of the population will clearly 
worsen income inequality in an economy. Over time, however, such differentials are likely to 
attract  an  increasing  number  of  people  to  enter  into  the  sector,  through  acquisition  of 
appropriate skills and education. As more and more people move into the modern sector, the 
incomes  accruing  from  it  will  be  spread  more  widely.  At  the  same  time,  earnings  in  the 
agricultural sector is also likely to improve (not only might labor productivity improve but so 
would demand for farm produce). And with generally better education and health services for 
the agricultural sector, brought about by the modernization process, birth rates may fall in rural 
as well as unban areas, reducing the rate of growth of the labor force. Eventually, a point will 
be reached when income distribution improves.   
 
It may be explored in more detail how this can happen. Note the crucial role human capital 86 
 
accumulation  plays  in  this  process.  At  an  individual  level,  human  capital  accumulation 
(principally education, but also health) of course raises a person‘s income. From the point of 
view of an economy, such accumulation (increasingly better and more widespread education 
for the population) can raise the share of income that accrues to labor. Additionally, it can also 
reduce wage differentials within labor. Both these processes will have a positive effect on 
income distribution. To examine the role of human capital accumulation in the simplest form 
possible, refer to Figure 3.4 below where we distinguish between ― skilled‖ and ― unskilled‖ 
labor.  What  differentiates  one  from  the  other  is  education.  An  unskilled  laborer  could  be 
anyone from a traditional agricultural worker to someone working in the modern sector or in 
an urban area but doing menial tasks or engaged in providing low-value added services, often 
with little education. On the other hand, to become a skilled worker one has to undertake 
comparatively  more,  and  sometimes  a  lot  more,  education,  involving  considerable  human 
capital investment.
15  In Figure 3.4, the SA curve represents the supply curve of unskilled labor, 






                                                        
15  This categorization is deliberately left vague. In the early phases of development, an unskilled rural laborer may well be 
illiterate. More recently, in many ESA economies, basic education has increasingly become universalized, so that even an 
unskilled worker may have to have some basic education. Correspondingly, it might have required someone to have just 
above basic education to be a skilled worker in the early phases of development, but increasingly in recent years, it would tend 
to require a person to receive a lot more than basic education, and often tertiary education, in order to qualify as a skilled 
worker. These changes, which are part of a general trend towards increasingly better education in a society, would have 
implications for our characterization of the reservation wages for the two kinds of labor, but we shall abstract from these 
complications here. 87 
 

















simply  be  his/her  cost  of  subsistence  (WAR),
16  and  for  a  skilled  worker,  his/her  cost  of 
subsistence  plus  a  standard  rate  of  return  on  the  human  capital  investment  (WIR).  The 
horizontal distance between OA and OI, two origins of the graph, denotes the full size of the 
labor force in the economy. Initially, the OAN portion of the workforce is unskilled, while the 
rest is skilled. Between OA and N, the SA curve is flat (any demand less than OAN will not 
push up the unskilled wage rate WA), while beyond N the curve slopes upwards (any demand 
                                                        
16  Earlier literatures on development stressed the importance of rural surplus labor, meaning labor that produces a zero or 
close-to-zero agricultural marginal product. If such surplus labor indeed exists, then it could be argued that the opportunity 
cost of unskilled labor is simply its agricultural marginal product, implying a zero or close-to-zero wage rate. On the other 
hand, there is also the consideration of the subjective 'cost of labor', given by the marginal disutility of labor (or the marginal 
utility  of  foregone  leisure)  weighted by  the  marginal  utility  of  income.  Typically  this  would  give  a  positive  wage  rate. 
However, where survival is at issue, the subjective 'cost of labor' can fall to very low levels, as the marginal utility of income 
in this case sharply rises. (Nothing is more important than survival, so to speak, not even the high drudgery involved!) 
Ironically, though, this subjective 'cost of labor' can sometimes even fall below the 'cost of survival' (defined as the minimum 
cost of living that would ensure a person's survival), thereby threatening the very survival, and continued labor supply, of a 
laborer. The notion of a reservation wage here  would, it seems, be about survival, and it would appear that neither the 
opportunity  cost  of  labor  in  traditional  agricultural  or  the  subjective  'cost  of  labor'  where  survival  is  an  issue  offer  an 
appropriate reference for a minimum sustainable wage for the unskilled labor. The right reservation wage for unskilled labor 
here would, it seems, be their cost of survival. (A person may, of course, depend on his/her family for survival, but the 
family's survival will have to depend on the incomes earned by its members.)   
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beyond it will push up the wage rate).
17  The same reasoning is behind the assumed shape of 
the SI curve. Demand for unskilled labor is given by the MA curve, and for skilled labor the MI 
curve (respectively the marginal product curves of unskilled and skilled labor). Equilibrium 
wages are given by the intersection of the two sets of supply and demand curves.
18     
 
The diagram provides us with a suitable framework for analyzing the role of a number of 
factors. Given the size of labor force and demand for skilled labor, an increase in the number 
of skilled workers (a greater number of people receiving better education) could result in a fall 
in the equilibrium wage for them, should these workers have initially enjoyed a wage premium 
(measured by the vertical distance of WI* to WIR). This same change of the situation further 
results in a compensating reduction in the number of unskilled workers, and this may or may 
not have an effect on their equilibrium wage, subject to the position of the demand curve for 
these workers. Note that, given the supply curves, of first-order importance are the positions of 
the two demand curves. Their slopes only come into play when equilibrium wages are affected 
as result of a change of situation, as they then, together with the slope of the upward portion of 
                                                        
17  Note  that  typically  a  labor  supply  curve  slopes  upward  throughout,  as  the  subjective  'cost  of  labor'  or  the  marginal 
opportunity cost of labor rises throughout. However, where survival is an issue and imposes a minimum wage rate that 
deviates from (lies above) both these, then a flat portion of the labor supply curve appears. Further, since labor supply here is 
measured in terms of the number of laborers or the size of the labor force employed in each sector, rather than the hours 
worked, some assumption has to be made regarding the standard number of hours a person works (having been paid a 
minimum wage equal to the cost of survival). It may be thought that the length of OAN on the horizontal axis as both 
measuring the number of laborers working in the unskilled sector and the combined number hours supplied by them (equal to 
the number of laborers involved times the standard number of hours per person). Where a person supplies more than this 
standard number of hours, a wage higher than WAR is required, and this then explains the upward sloping portion of the SA 
curve. This also means that moving up along the upward sloping portion of the SA curve should not be interpreted to mean an 
increase in the number of laborers employed in the sector, but only an increase in the number of hours supplied by existing 
employees in the sector. For the economy as a whole, the length of the horizontal axis OA to OI exhausts the entire labor force 
(indicated by the vertical alignment of the flat portions of the SA and SI curves), but the actual number of hours supplied by 
these laborers will depend on the wages in the two sectors. And the total number of hours supplied by the laborers working in 
each sector may well exceed the product of the number of workers working in them times the standard number of hours per 
worker. An advantage of this analysis is that it introduces a flexibility of the total number hours supplied even though the 
labor force may be fixed in short terms in an economy.     
18  Given our previous interpretations, naturally these equilibrium points need not be vertically aligned in the diagram. Note 
also that as drawn in Figure 3.4, it would imply unemployment in the unskilled sector equal to the distance of L to N. Given 
our interpretation of WAR as the subsistence wage, it also means that this employed unskilled labor force will have to rely on 
social protection reliefs from the government.     89 
 
the supply curves, affect the extent of the wage changes.     
 
However, should the demand for skilled labor also increase, and increase sufficiently, then the 
equilibrium  wage  rate  for  the  skilled  might  not  fall,  but  instead  rise,  following  the  same 
expansion in education. The question is: what might cause the demand curve to move in the 
desired  direction?  Various  factors  could  be  involved.  However,  in  the  ESA  economies,  it 
appears that the expansion in education itself might not only have affected the supply but also, 
more importantly, the demand curve for skilled labor in these economies. A better educated 
workforce enables those industries relying on such a workforce to grow and expand, pushing 
up the demand curve for the skilled. The development of ICT industries, an example of the 
so-called knowledge-intensive industries, in many ESA economies would seem to fit into this 
story. These industries are, of course, intensive in skilled labor.   
 
The rise in skilled wages, combined with an increase in the share of this workforce in the total 
workforce, is likely to raise labor's share in the total income of an economy, but it may not 
improve income distribution materially, if a vast number of the unskilled remain on very low 
wages and are very poor. To raise the wages of these workers, a fall in their absolute number 
could help (as a result of many of them, say, ― switching over‖ to the skilled group), but of 
equal importance would be a favorable shift in the demand for this labor. The expansion of 
modern industries, with the accompanying urbanization, is indeed likely to raise the demand 
for  this  labor.  Urbanization  in  particular  causes  the  service  sector  to  expand,  providing 
increased employment opportunities for the unskilled. But the urban and modern sector may 90 
 
not grow fast enough to accommodate the expectations of all the unskilled. For these workers 
to be effectively employed, agriculture, and the rural sector in general, still has an important 
role to play. Indeed, as emphasized previously, in addition to agriculture, rural non-farming 
activities could also provide an effective alternative, which actually did happen in some ESA 
economies.  However,  there  are  important  pre-conditions  for  this  to  happen,  including  a 
conducive tenurial system, rural and agricultural infrastructural investment, and supporting 
financial institutions. Another consideration is to support small and medium-size enterprises, 
which are generally labor intensive and which, moreover, mostly use labor of an unskilled 
kind.   
 
The framework we have developed is flexible in that it also allows us to consider issues such 
as the inequality trap and a labor force growth. An inequality trap may be seen as any negative 
feedback loop between two related inequalities, in this case income and educational inequality. 
The low a person's income is, the low his or her (or his/her children's) education is likely to be. 
However, since education is in turn a major determinant of a person or family's income, the 
low a person's (or his/her children's) education is, the lower his/her (children's) income is. 
Thus income inequality causes educational inequality, which in turn fuels income inequality, 
and so on.   
 
From Figure 3.4, it can be seen that if demand for and supply of unskilled labor do not change 
sufficiently  such  that  wages  for  unskilled  labor  rises  above  the  subsistence  level,  then 
unskilled workers will not be able to invest in their (or their children's) education sufficiently 91 
 
for them to rise to the skilled labor category. This is true with a system of privately funded 
education. However, if public support can be given to the unskilled for education, then it is 
possible for them to rise their (or their children's) education even if they are trapped at a 
subsistence wage. Section 4.6 discusses this in further detail.   
 
As well as resources available for education, incentives to invest them in education are also 
important, which have to do with returns on education. A skilled wage rate equal to WIR and 
probably with skilled labor unemployment is unlikely to generate much private incentive for 
education, save perhaps for its intrinsic values. In contrast, a skilled wage rate much higher 
than WIR can be expected to generate substantial incentives for undertaking private investment 
in education.
19      
 
Let us now address the important consideration of a natural population and labor force growth. 
In  the  diagram  above,  a  labor  force  growth  will  extend  the  length  of  the  horizontal  axis 
measuring  the  size  of  the  total  labor  force  in  an  economy.  A  population  and  labor  force 
increase would mean an extension of that axis. Without accompanying education, such an 
increase will only add to the unskilled pool of  labor. This would mean extending the flat 
portion of the SA curve by as much as the labor force growth, by moving the OA origin to the 
left by the same distance, and dragging the MA curve along in the same manner. Depending on 
the original configuration of the SA and MA curves and the extent of this labor force growth, 
                                                        
19  It may be thought that a high expected rate of return on education should not only generate incentives for investing in 
education but also mobilize resources for such investment, through the capital market. However, in a typical developing 
economy, the capital market typically fails to provide this function, such that private investment in education in investment in 
most cases has to be funded by one's (or one's family's) savings.   92 
 
the  unskilled  wage  rate  is  very  likely  to  fall  as  a  result,  causing  a  worsening  of  income 
distribution.   
 
On the other hand, if the expansion of labor force is accompanied by education expansion, 
then part of the labor force growth will go over to the skilled labor pool (by as many as there 
are who are so educated), and this can cause in the diagram a pattern of change involving the 
origin OI, the skilled labor supply and demand curves SI and MI, mirroring the changes in the 
origin OA, and unskilled labor supply and demand curves examined above when the labor 
force growth was assumed solely to take the form of an unskilled labor force growth. The 
implications for the skilled wage rate can also be analyzed. But, again, here we need to bear in 
mind the potential impact of an enlarged skilled labor force on the expansion of the industries 
hiring such labor, and the consequent impact on MI. We also need to consider the investment 
in  education  that  will  be  necessary,  whether  that  is  to  be  financed  by  the  government  or 
individuals themselves.   
 
As it happens, the demographic situation in recent decades has on the whole been favorable to 
many ESA economies (Table 3.7). Population growth in these economies has been by and 
large modest, without adding great pressure on the economy for massive numbers of additional 
jobs,  thereby  compromising  wage  levels.
20   These  economies  experienced  favorable 
demographic transition much sooner than is typically so for an economy at the same level of 
per-capita income. However, it appears that their high levels of investment in education, and 
                                                        
20  An early study by Gregory and Lal (1977) finds a one percent in labor forth growth to result in one percent fall in real wage 
growth. The study does not, though, distinguish between the skilled and unskilled components in this growth.     93 
 
health, have contributed to this early demographic transition as well. Thus education appears 
to be one factor that has strong multiple implications, and much of the success of the ESA 
economies in achieving rapid economic growth with low income inequality can be understood 
in these terms. 
 
Table 3.7: Annual Population Growth Rate, Selected Asian Economies (%) 
Economy  1970  1980  2000  2003 
East Asia and Southeast Asia         
People‘s Republic of China  2.76  1.25  0.71  0.62 
Indonesia  2.37  2.07  1.32  1.34 
Thailand  3.03  2.18  0.80  0.65 
Viet Nam  2.26  2.12  1.29  1.10 
South Asia         
India  2.31  2.25  1.68  1.49 
Pakistan  3.01  2.91  2.41  2.41 
Source: Shiladitya Chatterjee (2005). 
 
To summarize, it is clear from our discussion above that development is inherently uneven, 
and this unevenness may possibly worsen income distribution initially. On the other hand, this 
initial negative effect need not be severe. Possibilities exist to manage the growth-inequality 
dynamics in an economy. Indeed, as noted previously, while in some ESA economies the 
growth-income  inequality  relationship  does  appear  to  resemble  the  KC  curve,  in  other 
economies (e.g. Taiwan and Korea) growth has been attained without seriously  worsening 
income inequality. However, the lesson they offer appears not to be about how they reacted to 
serious  emerging  problems  with  massive  programs  of  income  transfer,  but  how  they 
successfully  managed  the  process  of  economic  growth  and  structural  change  in  their 
economies. 94 
 
3.5 Environmental Kuznets Curve 
In  this  subsection,  we  discuss  the  long-run  relationships  between  economic  growth  and 
environmental  pollution  in  an  economy.  The  original  Kuznets  Curve  (KC)  provides  a 
hypothesis on economic growth and income distribution. A subsequent extension of Kuznets' 
observation on this relationship concerns the long relationship between economic growth and 
environmental quality. Known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), it poses that in the 
early stages of economic growth (i.e. at a still low level of per capita income), environmental 
quality will likely deteriorate, then level off after some point, and thereafter improve as per 
capita income continues to increase. The hypothesis was first advanced by Grossman and 
Krueger (1991), and because the suggested long-run relationship—between economic growth 
and environmental pollution—resembles that originally suggested between economic growth 
and income inequality, it has since been associated with the name of Kuznets, even though 
Kuznets had had nothing to do with it. 
 
Empirical evidence on the hypothesis has been mixed, but on the whole supports the existence 
of an inverse-U relationship. However, as in the case of the KC hypothesis, this should in no 
way be understood as in any sense an iron-clad law governing the change of environmental 
quality in the course of an economy's growth, such that all one could and should do is to allow 
it to run its full course and wait for the happy ending to arrive. And yet too often it has exactly 
been perceived that way, by policy makers who are eager for economic growth.   
 
As  in  the  case  of  KC,  if  one  understands  the  causal  links  responsible  for  this  apparent 95 
 
empirically regular relationship between environmental pollution and economic growth, then 
interventions would be possible and indeed may well be urgent. Most by now agree that the 
principal causal factors behind this relationship again have to do with economic structural 
changes (Arrow, 1995), but this time also with people's environmental awareness (or demand 
for environmental quality). The structural factors are that before an economy industrializes, 
environmental quality typically would not be a problem (or even if it is, it would not normally 
be  caused  by  man).  However,  as  an  economy  industrializes,  often  with  rather  poor  and 
environmentally  very  damaging  technologies  to  begin  with,  the  environment  then  takes  a 
severe beating. However, as an economy further grows, at some point the structural factors 
will begin to work in its favor. First, technology upgrading may reduce the emission per unit 
of  output,  other  things  being  equal.  Secondly,  as  the  services  sector  grows  and  indeed 
eventually overtakes industry as the dominant sector, total emission may well falls. For these 
reasons, as an economy grows, one might expect that, at some point, environmental quality 
improves.   
 
The role of public awareness lies in the tact that in the early phases of industrialization, there 
is  likely  to  be  little  knowledge  or  awareness  on  the  part  of  the  public  of  the  serious 
environmental consequences of the process. However, as the environmental damages become 
severe and much more obvious, public action by the victims is likely to take place to exert 
pressure on the government to act and protect their local environment. In addition, as incomes 
rise, people also generally tend to demand better environmental quality, giving rise to greater 
involvement in environmental protection. This could take the form of a change in their own 96 
 
environment-related behavior, or applying greater pressure on the government to act. It needs 
to  be  said  that  the  role  of  the  government  is  central  here.  On  the  other  hand,  public 
participation  and  activism  in  environmental  protection  is  also  crucial  in  ensuring  that  the 
government does act when and where it should. 
 
It  is  rather  straightforward  to  understand  the  important  role  the  government  plays.  Many 
environmental consequences are, as called in economics, external effects, where victims of the 
pollution  have  no  effective  recourse  without  the  relevant  property  rights  or  without  their 
proper enforcements. Moreover, many kinds of environmental pollution are public bads, so 
that none may have a sufficient incentive to ensure that they be controlled (even if recourse is 
available). For these reasons, government actions are crucial, through various policy tools 
ranging  from  taxation  to  quantity  control,  or  outright  banning  of  an  activity.  However,  a 
non-active government, or one that is proactive but primarily committed to economic growth, 
is unlikely do any of these, at least not adequately enough. For this reason, public participation 
and involvement in environmental protection is crucial, to exert pressure on the government to 
act. In a democratic system, this is clearly possible. But even in a non-democratic one, some 
room still exists for the public to act and to bring pressure on the government to act. Public 
participation is important also because some kinds of environmental pollution may be highly 
local or are even private bads, and in these cases information asymmetry between a victim and 
government may well be a problem. In these cases, public participation can help ensure that 
such pollutions are brought to the attention of the government and, where possible, actions be 
sought (where lack of private property rights or their effective enforcements rules out any 97 
 
Coase-type private negotiations).       
 
It is clear that it is the interplay of the structural factors, people's environmental awareness and 
active participation in environmental protection, and government actions that will determine 
the trajectory of environmental quality in an economy's growth. It is difficult to imagine what 
such a trajectory may look like in the absence of any public participation and government 
action. On the other hand, structural considerations are clearly also important.   98 
 
4. Public Policy 
Section 3 has given accounts of some of the major processes associated with economic and 
human development in an economy: trade expansion and integration into the regional and 
international  production  networks,  industrialization  and  economic  structural  change, 
urbanization, and the effects of these on income distribution and environmental quality. These 
processes are not themselves the end of development. From a human development perspective, 
the end of development is to expand people's capabilities, so that they are better able to pursue 
the lives they value. The basic capabilities whereby progress in human development of an 
economy has been measured have included per capita income (a proxy for a decent standard of 
living),  health  and  education  (which  together  have  underlain  the  metrics  of  the  human 
development index (HDI)), but they could also include agency and empowerment. And, indeed, 
since inequalities in any dimension of human development may be a result of circumstances 
rather than choice, high levels of inequality could undermine the extent of human development 
in a society.   
 
While  the  foregoing  processes  do  not  represent  the  end  of  development,  they  do  offer 
enormous opportunities for that development, through raising productivity and income, and 
enabling educational advancements and health enhancements. However, as noted, for these 
opportunities to be effectively seized, appropriate public policies are also crucial. This does 
not mean, though, that a government should take complete control of these processes. Much 
can in fact be left to the market for these processes to unfold.   99 
 
4.1  Changing Institutional and Policy Landscape in the ESA Region 
Indeed, over the period under enquiry, there has been a decisive move in the direction of a 
greater role for the market in resource allocation and the management of an economy in most 
of the ESA region. China (PRC) is an especially important case in point. Before 1978 it was a 
classic  centrally  planned  economy.  The  economic  reforms  that  began  in  1978  principally 
involved substituting market forces for major parts of the former planning system, and by 
1990 the move towards a market economy in the country was well underway. Since then, 
China  has  achieved  a  decisive  transition  in  that  direction,  with  most  of  the  markets  now 
liberalized. But an increased role for the market was not limited to only China. Viet Nam and 
Mongolia, two other former centrally planned economies, followed China's suit, as did Lao 
PDR. Other economies in the region, while not centrally planned, nevertheless also formerly 
had had a strong government hand in their management. In part based on a review of their own 
past policy successes and errors, in part under the influence of the international intellectual 
climate then (as epitomized by the now defunct Washington Consensus), and in part under 
duress (as in those economies that were directly affected by the Asian Financial Crises), major 
moves were made in these economies to increase the role of the market in resource allocation 
and the management of the economy. The end result of these changes is that, save for North 
Korea and possibly Myanmar, by the end of the first decade of the new century, the economic 
institutional and policy landscape in the region has been fundamentally transformed compared 
with 20 years ago.   
 
Accompanying the economic institutional changes have been political changes. As reviewed in 100 
 
Section 2, the past two decades saw democratization processes begun, tested and consolidated 
in  a  number  of  economies.  The  same  period  also  witnessed  fundamental  changes  in  the 
political governance structure even in those economies without having explicitly undergone a 
democratization  process.  Thus  in  China,  while  the  government  is  not  yet  democratically 
elected in any usual sense of the word, public policy making has nevertheless involved much 
greater civic participation from the stakeholders and citizens, and has consequently become 
much  more  responsive  to  their  concerns,  than  before.  There  has  similarly  been  an 
improvement  in  the  transparency  of  public  policy  making,  made  possible  by  and  in  turn 
enabling closer public scrutiny of such policy making. Non-governmental organizations have 
been springing up in great numbers, playing a crucial role in promoting these processes. With 
improvements in transparency and closer scrutiny, government departments and officials are 
now generally made much more accountable for their decisions and actions than before. All 
these have contributed to a significant improvement in the political governance of the country.   
 
The term 'public policy' covers a wide range of policies made and implemented—or failing to 
be made and implemented—by the government in the interest of the public. Exactly what 
policies are made and implemented depends on the goals, objectives and strategies of the 
government. It also depends on circumstances and constraints. Ideally, it should depend on an 
objective analysis of the role of the market, where and how it fails, and whether government 
policy remedies can improve the matter rather than make it worse. In terms of the goals, 
objectives and strategies, a government may actively promote industrialization by adopting, 
say, trade and industrial policies that encourage the growth of some sectors at the expense of 101 
 
others, in disregard of the country's established comparative advantage, or it may adopt a more 
laissez-faire  approach,  which  often  means  a  greater  reliance  on  the  market  and  a  closer 
alignment with the country's comparative advantage. Equally, a government may hard-nosedly 
pursue economic growth without paying any attention to how the increased economic benefits 
are distributed, or it may balance its growth objectives with concerns for income distribution 
and minimum equity. A government may also exclusively pursue economic growth with utter 
disregard for its environmental consequences, or it may fully take on board such consequences 
in its decisions.  In short, there can be many possible policy  objectives that a government 
pursues, and there can be still more possible policy instruments that it can take.   
 
This section does not aim to review all cases of public policy that an ESA economy has or has 
not ever adopted. Where the ESA economies had generally stood out compared with the rest of 
the world prior to the most recent two decades has been their comparatively high rates of 
economic growth coupled with low levels of income inequality (World Bank, 1993). However, 
in the last two decades that we review, income distribution has dramatically worsened in many 
ESA economies, as shown in Section 2 of this report, giving rise to deep concerns among 
observers, researchers and policy makers both in and out these economies. The purpose of this 
section is to review those public policies—or lack of them—that we have good reasons to 
believe have contributed to both the region's earlier superior performance internationally in 
achieving rapid growth with equity, and to an apparent worsening of income inequality in the 
last two decades. Note also that in doing so, we shall only be concerned with public policies 
that we believe have contributed—or have failed to contribute—to a high level of inclusive 102 
 
growth and human development in the region, rather than to economic growth per se. What 
follows is a broad framework that outlines what we believe to be the important public policies. 
They  are  also  the  policies  that  in  our  view  should  receive  attention  and  emphasis  when 
designing future public policies and programs aimed to promote inclusive growth and human 
development in the region.
21 
4.2  Inclusive Human Development: A Policy Framework   
Our broad policy framework is as follows: Five sets of public policies are necessary to support 
and promote a more inclusive kind of economic growth and human development. The first 
includes economic policies, aimed not to replace the market but to supplement it where it fails, 
or  where  its  outcomes  would  otherwise  contradict  the  attainment  of  the  goal  of  inclusive 
growth and human development. The immediate aim of these policies is, however, to promote 
employment and hence income opportunities for people during the early phases of economic 
and social structural transformation. A more equal income distribution can be achieved by 
raising the share of labor in total incomes at the primary distribution stage (that is, as returns to 
factors  rather  than  as  transfers),  and  the  first  step  to  do  so  is  to  widen  employment 
opportunities for people. We shall consider three specific sets of such policies: agricultural 
development policies, intended to raise rural employment and incomes (Section 4.3); industrial 
and trade policies, aimed to promote more labor-intensive kinds of industries (Section 4.4); 
and policies designed to promote the development of small and medium sized enterprises (or 
SME development policies) (Section 4.5). Some specific kinds of these policies have been 
                                                        
21  The term 'inclusive growth' is borrowed from the Asian Development Bank, which it now takes as its new mission. The rise 
in income inequality compared with its historical levels in the Asia-Pacific Region caused the Asian Development Bank to 
reorient its lending objectives in 2007 not only to reducing poverty but also to promoting inclusive growth. See ADB (2007a, 
b).     103 
 
tried across the ESA economies at various stages of their development with diverse force. We 
shall review major cases of these policies.   
 
A second set of public policies concerns human capital accumulation. Indeed, human capital 
accumulation, either as  educational advancements  or health enhancements, has intrinsic as 
well as instrumental values to human development. Health and knowledge are themselves ends 
that people pursue, and they also constitute two basic capabilities of the people. At the same 
time, as our discussion of the Kuznets curve in Section 3 stresses, increased and broad-based 
human capital accumulation can over time improve income distribution in an economy by both 
raising the labor‘s share in such distribution and reducing wage differences between skilled 
and unskilled labor. Indeed, increased and improved education of the work force, by raising 
the skills of the workers, can also facilitate the development of more knowledge-intensive 
kinds of industries, thereby promoting the income growth for labor vis-à-vis other factors of 
production (and economic growth in  general).  The latter in  turn is  likely to contribute to 
further human capital accumulation, resulting in a beneficial cycle of actions and reactions. 
Public policy relating to education is addressed in Section 4.6, and health in Section 4.7. 
 
Although our emphasis is on more equal primary income distribution, secondary income and 
in-kind transfers (including free or subsidized public services) are nevertheless also important 
for alleviating existing absolute poverty, reducing future possible incidence of such poverty, 
and ensuring that none, even though not absolutely poor, is too far left out of the enjoyment of 
economic, educational, health and other benefits that the economy and society produces and 104 
 
provides.  Our  third  set  of  policies,  therefore,  concerns  absolute  poverty  alleviation  and 
prevention, through providing safety nets for those in need, and, over time, relative poverty 
reduction  through  income,  employment,  education,  health  and  other  supportive  programs 
(Section 4.8). The universalization and integration of various welfare programs have recently 
received much policy attention in some economies (e.g. China), and we will consider the case 
for reducing the dualistic nature of welfare programs both between the rural and urban areas, 
and  within  the  urban  areas  (Section  4.9).  In  the  process  of  rapid  industrialization  and 
urbanization  in  many  developing  economies,  the  old  dualism  that  has  characterized  the 
rural-urban divide has somehow found new inroads into the cities themselves, dividing those 
who  are  local  residents  and  those  who  are  migrant  workers  in  respect  of  employment, 
education, health, housing and other welfare entitlements and opportunities. It is important to 
find appropriate policies to combat these trends.   
 
The fourth set of public policies relates to environmental sustainability (Section 4.10). Across 
the  world,  various  local  and  global  environmental  problems  are  seriously  threatening  our 
wellbeing, our way of life and, indeed, our very civilization. For this reason, they have become 
among the most important policy concerns of our time, both nationally and internationally. 
Different  policy  regimes  exist,  ranging  from  a  completely  laissez  faire  approach,  to 
government exercising a strong hand using command-and-control methods, or market-based 
methods. However, besides issues over choice of tools to achieve given policy targets, the very 
concept of sustainability itself has, in fact, been surrounded by considerable controversy, and 
different ―p aradigms‖ of development can also be shown to have sharply different implications 105 
 
in terms of environmental consequences. As well as looking at specific environmental policies 
it will also be important to address these larger issues. 
 
The final set of policies relates to empowerment, agency, and civic and political participation, 
in short governance (Section 4.10). All public policy programs will need institutions, rules and 
procedures to support them. However, empowerment and civic and political participation can 
also help ensure that policies are responsive to the needs of the people, that policy making is 
transparent,  that  policy  makers  are  made  accountable  for  their  decisions,  and  that  policy 
implementations are efficient and the outcomes are equitable. Moreover, empowerment and 
participation (in short, agency) are themselves an end of development. As noted before, if the 
purpose of development is to enable people to better lead the lives they value, then it matters 
critically that they are involved in public policy making, supervision and evaluation.   
 
These five sets of public policies are diagrammatically related together in Figures 4.2.1 and 
4.2.2. We distinguish between the intrinsic and instrumental values of a policy objective. Since 
inclusive economic growth poses a major challenge to the ESA region in view of the recent 
deteriorations in income distribution in many economies, and since inclusive economic growth 
matters, though, critically to the progress of human development in the region, we highlight 
this as a key public policy goal. Figure 4.2.1 provides a framework for coordinating various 
public  policies  just  mentioned  in  working  towards  achieving  this  policy  goal.  Note  that, 
instrumentally, the final set of governance-related public policies is needed to underlie and 
support all the other four sets of policies to ensure that they achieve their intended policy aim. 106 
 
As well as their instrumental values in contributing to achieving inclusive economic growth, 
however,  many  public  policies  themselves  contribute  intrinsically  to  human  development. 
Figure 4.2.2 sketches out their intrinsic contributions.   
 





                                                        
22  In drawing this chart, we have drawn upon the related work of Ali (2007), which presents a very close framework for 
public policies aimed at achieving inclusive growth and poverty reduction in Asia.   
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4.3 Agricultural and Rural Development Policy 
Choice of agricultural and rural development policies that aim to enlarge employment and 
income opportunities for farmers can be extensive. In this subsection, we shall focus on two 
important sets of these, those concerning land holding and ownership, and those that aim to 
improve agricultural and rural infrastructure, both of which have had an important bearing on 
the course of agricultural  and rural  development  in  some ESA economies,  including their 
effects  on  agricultural  productivity,  rural  nor-farming  activities,  and  poverty  and  income 
distribution. 
4.3.1 Land Holding 
By land holding we mean the pattern whereby land is divided into production units called a 
farm. Existing literature finds that there exists an inverse relationship between the size of a 
farm and its land productivity, suggesting that inequality in land holding is detrimental to the 









agricultural productivity of an economy (see Berry and Cline, 1979, for a synthesis of the 
literature).  Holdings  need  not,  of  course,  fully  reflect  the  land  ownership  pattern.  Where 
tenurial arrangements allow extensive share or fixed tenancy, for example, ownership and 
holding  patterns  can  differ  significantly.  Absentee  land  ownership  is  a  case  in  point. 
Ownership entitles an owner to a share of the produce of the land, and this has enormous 
implications for the incomes of a tenant holder. Under share tenancy, the produce is typically 
evenly divided between the tenant farmer and the owner. Under fixed tenancy, on average 
roughly about the same portion of produce or income accrues to the owner, although the two 
tenurial arrangements have rather different implications in terms of production incentives and 
risk  sharing.  Thus  given  the  holding  or  size  structure,  which  as  noted  has  important 
implications  for  agricultural  productivity,  the  character  of  the  ownership  pattern  makes  a 
critical difference to income distribution and, indeed, to incidence of poverty. Needless to say, 
through its effect on the production incentives, ownership can also affect productivity. 
 
Given these underlying relationships, it is little wonder that an increasing body of literature 
now finds  a significant  negative relationship  between concentration of  land  holding  in  an 
economy  and  its  agricultural  productivity  and,  indeed,  aggregate  economic  growth.  A 
reduction in land holding concentration through land or agrarian reforms can generate positive 
effects on productivity and growth. A reduction in land ownership concentration can have the 
further beneficial effects of reducing income inequality and poverty.23  Moreover, it may have 
                                                        
23  In the literature, authors may, however, use land holding data as proxies for landownership data. While international 
agencies such as FAO periodically collect and report data on the former, the latter are often much more difficult to obtain. 
Given that in empirics, even though conceptually strictly different, land holding patterns nevertheless may not differ 
significantly from land ownership patterns, the discrepancy should not cause significant problems to the analysis using such 
proxy data.   
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a  positive  effect  on  human  capital  accumulation  through  promoting  more  widespread 
schooling  and  reduction  and  elimination  of  child  labor,  which  in  turn  has  favorable 
implications for growth and income distribution (see Section 3). The pathways to these effects 
range  from  the  inverse  farm  size-productivity  relationship  as  noted  early,  to  a  greater 
availability of private savings for investment in human capital accumulation, greater security 
against natural disasters and price uncertainties, and ability to use land as collateral for credit, 
etc. (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Galor et al., 2009; Besley, 2000; 
Gersbach and Siemers; 2010; Deininger and Squire, 1998).     
 
Typically  government-led  or  government-backed  land  reform  is  an  attempt  to  change  the 
ownership  and  tenancy  arrangement  of  land,  of  which  a  central  plank  has  often  been  to 
transfer  the  ownership  of  land  to  the  tiller.  Such  transfers  may  be  fully  or  partially 
compensated,  or  without  any  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the  land.  Where  ownership 
transfers are involved, land reforms often provoke the fiercest opposition from the existing 
land owners. This political dimension to a land reform program can sometimes doom it to 
failure, or even if it is carried out, affect how radical it is.24  In East Asian economies with a 
significant agricultural sector (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and mainland China), radial land 
reforms became possible at some stage in their recent history. In each case, they immediately 
followed  a  tumultuous  regime  change,  thus  effectively  removing  any  significant  political 
opposition to radical land reform.25  In other Southeast Asian Economies where this is not so, 
successive attempts to redistribute land have met, at best, partial success (see, for example, 
                                                        
24  See, for example, Ghatak and Roy (2007) on India. 
25  See Appendix 1 for discussion of the process of radical land reforms and their effects on the character and course of 
subsequent development in South Korea and Taiwan. 110 
 
Box  4.3.1  on  the  Philippines).  It  is  not  possible  immediately  to  attribute  the  subsequent 
superior performance in growth and income distribution in these East Asian economies to their 
more thorough land reform experiences. Nevertheless, it would have been surprising if no such 
effect ever existed. An Appendix to this report where we present the country cases of South 
Korean  and  Taiwan  and  explore  the  reasons  for  their  superior  growth-income  inequality 
trajectories considers this link in further detail.   
 
By far the most important legacy of the radical land reform programs in those ESA economies 
where these have happened is the birth and/or continuation of a small land holding system. 
Most ESA economies had had a low agricultural land-man ratio to begin with. Where land 
ownership  is  previously  unequal,  a  land-to-the-tiller  reform  program  should  ensure  that  it 
become  more  equal.  In  the  process,  this  should  create  a  broad-based  small  farm  holding 
system, if none had existed before. Or if such a system had already existed, then the process 
should further strengthen and reinforce it. In many ESA economies, moreover, land reform 
programs also included a ceiling on the amount of land a landowner could own subsequently. 
This effectively prevented land being re-concentrated into the hands of a few following the 
reform, thereby safeguarding  a wide ownership of land, the objective of the original land 
reform.  While  the  effect  of  this  policy  on  agricultural  productivity  may  be  disputed  (on 
accounts of economies of scale), its role in maintaining the small holding system is undeniable. 
Table 4.3.1 provides data on the number and average size of holdings over three decades 
(1960-1990) in Taiwan, which indicates a high degree of stability in the average size with 
actually  a  slight  increase  in  the  number  of  holdings.  The  same  table  also  provides  an 111 
 








What  enabled  many  ESA  economies  to  turn  an  otherwise  adversity  into  an  advantage  is 
precisely this small holding system. For it enabled rural non-farming activities to emerge and 
develop. As noted in Section 3, given the high man-land ratio prevailing in these economies, 
the land a farmer owns and cultivates could not on its own have supported a significant rise in 
income, if there had been no other non-farming activities which a famer could simultaneously 
engage in. However, the presence of such non-farming activities would be unthinkable without 
Box 4.3.2 the Philippines: The Case for Land Reform and the 1988 Law 
 
Agrarian relations in the Philippines share characteristics with both Latin American and Asian countries. 
There are hacienda-type plantations and small subsistence-oriented peasant tenancies, with a variety of land 
tenure arrangements in between. Putzel (1992) estimated that some 72% of rural families were landless in 
the late 1980s. Relative to other countries in Asia, agricultural sector growth has been poor. Rice yields in 
1991 were less than half those obtained in South Korea, Japan and China.   
The main arguments for reform of plantations are the highly seasonal employment they offer and the limits 
imposed on local food production by over-specialization (e.g. sugar, bananas, pineapples, etc), creating 
severe hardship when world prices fall and labor is laid off. Plantations are increasingly difficult to justify in 
the face of mounting land scarcity and rural unemployment. The most important category for reform is the 
landlord estate, from which tenants commonly can be evicted at will. The reform of tenancies transfers 
income to the tenant and creates incentives for investment. Land reform is high on the agenda of armed 
groups, adding urgency to the successful completion of land reform.   
Prior  to  Marcos's  'Operation  Land  Transfer',  1972,  and  the  Comprehensive  Agrarian  Reform  Law 
(Republican Act 6657 of 1988) under Aquino, reforms were restricted to the upgrading or conversion of 
sharecropping to leasehold tenancies. While not providing for the complete land reform that many had 
advocated, RA6657 extended coverage to all agricultural lands, provided for participation of farmers and 
NGOs in policy formulation and implementation, and allocated funds for support services. RA6657 sets an 
individual ownership limit of 5 ha for agricultural land. The overall retention limit for a family can be 14 ha. 
Due to delays in implementation of RA6657, holdings less than 25 ha are unlikely to be touched before 
1998  when  the  law  expires.  The  Constitution  requires  that  landowners  receive  just  compensation.  The 
valuation  of  lands  under  RA6657  is  based  on  a  formula  containing  3  criteria  of  varying  importance: 
productive value; the market value as declared in tax returns; and the value as indicated by comparable sales 
in the locality.   
Up to April 1994, 1.5 million ha had been distributed, which represented 39% of the total 10-year target of 
3.8 million ha. Well under half of the land distributed was private, demonstrating the resistance to the more 
controversial part of the program. However, this component has recently risen to represent half of that 
distributed annually.   
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a small holding system. Suppose that the rural areas of ESA economies were instead carved up 
by a few latifundios or plantations, hiring wage labor to work on land, often specializing in a 
few selected crops, the rural areas in most of the ESA economies would not have been able to 
support the population they have been supporting. Without a small piece of land which they 
cultivate intensively so as to generate extra income, it would have been difficult for rural 
nor-farming  activities to  thrive, since they  could not  have alone supported an  entire  farm 
family (see Section 3 where we discuss complementarities and mutual dependence between 
farming  and  non-farming  activities).  Indeed,  even  if  such  non-farming  activities  were 
undertaken, there may well not have been an adequate demand for their products and services. 
In that scenario, many farmers must instead migrate to urban margins to scrape a living. 
 
However,  with  their  small  land  holdings,  it  becomes  possible  for  them  to  simultaneously 
engage in both farming and non-farming activities. The rather high density of the population in 
the rural areas of these economies also helps to ensure a sizable local market and a significant 
demand for their products and services. Being close to a thriving urban community can also be 
a  help,  although  this  cannot  be  true  in  every  case.  With  incomes  from  both  farming  and 
non-farming activities, a farmer may now indeed find it preferable to stay on in rural areas, 




Table 4.3.1 Average Size and Gini Index of Land Holdings, Selected Economies 
(1) 
Countries  By 
Continents. 
Censu
s   
Year 
Number  of 
Holdings 






Gini  Index  of 
Concentration 
Taiwan  90  859 772  890 089  1.04   
  80  891 115  907 353  1.02   
  70  880 274  905 263  1.03   
  60  785 592  869 223  1.11   
Indonesia  93  19 713 806  17 145 036  0.87  0.46 
  73  14 375 343  16 394 000  1.14  0.55 
Japan  95  3 444 000  4 120 000  1.20  0.59 
  79  4650214  4 772 093  1.03  0.52 
  70  5 354 074  5 389 000  1.01  0.47 
Korea, Rep. of  90  1 768 501  1 857 491  1.05  0.34 
  80  2 157 555  2 025 795  0.94  0.35 
  70  2 421 420  2 132 233  0.88  0.37 
Philippines  91  4 610 041  9 974 871  2.16  0.55 
  81  3 420 323  9 749 200  2.85  0.51 
  71  2 354 469  8 494 000  3.61  0.51 
Thailand  93  5 647 490  19 002 071  3.36  0.47 
  78  4 018 427  14 954 592  3.72  0.44 
Lesotho  90  229 300  331 000  1.44  0.49 
  70  187 421  372 342  1.99  0.39 
Bahamas  94  1 760  20 336  11.55  0.87 
  78  4 246  36 246  8.54  0.89 
U.S.A.  87  2 087 759  390 311 617  186.95  0.74 
  79  2 476 340  394 061 235  159.13  0.72 
  69  2 730 250  430 321 000  157.61  0.72 
Brazil (2)  85  5 820 988  376 286 577  64.64  0.85 
  80  5 159 851  364 854 421  70.71  0.85 
  70  4 905 642  294 145 466  59.96  0.84 
France  89  1 016 755  31 985 606  31.46  0.53 
  80  1 262 672  33 648 959  26.65  0.53 
  71  1 587 643  35 039 217  22.07  0.53 
Greece (3)  95  802 400  3 578 200  4.46  0.57 
  71  1 047 260  3 586 294  3.42  0.49 
United Kingdom (4)  93  244 205  17 144 777  70.21  0.67 
  79  268 560  17 568 330  65.42  0.68 
  70  326 698  17 992 312  55.07  0.69 
Notes: (1) Includes holdings without land, for countries for which data for the 1990 census 
round and 1980 and/or 1970 census rounds were available. (2) Due to lack of data for the 
period 1986-95, data from 1985 Agricultural Census are used. (3) Data source: Eurostat - Farm 114 
 
Structure - 1995 Sample Survey. (4) Area classified by size of holding for 1993 excludes 156 
223 Ha reported by Minor Holdings. 
Source:  FAO,  United  Nations,  World  Census  of  Agriculture  Data;  Taiwan  Agricultural 
Yearbook, Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1996. 
 
4.3.2 Agricultural and Rural Infrastructural Investment: The Case of Taiwan 
A  second  important  set  of  policies  and  programs  concerning  agricultural  and  rural 
development that were adopted and carried out in some ESA economies and that have had an 
important  bearing  on  the  agricultural  and  rural  development  in  those  economies  relate  to 
agricultural and rural infrastructural investment, sometimes known as farmland consolidation 
(FC) programs. Note, however, that even though known as FC programs, the scope of these 
programs usually went  much beyond purely consolidating farmland only, but included the 
building of rural roads, agricultural technology extensions, and support to marketing and sales 
and agri-businesses. We highlight the FC programs in Taiwan (China) for close study, although 
similar sets of policies and programs were adopted and carried out still earlier in Japan, and 
almost contemporaneously in China under a rather different set of institutions at the time (Liu 
et al., 1998). 
 
FC in Taiwan involved consolidating those farm plots of irregular shape and size, with a poor 
farm road system, and poor irrigation and drainage systems. These conditions were recognized 
not to be conducive to carrying out controlled and timely irrigation and drainage, for farmers 
and machines to access plots, and for them to perform various operations in the plots. As such, 
FC in Taiwan involved rearranging existing plots and redesigning them into new ones of a 
suitable size and shape, with adequate roads and irrigation and drainage systems so that the 115 
 
plots can be directly irrigated and drained, and is linked to main farm roads. The main farm 
roads would be of an adequate width and condition for various farm machineries (tractors, 
harvesters, vehicles) as well as humans to pass so as to facilitate anticipated mechanization. 
Part of the aim of FC was to reduce land fragmentation, that is, the scattering of the same 
farmer's land into a number of non-contiguous plots at more than one place. Since most of the 
land to be consolidated was paddy fields, FC also meant re-leveling the plots to suit paddy 
cultivation,  according  to  the  new  boundaries,  roads,  and  irrigation  and  drainage  systems. 
Figure 4.3.1 provides the standard layout of post-consolidation farm plots vis-à-vis roads and 
irrigation and drainage ditches, and Figure 4.3.2 gives an areal view comparison of the land at 
one location in Taiwan before and after consolidation. 
 
All FC programs in Taiwan were fully government-initiated and -organized, sometimes with 
heavy  government  (and  international)  funding.  The  idea  of  organizing  and  carrying  out 
large-scale  FC  programs  in  Taiwan  dates  back  to  the  early  1950s.  Japan's  FC  experience 
appears to have had an important influence on Taiwan's official thinking at the time. Two 
government officials were dispatched to Japan on a fact-finding mission in 1953. They later 
became main proponents of FC in Taiwan.
26 
 
The most important of Taiwan's FC programs was the first Ten-Year Program (1962-71), at the 
completion of which a cultivated land area of 249,000 hectares, accounting for 28% of the 
total cultivated land in Taiwan at the time, was consolidated. This is by any standard a colossal 
                                                        
26  When the present author visited Taiwan's Agricultural Commission in 1993, he received a complete set of a Chinese 
translation of the Japanese laws and regulations on land use and FC, an indication of the heavy Japanese influence on 
Taiwan's FC programs. 116 
 
achievement. Also noteworthy is the fact the costs for this program were principally borne by 
farmers  themselves.  Only  two  thirds  of  the  estimated  administration  and  professional 
assistance costs were covered by the government. In subsequent programs, a greater portion of 
the costs was to be borne by the government. 
 
Figure 4.3.1 Farmland Consolidation in Taiwan: Standard Specification 
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According  to  Hsieh  (1993),  the  Program  had  an  enormous  impact  on  the  conditions  of 
farmland and on production. In the period 1962-67, the total number of farm plots in the 
consolidated area fell from 1,260,200 before FC to 465,050 after FC, a reduction of nearly 
two thirds. The proportion of directly irrigated and drained plots (i.e. a plot that is directly 
linked to an irrigation and drainage ditch without having to pass another plot) increased, 
respectively, from 21% and 19% before FC to 97% and 98% after FC. The yield of the first 
rice crop increased by 30% after FC compared with before FC. On the other hand, labor 
input per unit of land fell by 20%, and other production costs decreased by 15%. There were 
assessments of other wider social and economic impacts of the Program but I shall not dwell 
on them here. 
 
After the first Ten-Year Program, 1973 saw the launching of the second Four-Year Program, 
followed by other but minor programs in the ensuing years (see Table 4.3.2 for a list of the 
successive  programs  up  to  1995).  In  comparison,  while  the  first  Ten-Year  Program  had 
emphasized the goal of promoting agricultural growth by improving irrigation and drainage 
conditions,  and  by  facilitating  farm  operations  and  management,  the  emphasis  of  the 
subsequent  programs  shifted  to  creating  the  right  infrastructural  conditions  for  a  more 
mechanized agriculture so as to ensure continued agricultural growth with reduced labor 
inputs  and  increased  part  time  farming.  This  coincided  with  a  time  when  the  economic 
structure of Taiwan was undergoing a fundamental change. 1973 saw industry overtaking 
agriculture in the share of employment, having already overtaken agriculture in the share of 
GDP in 1962. (Industry became the second largest sector in both output and employment in 119 
 
1973, after the service sector. Rapid industrial development was expected to further draw 
labor away from agriculture (but not necessarily from rural areas, if part of the industrial 
development was to take the form of the development of rural industries, which did happen 
in Taiwan). The policy challenge then was how to ensure continued growth of agriculture 
with falling labor inputs. The solution of the Taiwanese government was to facilitate and 
encourage agricultural mechanization with part-time farming under a system of small land 
holding.   
 
Table 4.3.2 Taiwan's Farmland Consolidation Projects (Up to 1995) 





(2)Realized Areas  (2)/ (1) (%) 
First Phase           
1958-59  FC Experiments  2  525  525  100.00 
1960  FC  In  The  Flood- 
Afflicted Areas 
9  817  817  100.00 
1961  FC Demonstrations  11  3,362  3,225  95.93 
1962-71  First 10-Year FC Project  443  300,000  249,176  83.06 
2nd Phase           
1972-77  Rural  Construction  And 
Recovery Project 
22  -  3,349  - 
1976-81  6-Year  Economic 
Construction 
40  20,000  18,521  92.61 
1981-85  5-Year  FC-Promotion 
Project 
93  100,191  60,970  60.85 
1988-97  Waterway  And  Farm 










1992-95  Farm  Road  Mending 
And  Improving  Project 
In FC Zones 
  2,400 km  2,796.4 km  116.52 
Source:  Liu  Chien-jer  and Fu Yu-hsiu  (1995), ― An evaluation  on Taiwan‘s  FC‖, Taiwan 
Provincial  Government  and  National  Chung-Shing  University,  p.42;  quoted  in  Liu  et  al. 
(1998). 120 
 
Because of the increased costs and engineering difficulties, between 1973 and 1992 only a 
total of 116,267 hectares of land was consolidated. Adding this to that consolidated during 
the first Ten-Year Program, at the end of 1992 a total of 365,443 hectares of land underwent 
FC, which accounts for over 40 percent of Taiwan's total cultivated land at the time. 
4.3.3 Impact of Farmland Consolidation in Taiwan   
The impact of the FC programs is two fold. In the short run, by improving the basic farming 
conditions (improved irrigation and drainage, better crop management when the new road 
system facilitates personnel access to plots, and extra land due to a saving on plot boundaries 
when smaller plots are combined to form larger ones), FC can directly raise farm output and 
land productivity. In the long run, however, FC allows a saving on labor by facilitating factor 
substitution, that is, capital-labor substitution, by making certain agricultural machineries 
effective,  economical  and  rational  to  use.  Moreover,  under  the  conditions  of  small  land 
holdings, by enabling mechanization of almost all key stages of crop production and other 
farming activities, FC has the further effect of enabling farmers to make use only their spare 
time for farming, or only the labor input of the non-economically active part of a family's 
labor force for farming. If one calls this pattern of use of a farm family's labor for farming as 
part-time farming, then, to put it another way, by improving the basic farming conditions and 
making it possible and economical for farmers to mechanize, FC enables part-time farming. 
In Taiwan, thanks to its earlier land reform, small land holdings have become the bedrock of 
the rural institution. This provides the larger context for our understanding of its successive 
FC  programs,  or  for  us  to  make  sense  of  them.  On  the  other  hand,  through  these  FC 121 
 
programs, it also becomes possible for these small land holdings to survive and prosper. In 
other  words,  it  also  becomes  possible  for  the  very  institution  of  small  land  holdings  to 
survive in rural Taiwan. 
 
It is difficult in practice to separate these short-run and long-run effects, in part because the 
FC programs took place exactly at a time when the economy was undergoing rapid structural 
changes. At such a time, when industries already began to draw labor away from agriculture, 
there was no time for the short run effect to make itself felt before long run effect began to 
bite. Had the structural changes took place much later, and then it would have been possible 
clearly to discern the two types of effects, separately. Nevertheless, available evidence does 
appear to indicate both a strong short-run and a strong long-run effect.   
 
For the short-effect, as noted previously, according to Hsieh (1993), the yield of the first rice 
crop increased by 30% after FC compared with before FC. Liu et al. (1998) provides further 
micro survey data on this. As for the long-run effect, this is also clearly visible from the 
aggregate  data  on  falling  shares  of  agricultural  employment  but  coupled  with  rising 
agricultural production indices, as given in Figure 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. As can be seen, from 1964 
(two years after the start of the first Ten-Year program), the share of agricultural employment 
fell rapidly over the period for which we have data. With a relatively stable aggregate labor 
force, a fall in its employment rate must mean a fall in total agricultural employment and 
labor input.
27  At the same time, however, this was accompanied by a sharp, rising trend in 
                                                        
27  In absolute numbers, the size of agricultural workforce reached a maximum of 1.68m in 1964, and thereafter the number 
fell rapidly.   122 
 
the agricultural production indices. All this took place, importantly, over the FC program 
































































































While agricultural output continued to rise in spite of falls in its employment, the nature of 
rural employment did undergo a critical change. Part-time farming which until the early 
1960s  was  rare  and  constituted  only  a  small  percentage  of  farm  households,  became 
widespread over the next three decades. In Taiwan the official classification of a part-time 
farmer  or  farm  household  is  one  that  has  one  or  more  members  working  outside  the 
household farm for over 30 days, a rather broad definition of part-time farming. And among 
such households those whose income from non-agricultural sources equal or exceed 50% are 
called ― sideline‖ part-time farmers. Otherwise they are known as ― agricultural‖ part-time 
farmers. Using the narrower definition of ― sideline‖ part-time farmers as part-time farmers, 
Figure  4.3.5  shows  that  the  percentage  of  this  category  of  part-time  farmers  (or  farm 
households) was around 20% of all farm households in 1960, marginally rose to over 25% in 123 
 
1970s, but then sharply increased to 55% in 1980, and rose again to around 70%. Thus in 
only  three  decades,  the  same  time  period  in  which  extensive  FC  programs  took  place, 
part-time farming became dominant in Taiwanese agriculture. There is hardly any doubt that 
this enormous change must have been due to, at least in part, to the extensive FC programs 
that were carried out over the period.   
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Note: In Taiwan part-time households are those with one or more members working 
outside the household farm for over 30 days. Among these households those whose 
income from agricultural sources exceeds 50% are classified as agricultural part-time 
farmers, and the rest sideline part-time farmers. 
Source: Liu et al. (1998). 
 
In terms of the three-activity model developed in Section 3, such a link is clear to see. By 
improving irrigation and drainage, FC raised yield and land productivity; by building road 
systems and standardizing farm plots, it facilitated mechanization and further increased labor 
productivity; by saving on labor, it made part-time farming possible and viable. At the same 
time,  FC  reduced  the  chances  of  time  clash  that  may  arise  if  one  or  one‘s  family 
simultaneously engages in both farming and non-farming activities, by making it possible for 
one to rely only on one's spare time to engage in farming, or for the economically non-active 
part of a family‘s labor force to perform most or all farming tasks. All this made part-time 
farming a rational thing to do, enabling farming to survive and prosper in the midst of rapid 
industrialization.  At  the  same  time,  it  widened  and  increased  available  employment  and 
income opportunities for farmers, raising their income and improving income distribution in 125 
 
the economy.   
 
It  is  important  to  caution,  however,  that  this  does  not  mean  that  FC  is  the  panacea  for 
achieving growth with equity in all cases. First, the larger context of small land holdings 
should not be forgotten. But even with small land holdings, it makes sense for a government 
to undertake FC only when the time is ripe, that is, when industrialization and economic 
structural changes have proceeded to a stage where the relative cost of labor has risen and 
that of capital fallen sufficiently. Figure 4.3.6 shows this, where the long-run effect of FC on 
capital-labor substitution is depicted as a technological change, represented by a southeast 
shift of the whole map of production isoquants for producing a given level of output Q1 (for 
brevity, only one such isoquant, a and b, is drawn for before-FC and for after-FC). Now 
before the economic structural transformation and rapid expansion of industries, and the 
rising income opportunities these provide, the opportunity cost of agricultural labor tends to 
be relatively low, and that of capital high. The steeper iso-cost line in Fig. 3 depicts this 
situation. The optimal capital labor combination chosen by a farm family is given by point a. 
However, with industrialization and economic structural transformation, the opportunity cost 
of  labor  generally  rises  and that of capital  relatively falls,  giving rise to the new flatter 
iso-cost line. The new optimal capital-labor combination chosen by a farm family is given by 
point b. It is of interest to see what would happen without FC while labor and capital costs 
change as above. Then only the old technology is available, and the changing factor prices 
would mean that capital-labor combination a' would be chosen. Now compare this with the 
case with FC, where b is chosen. The cost of producing output Q1 clearly increases. Thus the 126 
 
farm family would prefer using the new technology at new factor prices. On the other hand, 
if there were no changes in the factor opportunity costs, it would not be rational for a farm 
family to use the new technology, since in this case using the new technology (and choosing 
point b') to product output Q1 would entail a higher cost. Needless to say, if the farm family 
does not prefer using the new technology, there can be no incentives and rationale for FC. 
Thus  although  FC  might  make  certain  capital-labor  substitution  possibilities  feasible, 
nevertheless whether farmers would adopt it (and whether on social welfare grounds there is 




To conclude, with their high rural population density, radical land reforms such as those that 
took place in East Asian economies (Japan, Taiwan, Mainland China, and South Korea), and 
a further ceiling on future ownership of land, ensured the continuation and stability of a 
system of small land holdings. Similar sets of policies and programs on agricultural and rural 
development were also pursued in these economies. In the case of Taiwan, one kind of such 
programs, the farmland consolidation programs, is shown to have had an enormous positive 
effect on both agricultural output and on the emergence of part-time farming in rural Taiwan. 
The practice of part-farming enabled a widening and an increase of employment and income 
opportunities  for  the  farmers,  while  allowing  industries  to  draw  labor  from  agriculture, 
                                                        
28  It should be pointed out that Figure 4.3.6 shows, in fact, only one possible case. If the new isoquant Q1' is not situated where it 
is drawn in the figure, but a lot closer to the origin such that the new price line that uses pre-FC factor prices and that is tangent to 
Q1' lies below the price line IC1, then there is a case for FC even without structural changes. On the other hand, if the new 
isoquant Q1' is situated a lot father away from the origin in the northeast direction than in Figure 4.3.6, such that the new price 
line using pre-FC factor prices and tangent to Q1' lies above the price line IC2', then there is never to be a case for FC, with or 
without structural change. So the relationship between the need for FC and economic structural changes is not a clear-cut one. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does establish the fact that, under certain conditions, the case for FC may well depend on stages of 
economic development. Typically, we would expect there to be such dependence. 127 
 
thereby ensuring a balanced growth of industry and agriculture, and urban and rural areas. 
The  thriving  agricultural  and  rural  sectors  of  Taiwan  are  an  important  reason  for  its 
achievement of both rapid economic growth and relatively equal income distribution. 
 
 
It remains to note that in Fig. 4.3.6 it has, in fact, been implicitly assumed that all other 
factors of production except labor and capital are held constant. The assumption of land 
being held constant is particularly important, for it implies that over the course of structural 
transformation a farmer's land holding does not change. While this may have been true in 
Taiwan,  in  other  economies  where  industrialization  and  structural  changes  have  been 
accompanied by a process of "peasant differentiation", some farmers become landless and 
leave agriculture and others enlarge their land holdings. Overall, in these economies, there 
may be a significant fall in the man-land ratio and a change from more to less labor intensive 
cultivation  methods.  In  other  words,  there  may  well  occur  a  process  of  land-labor 
substitution (producing a given level of output with more land and less labor). Other things 
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being equal, land-labor substitution entails a fall in land productivity. However, this may be 
compensated by technological changes such that yield or land productivity does not fall. 
Land-labor substitution may or may not be accompanied by FC. However, by making the 
kind of changes in road and plot conditions as seen in Taiwan, one may expect FC to allow a 
farmer to cultivate a larger area of land than otherwise. So, in principle, FC can facilitate 
land-labor substitution as well. Without FC, it may be difficult or even counterproductive for 
one farmer to cultivate more than a given area of land. 
4.4  Industrial and Trade Policy 
It has been noted in Section 3 that industrialization has a key role to play in promoting 
economic growth and human development. The re-allocation of given amounts of production 
factors  from  low  value  added  sectors  to  those  with  high  added  values  will  improve  the 
overall economic attainment of a region or country, and this process can be expedited by 
international trade, e.g. by enabling an economy to capitalize on its comparative advantage 
and, indeed, to upgrade its technology at a faster pace than it otherwise could. Generally 
speaking,  in  the  industrialization  processes  of  ESA  economies,  the  export-oriented  trade 
policies have played a much more important role than industrial policies in improving their 
domestic  productivities.  Indeed,  it  appears  that  the  shift  of  industrial  structure  in  these 
economies has been driven mainly by market forces and comparative advantages through 
trade, rather than through distortional industrial policies. 
4.4.1 Market Failures and Industrial and Trade Policies 
By industrial policies are meant policy measures that are intended to support strategic and 129 
 
emerging industries with a view to achieving catching-up through a shorter trajectory of 
industrial evolution. In an increasingly interdependent world, however, any economy has to 
coordinate its industrial and trade policies. In the early phases of the post-War period, trade 
protectionism as  represented by various  import-substitution polices  had been  adopted by 
many economies in the ESA region to achieve their respective industrial policy goals. These 
policies were usually aimed to promote the expansion of some particular industries, often 
without  taking  account  of  the  economy's  comparative  advantage,  based  on  factor 
endowments or otherwise. Such policies often failed. On the other hand, industrial policies 
can  also  be  based  on  an  economy‘s  comparative  advantage,  and  be  promoted  through 
international trade. Most ESA economies appear to have gone through a succession of phases 
of developmental policies that were characterized by one or the other of these sets of policies, 
but they ultimately settled on export push strategies.   
 
Why should governments interfere with the level playing field of the international market 
through industrial policies? An influential report by the World Bank (1993), The East Asian 
Miracle, which addressed this issue with specific reference to the ESA region, lists four 
reasons, which we quote in full here (p.294-294):
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Interdependent investments and economies of scale. Increasing returns from scale 
and  capital  market  imperfections  may  mean  that  investments  that  could  be 
                                                        
29  The analysis and discussion in this and other parts of this section draw closely on World Bank (1993), as this provides 
still by far the most influential and comprehensive look at the trade and industrial policies in ESA economies. Although this 
report deals with a period immediately preceding the one that we are dealing with, many of the policies that it discussed and 
analysed had a great impact on the subsequent course of development in the economies in question, were in some cases 
carried over to the subsequent period, and, indeed, may also have influenced the policy stance in other economies in the 
region.           130 
 
internationally  competitive  at  optimal  scales  will  not  be  undertaken.  This  is 
especially  true  with  large,  interdependent  projects  for  which  optimum  scale 
depends on simultaneous investment in upstream and downstream industries. The 
larger  the  indivisibilities  and  returns  from  scale,  the  more  likely  that  private 
initiatives will be absent.‖ 
 
Strategic negotiations. In negotiation with other economies and foreign companies, 
governments can alter the nature of the market environment by intervention. The 
outcome of any bargaining problem depends on the strength of competition on 
both  sides.  By  coordinating  the  actions  of  buyers  of  technology  and  trying  to 
increase  competition  among  sellers,  governments  can  appropriate  more  of  the 
surplus associated with the transfer of technology than they otherwise could…. 
 
Pecuniary externalities. Pecuniary external economies arise if, as the size of a 
competitive industry increases, the long-run supply curve fails (Marshallian real 
externalities). Such gains in productivity are attributable to economies of scope in 
the use of specialized equipment and greater specialization of individual skills. 
When economies are small, current prices may not convey adequate information 
about  prospective  lower  costs  of  production  through  larger  plant  size  …. 
Externalities  can  also  arise  from  the  interaction  between  suppliers  and  buyers 
about the design or production of a product leading to a better or cheaper good 
than is available internationally. In this case, the source of the externality is the 131 
 
non-tradability of some types of inputs or knowledge—otherwise the improved 
method or product could be obtained from international suppliers. 
 
Learning.  Externalities  related  to  learning  have  traditionally  been  identified  as 
important sources of market failures in developing economies. When firms gain 
knowledge  of  production  from  other  firms  without  incurring  costs,  real 
externalities  are  present.  Because  of  incomplete  appropriability  of  knowledge, 
individual  firms  may  spend  less  on  obtaining  production  knowledge  than  is 
socially optimal. Externalities due to learning may also be conferred on other firms 
by the first entrant. These include the demonstration that the sector is physically 
and  economically  feasible  and  the  leakage  of  information  on  technology  and 
marketing …. 
4.4.2 Switch of Trade and Industrial Policies from Import-Substitution to Export-Push   
The same World Bank (1993) study also provides a detailed account of the evolution of trade 
and industrial policies in most ESA economies (with the important exception of China) in the 
decades immediately preceding 1990, and evaluates their successes and failures. Although 
the period we are dealing with is since 1990, clearly past industrial policies of an economy 
can leave a deep imprint on the subsequent course of its industrialization, and they offer 
important pointers to future courses of action. For this reason, we quote extensively below 
the account and analyses from that study.   
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According  to  World  Bank  (1993,  p.293),  in  the  1950s-1970s,  through  their  heavy  and 
chemical  industries  (HCI)  programs,  Japan  and  Korea  had  been  the  most  active  High 
Performing  Asian  Economies  (HPAEs)  in  promoting  specific  industries  and  sectors.
30 
Singapore  and  Taiwan  (China)  had  also  actively  provided  incentives  for  technological 
upgrading.  Malaysia  had  had  an  HCI  program  similar  to  that  of  Japan  and  Korea,  and 
Indonesia had attempted to leapfrog from labor-intensive manufacturing to high-technology 
industries such as aircraft and electronics. However, that policy ended in heavy failure. 
 
However,  ― [A]lthough  all  ESA  economies  except  Hong  Kong  passed  through  an 
import-substitution phase, with high and varying levels of protection for domestic substitutes 
for  imports,  these  periods  ended  earlier  than  in  other  economies,  typically  because  of  a 
compelling need for foreign exchange. In contrast to many other economies that tried to 
preserve foreign exchange with stricter import controls, the HPAEs set out to earn additional 
foreign exchange by increasing exports.‖ Thus, ― Hong Kong and Singapore adopted trade 
regimes  that  were  close  to  free  trade;  Japan,  Korea,  and  Taiwan,  China,  adopted  mixed 
regimes that were largely free for export industries. In the 1980s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand  have  adopted  a  wide  variety  of  export  incentives  while  gradually  reducing 
protections. Exchange rate policies were liberalized, and currencies frequently devalued, to 
support  export  growth.  Overall,  these  policies  exposed  much  of  the  industrial  sector  to 
international  competition  and  resulted  in  domestic  relative  prices  that  were  closer  to 
international prices than in most other developing economies‖ World Bank (1993, p.22). 
                                                        
30  In World Bank (1993), the High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) include: Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 133 
 
 
Specifically, ― [T]he northeastern-tier economies—Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, China—halted 
the  process  of  import  liberalization,  often  for  extended  periods,  and  heavily  promoted 
exports. Thus while incentives were largely equal between exports and imports, this was the 
result  of  countervailing  subsidies  rather  than  of  trade  neutrality;  promotion  of  exports 
coexisted with protection of the domestic market. In the Southeast Asian HPAEs, conversely, 
governments used gradual but continuous liberalization of the trade regime, supplemented by 
institutional support for exporters, to achieve the export push. In both cases, governments 
were credibly committed to the export-push strategy; producers, even those in the protected 




Indeed, to the extent that the ESA economies had had sectoral policies, these policies were 
― usually geared toward export performance, in contrast to the inward-oriented policies of 
less successful developing economies. Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China, all relied 
on economic performance criteria, usually exports, to judge success. For example, in Taiwan, 
China, the government  suspended domestic content requirements that interfered with the 
exports  of  foreign  investors.  In  addition,  sectoral  policies  were  closely  monitored  and 
frequently adjusted. Thus, many of East Asia's ― industrial upgrading‖ programs of the late 
1970s  and  early  1980s  were  substantially  modified  or  abandoned  when  they  failed  to 
                                                        
31  ― The  export  push  in  the  Southeast  Asian  NIEs  came  later,  in  the  early  1980s,  and  the  instruments  were  different. 
Reductions in import protection were more generalized and were accompanied by export credit and supporting institutions. 
In these economies export development has relied less on highly selective interventions and more on broadly based market 
incentives and direct foreign investment‖ (World Bank, 1993, p.13). 134 
 
produce satisfactory results. Using the export rule meant that even programs of selective 
industrial promotion were indirectly export-promoting‖ (World Bank 1993, p.23).   
 
As well as these general accounts of the evolution of trade and industrial policies in the ESA 
region, Table 4.4.1 provides detailed information on the evolution of industrial policies in 
selected ESA economies, and Box 4.4.1 further provides a closer look at the particular case 
of Korea (Rep). The case of Korea (Rep) is of special interest as it is perhaps by far the most 
hotly discussed and debated case in the development literature as to the character and role of 
these policies in promoting the country's rapid industrialization and economic growth.   
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Table 4.4.1 Key Industries and Development Stages in ESA Economies 
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Source:  *  from  World  Bank,  1993,  p.134-142;  others  from  Ito,  Takatoshi,  "Japanese 
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4.4.3 Increased Trade and Industrial Upgrading in ESA 
It needs to be noted that the export-push strategy of ESA economies has both contributed to 
and benefitted from the expanding volumes of intra-regional trade within the ESA region. It 
is  difficult to  imagine how the export-push  strategy  could  have succeeded in  most  ESA 
economies without the rapidly expanding volumes of intra-regional trade in the region, just 
as it would be difficult to imagine how the rapidly expanding volumes of intra-regional trade 
could have taken place without the economies in the region strongly pursuing an export-push 
Box 4.4.1 Shift of Industrial Policies in South Korea 
 
Phase 1: 1950-1960. Before 1961, the industrial policies of South Korea had been focused on import-substitutions 
of non-durable consumer products such as textiles, shoes and home appliances.   
 
Phase 2: Labor-intensive export-oriented sectors became the object of South Korean industrial policies in the 
1960s. Policies were aimed to promote export-led industrialization. Exporting firms were exempted from duties on 
their  imported  inputs  and  were  eligible  for  public  funding  to  improve  equipments.  Exports  are  universally 
subsidized  and  those  to  emerging  markets  were  authorized  to  become  monopolies  in  those  markets.  Multiple 
exchange rates were adopted to exert import controls with the exchange rate for importing private firms higher than 
for official ones.   
 
This export-oriented system was built on government controls of financial resources and the channeling of such 
resources to selected sectors. Firms receiving support were given both incentives to make investments and develop 
technology capabilities and penalties for doing otherwise. 
 
Phase 3: Late 1960s-1970s. Heavy and chemical industries (HCIs) became the focus of South Korean industrial 
policies  in  this  phase.  The  overall  strategy  was  to  promote  import-substitutions  of  intermediate  production 
materials and the development of capital-intensive sectors such as shipping, steel, automobile, nonferrous metal 
and petroleum. 
 
The specific policies geared toward HCIs can be grouped into three categories: First, provide capital as needed by 
large  capital  investment  projects  through  state-initiated  funds.  Secondly,  protect  those  infant  industries  from 
international competition until they became competitive. Thirdly, legitimize monopoly in some sectors to cope with 
the problem of insufficient market size. 
 
Phase 4: Industrial policies since the 1980s are fundamentally distinct from the previous selective ones, with the 
objective being to incubate and promote those most competitive sectors. 
 
The  Industrial  Development  Act  of  1985  stressed  the  importance  of  market  mechanism  and  withdrew  policy 
support to selected sectors. The reference to "strategic industries" was removed from legal texts, with government 
interventions limited to only two kinds of sectors where the market fails: sectors where market incentives were 
weak and government support is needed to enhance its international competitiveness, and those sunset industries. 
 
Phase  5:  South  Korean  industrial  policies  since  the 1990s have  fundamentally  changed.  The  aim  of  the  new 
policies has been to "achieve industrial upgrading and efficient resource allocation via fee competition". Instead of 
designating  key  sectors,  the  government  now  grants  support  only  to  those  firms  that  can  survive  market 
competition. The focus of industrial policy is now on promoting efficiency.   137 
 
strategy. Indeed, as is pointed in Section 3, not only has the volume of intra-regional trade 
expanded at a rapid pace in ESA in recent decades, but also the character of this trade has 
undergone a radical change, with an increasing proportion of intersectoral trade, a result of 
an  expanding  regional  production  network  based  on  vertical  division  of  labor,  whereby 
economies at heterogeneous levels of technology each specialize in a particular production 
stage of an industry, rather than in different industries, a pattern of regional division of labor 
which some Japanese economists have called a ― flying geese‖ pattern.   
 
According to World Bank (1993), by shifting to an export-push strategy, ― [A]s a group, the 
HPAEs increased their share in world exports from 8 percent in 1965 to 13 percent in 1980 
and 18 percent in 1990. Manufactured exports have provided most of this growth. From 1965 
to 1990, Japan emerged as the world's biggest exporter of manufactured goods, increasing its 
share of the world market from nearly 8 to almost 12 percent. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
locus of growth shifted to the Four Tigers, whose share of manufactured exports grew nearly 
four times faster than Japan's. Beginning around 1980, the three Southeast Asian HPAEs 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand), which had been historically dependent on commodity 
exports, recorded a similar but so far smaller surge in manufactured exports‖ (World Bank, 
1993, p.37). 
 
Much of this trade has been, in fact, intra-regional trade. Indeed, recent decades have seen 
rapid rises in intra-regional trade within ESA. Thus, its share in the total volume of trade of 
the  region  increased  from  only  35%  in  1980  to  55%  in  2004,  next  only  to  EU  in 138 
 
intra-regional trade share. The rising share of intra-regional trade combined with the rising 
trade share of ESA in world trade, as well as the increasing worldwide trade volume itself, 
jointly  give  rise  to  an  explosion  of  intra-regional  trade  in  ESA.  Since  1980,  total 
intra-regional trade and GDP of ESA have both been increasing at a rapid pace, at an average 
annual rate of 13.5% and 8%, respectively. 
 
Of the total trade volume in ESA, intra-sectoral trade has experienced even more rapid rises. 
Its  share in  the total  trade volume increased  from  55% in  1990 to  78% in  2004,  at the 
expense of a decreasing intersectoral trade share from 45% to 22%. One cause and, indeed, 
also consequence of this development is, as noted, the growth of a region-wide sophisticated 
production and distribution network in ESA, something almost unique among the developing 
regions of the world (Ando and Kimura, 2003).   
 
Complementing  trade  is  FDI.  FDI  inflows  to  the  ESA  region have  been increasing  at  a 
phenomenal pace in the past decades. Take the 10 ASEAN economies for example, their 
accumulated FDI inflow increased steadily from 50.2 billion dollars in 1985 to 89.9 billion in 
1990, 170.6 billion in 1995, and 262.8 billion in 2000 (UNCTAD FDI database). The values 
of  FDI  Performing  Index  for  Singapore  and  Malaysia,  which  measures  a  country‘s 
competitiveness in attracting FDI, reached as high as 14.01 and 4.49 respectively. Notably, 
China had the largest volume of FDI among developing countries in the 1990s, attracting 
about 12% of global FDI. 
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Among FDI inflows into ESA economies, intra-regional FDI within ESA has been increasing 
at a phenomenal rate in the past decades, complementing its intra-regional trade. Its share in 
the total FDI inflow reached 57% in 2003. About 2/3 of FDI inflows in this region are from 
other ESA economies to China, which has countervailed China growing trade surplus with 
these economies.   
 
These expanding volumes of intra-regional and intra-sectoral trade and expanding flows of 
FDI from technologically more advanced economies to less advanced ones in the region are 
but manifestations of a region-wide production network emerging in the last few decades. As 
a result of the export push strategies pursued by the various economies in the region, much 
reduced trade barriers thanks to various regional and international trade agreements, and 
much reduced transportation costs due to improved transportation networks and facilities, 
moving goods across the borders has never been as easy and as economical as at present, 
enabling large-scale vertical divisions of labor to take place between the economies in the 
region. The heterogeneity in technological levels of the region‘s economies, while causing 
severe social and economic inequalities between the economies on the one hand, as we saw 
in Section 2, also provided, in fact, the very basis for this vertical division of labor. Under it, 
as well as capturing static economies of scale and benefits of specialization, technologically 
more advanced economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (China) have also led the 
process  of  industrial  upgrading.  Through  human  capital  accumulation  and  technological 
innovation  involving  new  production  processes,  new  products,  and  new  management 
concepts  and  practices,  these  economies  have  been  able  to  move  into,  or  specialize  in, 140 
 
technologically  more  advanced  industries,  or  more  advanced  parts  of  an  industry,  while 
shedding the other industries, or the other parts of an industry, to other economies in the 
region.   
 
Indeed,  by  following  a  graded  path  from  labor-intensive  through  capital-intensive  to 
knowledge-intensive stages of development, industrial upgrading in ESA economies can be 
seen  as  very  much  driven  by  the  mobility  of  old,  traditional  and  more  labor-  and 
capital-intensive  industries  away  from  more  developed  economies  such  as  Japan,  South 
Korea and Taiwan (China) to other economies in the region, in a fashion that many Japanese 
economists have called the ― flying geese‖ pattern, while these more developed economies 
themselves become increasingly specialized in more knowledge-intensive industries. It needs 
to be said that such a pattern of vertical division of labor and mobility of industries has, by 
and large, both closely reflected and capitalized on the existing comparative advantages of 
the economies in the region at any one time (each economy tends to specialize in those 
industries or parts of an industry that it has a comparative advantage in at that time), and it 
has allowed each economy‘s comparative advantage to evolve over time. Indeed, over time, 
following its own course of industrialization (e.g. increased costs of labor, and increasing 
human  capital  accumulation)  but  also  depending  on  the  course  of  industrialization  and 
development experience in other economies, an economy‘s comparative advantage may well 
change. Thus Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (China) all started their industrialization with a 
marked comparative advantage in labor intensive industries, and they then progressed to 
gaining a comparative advantage first in capital-intensive and then in knowledge-intensive 141 
 
industries. When they no longer had a comparative advantage in labor- and capital-intensive 
industries, other economies in the region (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
China)  then  filled  in  that  niche.  Through  such  region-wide  patterns  of  evolving  vertical 
division of labor and comparative advantage, the ESA region as a whole achieved a rapid 
pace of industrialization and economic development. However, one must never lose sight of 
the underpinning role of the export-push development strategy that these economies have 
pursued.   
4.4.4 Nature of Industrial and Trade Policies in ESA 
In this subsection, we explore two broad and closely related sets of issues. First, could an 
export-push strategy nevertheless be seriously market- and comparative advantage distorting? 
Secondly, if it is not, and if it merely conforms to the market and reflects an economy‘s 
comparative advantage, is there then any need for it?     
 
First,  could  an  export-push  strategy  be  seriously  market-  and  comparative  advantage 
distorting? For example, could a government be so bent on promoting the development of a 
particular (say, infant) industry to promote exports, an industry that is nevertheless in no way 
near  having  any  present  or  potential  future  comparative-advantage,  that  it  puts  in  vast 
amounts of resources determined to see its policy succeed? While such possibilities cannot a 
priori be ruled out, nonetheless the chances that such cases occur are expected to be few. 
First, an export-push strategy implies a high degree of openness of the domestic economy to 
the  international  market  and  international  competition  such  that  a  highly  comparative 142 
 
advantage-disobeying industrial policy will be highly costly and, moreover, such costs are 
easy to see given international prices. What is more, when there are alternative industries to 
support, as surely there must be (perhaps those that do have a comparative advantage), the 
cost and benefit differences of different choices of industries can also be established. Any 
sensible government, or a government that is not plagued with extreme corruption, would 
surely take notice of this and adjust its policy. Indeed, such policy reversals have by no 
means been infrequent in the history of industrial policy in ESA economies, as noted earlier. 
Secondly, political considerations are also an important factor. Beneficiaries of any export 
subsidies  are  foreign  consumers.  When  any  industrial  policy  that  sets  out  to  promote  a 
particular industry for exports and that costs an enormous amount of public money,  and 
especially  if  there  is  also  clear  and  better  alternative,  the  policy  would  ultimately  be 
politically unsustainable.
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And, indeed, according to the findings by World Bank (1993), the early industrial and trade 
policies in the ESA economies it studied had not been market-distorting, and had broadly 
reflected those economies‘ comparative advantages. ― Not withstanding the protection that 
exists  in  all  the  HPAEs  except  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore,  domestic  prices  in  these 
economies are closer to international prices than in other developing regions. Two bodies of 
evidence lead us to this conclusion. First, nominal tariff rates adjusted for the presence of 
nontariff barriers are lower in the HPAES than in most other developing economies. Second, 
                                                        
32  In contrast, under an import substitution regime (which may be used as the comparator here), domestic prices and, 
indeed, the exchange rates can often be so distorted that any evaluation of the costs of an industrial policy program can be 
difficult to make and even more difficult to see by the public, and beneficiary of any import-substitution subsidies will be 
domestic producers and consumers, which may remove much of the political sting from the issue.      
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comparisons of real GNP across a broad range of economies indicate that domestic relative 
prices  for  tradable  goods  in  the  HPAEs  are  closer  to  international  prices  than  in  other 
regions‖ (World Bank, 1993, p.298-299). 
 
However, ― [T]hese findings do not imply that governments were not attempting to influence 
industrial  structure.  They  undoubtedly  were.  But  they  suggest  that,  despite  government 
intentions,  the  manufacturing  sector  seems  to  have  evolved  roughly  in  accord  with 
neoclassical expectations; industrial growth was largely market conforming‖ (World Bank, 
1993, p.315). 
 
Our  second  issue  is:  if  the  sectoral  policies  in  ESA  economies  had  indeed  been 
market-conforming and had merely reflected the underlying comparative advantage of these 
economies,  was  there  then  any  need  for  them?  The  same  World  Bank  study  appears  to 
question this need when it calls into the question ― the efficacy of government efforts to 
promote or discourage specific sectors (World Bank, 1993, p.312). According to it, ― [I]n 
Korea, for example, despite the government's extensive efforts to speed the privates sector's 
shift  from  labor-intensive  to  capital-  and  technology-intensive  industries,  the  relatively 
labor-intensive textiles and garments sector was nearly three times bigger than international 
norms predicted in 1988, a substantial increase relative to international norms from 1968. 
During the same period, Korea merely maintained the international norm in chemicals, a 
heavily  promoted  sector,  while  other  heavily  promoted  sectors,  basic  metals  and  metal 
products and machinery, achieved only modest improvements. Similar surprises are evident 144 
 
in Singapore which like Korea, has a government that aggressively intervened through a 
variety of mechanisms to promote capital- and technology-intensive industries. Here, the 
importance of textiles relative to the predicted norm has increased even more sharply. The 
textile sector went from double its predicted size in 1973 to eleven times in 1989. Over the 
same period, metal products and machinery declined from twelve to five times its predicted 
size‖ (World Bank, 1993, p.312-314). 
 
Here  is  not  the  place  to  enquire  into  how  the  ― international  norms‖  used  in  such  an 
evaluation were calculated and what the counterfactuals might have been had there been a 
complete  absence  of  sectoral  and  other  export-push  policies.  The  fact  that  Korea  and 
Singapore (and many other ESA economies) had been among the most intervened economies 
in the world during its early phases of industrialization, and that they had also been among 
the fastest-growing economies in the world then, would seem to suggest that the answer is 
perhaps  otherwise.  Contrary  to  the  view  that  the  particular  sectoral  policies  in  these 
economies appear to have had a neutral or even harmful effect (it would seem odd to argue 
that these economies would somehow have grown even faster than they did without adopting 
the  said  policies,  when  many  other  not-so-heavily-intervened  economies  have  in  fact 
performed a lot poorer), the truth might be that these policies perhaps did play a role, on 
accounts of technological indivisibilities and capital market imperfections, and indeed the 
other factors (strategic negotiation, pecuniary externalities, and learning) the same World 
Bank  study  also  acknowledges.  Given  their  much  super  record  of  overall  growth 
performance than other not-so-heavily-intervened economies, it would appear much more 145 
 
convincing to argue that the policies in question did, overall, play a positive role. On the 
other hand, it would also be wrong to suggest that other economies can then simply copy the 
same  policies  that  were  tried  in  Korea  or  Singapore  (or  indeed  in  any  other 
higher-performing ESA economies), since each economy must have tried or not have tried a 
particular policy for an underlying reason, often specific to the conditions of that economy. 
Successful policies in one economy may be transplanted to another, but it should be done 
only after careful study and analysis.   
 
However, in spite of the caution, significant commonalities do appear to emerge from the 
successful  export-push  policies in ESA economies. The same World  Bank (1993, p,143) 
study  identifies  the  following  four  common  elements  towards  a  successful  export  push 
strategy: access for exporters to imports at world prices; access for exporters to long and 
short-term financing; government assistance in penetrating markets; and flexibility in policy 
implementation. Thus even though the form of export-push policies may have differed across 
ESA economies, these policies appear to have had a common set of core elements.   
4.4.5 Shifting Comparative Advantages and Evolving Industrial Policy in ESA   
It needs to be further stressed that an economy‘s comparative advantage need not be fixed 
but can in fact change. For example, as an economy undergoes industrialization, certain 
resources, especially unskilled labor, may eventually becomes scarce, and consequently its 
price rises, undermining the comparative advantage this economy may initially have enjoyed 
in  unskilled  labor-intensive  industries  (textiles,  clothing  etc.).  At  the  same  time,  new 146 
 
comparative advantages can emerge. An economy may initially have been endowed with a 
small  skilled-labor  force.  However,  as  personal  income  rises,  individuals  may  decide  to 
invest more in their own and their children‘s education. At the same time, with a greater 
amount  of  public  revenue  accruing  from  economic  growth,  and  perhaps  also  a  greater 
emphasis on education by the government, public spending on education may also increase, 
and this may result in rapidly increasing levels of education of the population as well, which 
in  turn  leads  to  rapid  increases  in  the  stock  of  skilled  labor.  Better  education,  better 
knowledge,  and  greater  cognitive  skills  of  the  work  force  mean  that  certain 
technology-intensive industries that were beyond the skill and knowledge capacity of the 
economy before, are now possible to undertake. And through learning by doing, the existing 
stock of knowledge and skills also becomes further expanded and improved both in quantity 
and  quality,  enabling  the  economy  to  further  engage  in  knowledge-  and  skill-intensive 
industries. In turn, the expanded skilled job opportunities with higher  salaries and better 
rewards can further induce people to invest in education, resulting in a beneficial circle of 
actions and reactions to propel the economy ever further along the path of knowledge- and 
skill-intensive industrial development. In a nutshell, this appears to be the path the more 
developed ESA economies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have trodden.   
 
But could the government have a role in influencing and shaping the future comparative 
advantage of its economy? According to Justin Lin (Lin et al., 2008), this the government 
should better try not to do. He distinguishes between an economy‘s comparative advantage 
and  its  factor  endowment  structure,  with  the  letter  determining  the  former.  Economic 147 
 
development causes an economy‘s factor endowment structure to change, and pari passu 
with this change its comparative advantage also alters. As its comparative advantage changes, 
its  industrial  structure  will  also  change.  According  to  Lin,  throughout  this  process,  the 
government will never be able to identify the economy‘s true comparative due to incomplete 
information.  Only  the  market  through  its  price  mechanism  can  tell.  In  the  absence  of 
government intervention, market prices in the economy are a good indicator of the relative 
scarcity of the production factors, inducing firms to enter those industries with an abundance 
of the factors specific to them, and exit those whose specific factors are scarce.   
 
Government  might  indeed  only  have  incomplete  information  about  the  economy‘s 
comparative advantage, and well-developed markets might indeed be a better mechanism to 
reveal that information. But markets may nevertheless fail, exactly in those ways as noted at 
the  beginning  of  this  section.  So  it  looks  that the  case  for  or  against  industrial  policies 
ultimately boils down to whether the risk and extent of market failures are greater than those 
of government failures, and this can only be determined empirically. A priori, there cannot be 
a valid case either for or against industrial policy across the board.   
 
Nevertheless, it remains to be said that it will be crucial for any government to ensure that its 
industrial policies are ― market assisting‖ rather than ― market distorting‖. As a general rule, 
industrial policies that are export-push have a better chance to be market assisting. This is 
perhaps why most of the ESA economies, through pursuing an export-push strategy, have 
managed to be higher-performing. Under an export-push strategy, industries are exposed to 148 
 
international  competition,  enabling  the  economy  to  overcome  any  significant  lack  of 
domestic competitions and any major market imperfection. Firms in these economies can 
follow the comparative advantage according to international relative prices. Interestingly, the 
― flying geese‖ pattern has been a rather vivid way of depicting the respective comparative 
advantages  of  the  ESA  economies  within  the  context  of  the  ESA  region,  and  how  the 
comparative advantage of each economy might or might not evolve.   
4.5  SME Development Policy 
In  this  subsection,  we  examine  public  policies related  to  SME  development  in  the  ESA 
region. SMEs have played a highly important role in the economic and social development in 
postwar ESA. For one thing, being more labor-intensive than large enterprises, SMEs can 
create more job opportunities with the same amount of investments in  an economy. For 
another, SMEs can help enhance market competition and cultivate entrepreneurship. Lastly, 
the development of SMEs can play an important and active role in poverty elimination (Yu et 
al., 2007) and even technological innovation in (Beck et al., 2005). The poverty alleviation 
role of SMES is looked at in Subsection 4.8. Below, we firstly present a summary of the 
characteristics  of  SMEs  in  the  ESA  region  in  respect  of  employment,  wages  and 
productivities. As we will see, in the ESA economies that we look at, SMEs together account 
for an employment share close to 40% and over. And while their productivities and wages 
are  lower  and  sometimes  significantly  lower  than  those  of  large  enterprises,  they 
nevertheless offer an important source of income for a significant portion of the population, 
especially those who are poor and unskilled. Secondly, we consider the obstacles facing 149 
 
SME development in ESA, ranging from credit constraints to constraints to technological 
innovation, and so on. Thirdly, we provide tentative policy suggestions on how to support 
SME development in ESA. Finally, we highlight successful policy experiences of Korea 
(Rep),  and  Taiwan  (China)  with  supporting  their  SME  development.  In  much  of  this 
subsection, our discussion and analysis will draw heavily on a recent report by the Asian 
Development Bank (2009) on SME development and challenges in the ESA region.
33 
4.5.1. Characteristics of SMEs in ESA 
As  sometimes  defined  in  the  literatures,  small,  medium  and  large-sized  enterprises  are 
respectively those with numbers of employees between 5 and 49, 50 and 199, and 200 and 
more. We summarize the characteristics of SMEs in ESA below in respect of their shares of 
enterprise  establishments,  their  employment  shares,  and  their  wages  and  productivity 
vis-à-vis those of the large enterprises.   
 
(1) High Shares of SME Establishments in ESA 
As shown in Figure 4.5.1, a vast majority of enterprise establishments in ESA are SMEs. In 
China, Malaysia and Thailand, SMEs account for 85-90% of all enterprise establishments, 
while their share is above 95% in India, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan 
(China).
34   
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  The ADB (2009) study amassed an impressive body of data on SMEs in ESA, but even so its analysis could not cover 
all the economies in the region. What follows below is a short summary of its findings in terms of the aspects of SME 
development that we have identified, and as such our account below will be limited by the extent of the coverage of that 
report. Note also that the ADB study does not, in fact, exclusively focus on the ESA region, but the whole of Asia. 
34  India is, of course, not an ESA economy. Nevertheless, we shall follow the ADB study in including it in the 
comparison. 150 
 
In terms of the size distribution of enterprises across the full range of small to medium and 
large enterprises, of the 8 economies covered in Figure 4.5.1, two distinct patterns appear to 
emerge. China, Malaysia and Thailand belong to one type with a significant proportion (over 
20%) of medium-sized enterprises, and a lower but nevertheless sizable proportion of large 
enterprises. In contrast to this more ― balanced‖ type, a much lower proportion of medium 
and large enterprises exist in the other five economies, with an overwhelming majority (over 
90%) of the establishments being small enterprises (which we may call the ― skewed‖ type). 
These differences in size distribution appear also to have had an important influence on the 
distribution  of  employment  shares  of  the  three  types  of  enterprises  in  the  economies  in 
question, as we shall see below. 
 
Figure 4.5.1 Share of Establishments by Enterprise Size (%) 
 
Note: Enterprise size is measured in terms of the number of workers. Years of data for 
these  ESA  economies:  China  PRC(2004),  India(2004-2006),  Indonesia(2006),  Korea, 
Republic of(2004), Malaysia (2005), Philippines (2005), Taiwan, China (2006), Thailand 
(2007). 




(2) SMEs in ESA as Powerful Job Creators   
As noted, SMEs in ESA economies have played a critical role in generating employment and 
income  opportunities  for  a  large  section  of  the  population,  especially  the  poor  and  the 
unskilled. Figure 4.5.2 presents findings on shares of employment of the large, medium and 
small enterprises for the same selected Asian economies. As can be seen, among the ESA 
economies, South Korea and Taiwan stood out: SMEs‘ share of employment is close to 60% 
in Taiwan, and around 70% in South Korea. In Indonesia, the share is lower, but still close to 
50%, while in the Philippines it is just above 40%. These are the economies that have had a 
more ― skewed‖ size distribution in favor of small enterprises. In the other economies with a 
more  ― balanced‖  size  distribution  (China,  Thailand  and  Malaysia),  SMEs‘  share  of 
employment  is  correspondingly  lower,  just  above  40%  in  China,  and  less  than  40%  in 




















Figure 4.5.2 Share of Employment by Enterprise Size (%) 
 
Note: As in figure 1. 
Source: Key Indicator (ADB, 2009) 
 
(3) Lower Productivities of SMEs in ESA 
Figure 4.5.3 compares the relative productivity (value added per worker) of small, medium 
and large enterprises in selected ESA economies. As can be seen, in the two economies with 
a sizable presence of large and medium enterprises (Malaysia and Thailand), the productivity 
of small enterprises, expressed as a percentage of that of the large enterprises, is also higher, 
close to 50% in Malaysia, and just over 40% in Thailand (due to data limitations, the ADB 
team was not able to perform the same analysis for China). In the other ESA economies, the 
ratio is just around 20%! There are reasons to believe that this association (greater share of 
medium and large enterprises and higher relative productivity of small enterprises) is by no 
means a chance occurrence. One would indeed expect a greater presence of medium and 
large enterprises to benefit the productivity of small enterprises too. However, in respect of 153 
 
the productivity of medium enterprises, no clear pattern appears to emerge reflecting the 
influence of size distribution. Except in South Korea, where the productivity of medium 
enterprises  is  only  just  above  40%  of  that  of  the  large  enterprises,  in  the  other  ESA 
economies  the  ratio  is  between  60%  and  70%.  The  breakdown  of  the  influence  of  size 
distribution on the productivity of medium enterprises, unlike in the case of small enterprises, 
is puzzling. While many possible explanations exist, as  yet there is no firm evidence to 
suggest a clear answer.   
 
Figure 4.5.3 Productivity (Value Added per Worker) Differentials by Enterprise Size   
(large enterprises = 100) 
 
Note: As in figure 1. 
Source: Key Indicator (ADB, 2009) 
 
(4) Lower Wages at SMEs in ESA 
While wages must be based on the productivity of workers, the relationship need not be 154 
 
exact. Figure 4.5.4 presents findings from the same ADB study on relative wages as paid by 
medium and small enterprises as a percentage of those paid by large enterprises in several 
ESA  economies.  As  can  be  seen,  while  the  pattern  of  wage  differentials  between  large, 
medium and small enterprises in these economies does broadly accord with the pattern of 
productivity differentials in  these economies,  the former does  deviate in important  ways 
from the latter. In all ESA economies for which there are data, small and medium firms pay 
higher wages relative to their productivity than large firms. This positive wage ― premium‖ is 
greatest (around 20 percentage points) for both small and medium enterprises in Thailand, 
Malaysia and South Korea, but      much less in the Philippines and Indonesia. Because of a 
lack of productivity data for China and Taiwan (China), no similar analysis can be made for 
these two economies.   
 
The presence of such a positive wage premium for small and medium enterprises is easy to 
understand. Being more capital intensive, a greater proportion of the proceeds of a large 
enterprise will have to be used to pay for non-labor factors of production, whereas small and 
medium  enterprises,  being  less  capital  intensive,  can  use  a  greater  proportion  of  their 








Figure 4.5.4 Wage Differentials by Enterprise Size (large enterprises = 100) 
 
Note: As in figure 1. 
Source: Key Indicator (ADB, 2009) 
4.5.2. Obstacles to SME development in ESA 
While SMEs have played a particularly important role in ESA economies, their development 
has been constrained by a range of factors. According to a recent study by Tambunan (2008), 
many kinds of constraints limit SME development, but the most common ones are those 
related to finance, and technology and skill (Table 4.5.1).   
Table 4.5.1: Constraints Facing SMEs in Asian Developing Economies 
 
Notes: * includes electricity; ** includes regulations, restrictions, legal framework, law and 
order,  and  discriminatory  policies  in  favor  of  large  enterprises  and  multinational 
corporations. 
Source: Tambunan (2008). 156 
 
 
(1) Finance Constraints 
Development of SMEs depends on a number of factors, of which access to finance has been 
an especially important bottleneck in ESA and, indeed, in other economies as well. SMEs are 
more likely to  encounter finance constraints than large enterprises. Compared with large 
enterprises, SMEs are generally characterized by poor transparency of information (because 
of less stringent bookkeeping standards, etc.). This limits their ability to raise funds through 
direct financing. When SMEs want to obtain indirect financing, such as loans from banks, 
asymmetric information  and imperfect  contract enforcement associated with SMEs  make 
loan assessment, supervision and reclamation costly for creditors. Inadequate collaterals of 
most SMEs increase the risks of default. Thus, the banks do not tend to lend to SMEs.   
 
The character of an economy‘s financial structure has an impact on the financing of SMEs 
(Liu and Yu, 2008). In some economies of ESA (such as PRC), the bank sector is dominated 
by a few large state-owned commercial banks. Such a banking sector structure could reduce 
SMEs‘ ability to obtain indirect financing, and hence affect their development, for several 
reasons. First, for larger banks, lending to SMEs tends to be more costly than lending to 
large enterprises because loans to SMEs, which are usually in smaller sums, carry relatively 
higher average transactions costs. Therefore, these banks are usually reluctant to lend to 
SMEs.  Small  banks,  in  contrast,  because  of  their  limited  lending  capacity  and  for  risk 
diversification, would not be in a position to extend loans to large enterprises, but are able to 
lend  to  SMEs.  Consequently  a  banking  structure  dominated  by  large  bank  would  be 157 
 
unfavorable  for  SME  financing.  Second,  funds  often  tend  to  flow  more  easily  from 
economically backward to more developed regions, and from rural to urban areas through 
large banks than through small banks. Therefore, a banking sector dominated by big banks 
could well hamper SMEs‘ access to credit in poorer localities. Third, a higher level of market 
concentration could reduce SMEs‘ ability to bargain for a lower cost of borrowing. Financial 
institutions with strong market power could force SMEs to pay very high interest rates for 
any  borrowing  they  obtain.  Fourth,  in  the  PRC,  state-owned  banks  are  favored  in  the 
financial market, while most SMEs are privately owned. Such a mismatch of property rights 
between banks and borrowing enterprises has been an added factor reducing the flow of 
financial resources to SMEs: state-owned banks could face political risks when lending to 
SMEs, particularly when such lending results in bad debt, whereupon banks could be blamed 
for  the  loss  of  state  assets,  making  them  reluctant  to  lend  to  SMEs.  In  contrast,  large 
enterprises  tend  to  be  state-owned,  and  loan  risks  with  them  would  not  generally  carry 
similar political risks (Jiang 1998). 
 
Aside from a lack of access to financing, such funding unavailability also tends to strike 
different enterprises with difference force. Thus SMEs are generally much more vulnerable 
to  the impact  of  financing  constraints  compared with  large enterprises,  in  that the same 
constraints can inflict disproportionately greater harm on them. A study by Ayyagari et al. 
(2006) finds that small enterprises facing credit constraints on average suffer a 10 percentage 
points growth loss compared with those not facing such constraints, while the loss is only 6 
percentage points in the case of large enterprises.   158 
 
 
(2) Constraints in Technological Innovations   
As a result of severe credit constraints, it becomes less likely for SMEs to invest in risky 
technological innovations than large enterprises. Besides, while the daunting fixed costs of 
technological  innovations  may  be  afforded  by  large  enterprises  that  enjoy  massive 
production volumes, the same is not true of SMEs. Cost considerations alone may discourage 
many  SMEs  from  undertaking  technological  innovations.  Indeed,  SMEs  in  ESA  fall  far 
behind  large  enterprises  in  technological  innovation,  which  is  clearly  illustrated  by  the 
figures given in Table 4.5.2. As can be seen, the percentages of SMEs developing a new 
product line, upgrading an existing product line, or indeed introducing a new technology, are 
much lower than those of large enterprises. 
Table 4.5.2: East and Southeast Asia Enterprises Undertaking Innovations (%) 
  Small  Medium  Large 
Developed a major new product line  32.40%  45.60%  56.90% 
Upgraded an existing product line  53.40%  63.30%  72.20% 
Introduced  new  technology  that  has 
substantially changed the way that the main 
product is produced 
27.00%  41.30%  54.30% 
Notes: East and Southeast Asia in this case includes Cambodia, People's Republic of 
China, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam. 
Source: Key Indicator (ADB, 2009) 
 
(3) Poor Infrastructure 
For one thing, poor infrastructure can cause and/or reinforce market segmentation that may 
in turn impede the development of SMEs. For instance, some SMEs may be confined, for 
lack of good roads and transportation facilities, to their immediate ― local‖ markets, thereby 159 
 
preventing their expansion. For another, backward infrastructures can well prevent SMEs 
from  importing  and  adopting  advanced  production  technologies.  For  example,  the  less 
reliable  network  facilities  may  make  it  difficult  for  SMEs  to  take  advantage  of  certain 
internet-based  advanced  technologies.  According  to  recent  World  Business  Environment 
Survey data (surveys carried out between 2003 and 2006), backward infrastructures in Laos 
have exerted a great negative impact on the development of SMEs in the country (ADB, 
2009). 
 
(4) Other factors 
Other factors limiting the development of SMEs in ESA include market segmentation and 
the  externality  of  training.  As  a  result  of  low  per  capita  incomes  in  many  developing 
economies in ESA, most of their market demands concern low-end commodities. That has 
led to a concentration of SMEs around the bottom rungs of the technological ladder and has 
discouraged technological improvements. Additionally, experienced workers trained by one 
SME may be head-hunted by another with better offers, when average wages and benefits 
are poor. Externalities such as this make most SMEs reluctant to invest in training their 
workers, severely preventing their productivity improvements. A vicious circle seems to be 
formed involving low wages and benefits, low training, low productivity, and low wages and 
benefits. There are still other more idiosyncratic constraints to a SME‘s development but we 
shall not further list them here. 160 
 
4.5.3 Policy Implications for SME Support in ESA 
The above analysis reveals important obstacles to the development of SMEs, in ESA but also 
in other parts of the world. Policies are needed to overcome them. The following discussion 
of possible policy measures in that direction shall relate to credit and skill and technology 
constraints  only,  constraints  that  are  widely  present  in  ESA  economies.  Where  ESA 
economies (especially some of them) have performed better in promoting SME development, 
compared  with  other  economies  in  the  world,  is  how  they  applied  various  measures  to 
overcome these constraints.   
 
(1) Credit Support   
Many economies in ESA have taken measures to deal with credit constraints that heavily 
plagued SME development. The most common type is the Directed Credit Programs (DCPs). 
These programs usually take two approaches: to secure a certain amount of credit line to 
SMEs, and/or to issue SMEs loans at subsidized rates. The Credit for People's Business 
program in Indonesia and the SME Development Fund program in China are two examples 
that support SMEs by extending directed credit to them.   
 
DCPs have, however, also suffered from problems of high costs and that state-backed SMEs 
are more likely to obtain credit support. Before deciding to provide credit to a SME, the 
government agency in charge will need to collect relevant information about the enterprise, 
but this can be difficult and costly, compared with collecting the same information about a 
large enterprise. Besides, using administrative means rather than the market mechanism to 161 
 
allocate  available  funds  may  well  cause  inefficiency  and,  indeed,  induce  rent-seeking 
behavior.  Moreover,  the  program  may  particularly  favor  state-backed  SMEs  as  these 
enterprises are likely to enjoy an established, good relationship with the government agency 
(even if there is no other, perhaps ideological, reason to favor them). In many economies, 
these drawbacks of the program have often resulted in those really needy SMEs not actually 
getting the loans, while those not in real need getting them. Indeed, according to one study 
(Aldaba, 2008), in the Philippines much of the DCP funds did not even go to SME but to 
large enterprises that deliberately understate their assets to be classified as SMEs.     
 
In addition to directed credit programs, the government can also increase access to credit 
through following policies. First, in those countries where the banking sector is dominated 
by a few large state-owned commercial banks, it is important to actively develop small and 
medium-sized financial institutions such as  small regional banks,  including microfinance 
institutions;  encourage  financial  market  competition;  and  allow  disadvantaged  groups  to 
participate in the financial markets (Liu and Yu, 2008). 
 
Secondly, governments ought to provide better legal protection for creditor‘s rights that are 
the foundation of a well-functioning financial system. The opportunities to obtain credits will 
increase only if the lender‘s  rights  to reclaim  their principals  and interest  are protected. 
Given the importance of collaterals to reduce information asymmetry in the credit market, 
developing credit collaterals may help SMEs obtain greater financing supports. On the other 
hand, the role of collaterals comes into full play only when property rights are under strict 162 
 
protection. That requires greater efforts by governments to improve the legal systems.   
 
Thirdly,  Credit  Guarantee  Schemes  can  also  provide  important  credit  supports.  The 
government can encourage large enterprises that have business relations with and influence 
on SMEs to provide credit guarantees for them. Because Credit Guarantee Schemes neither 
require  matching  collaterals  from  SMEs  nor  much  financial  commitment  from  the 
government, they can be an effective credit support measure for SMEs. 
 
Finally, Credit Registry and Credit Scoring can substantially reduce information asymmetry 
in credit markets, thereby relieving credit constraints on SMEs. On the side of creditors, 
Credit Registry incurs lower costs than otherwise in collecting credit histories of SMEs, 
thereby raising the willingness of creditors to issue loans. On the side of SMEs, a scheme 
whereby default records can have negative impacts on the success of one‘s future credit 
applications  can  urge  a  firm  to  make  timely  repayments  according  to  contract.  Thus 
governments should establish institutions that administer Credit Registry and Credit Scoring 
as one way of improving the accessibility of credit for SMEs. 
   
(2) Technology Support 
A range of public policies have been tried in many ESA economies aimed to overcome the 
relatively  weak  technology  capabilities  of  SMEs  and  to  raise  productivity.  They  include 
provisions of various technology-related credit subsidies, technology extension services, and 
technical training to SMEs. South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China) are all models in 163 
 
this respect. In the 1970s, South Korea began to support SMEs through industrial policies. 
The Subcontracting Promotion Act of 1975 encouraged large enterprises to transfer advanced 
production  equipments  to  SMEs.  The  technology  support  given  by  the  South  Korean 
government was aimed not only to boost productivity, but also to provide incentives for 
SMEs to improve their technology over time. SMEs in South Korea, however, needed to 
submit  technology  improvement  plans  to  relevant  government  departments  before  hand. 
Only if their plans were approved, could the enterprises in question receive long-term credit 
and  technology  support.  In  Singapore,  a  Vocational  and  Industrial  Training  Board  was 
founded in 1979, with the mission to provide SME employees with technical training. 
 
When an SME becomes a supplier of materials or accessories for a large enterprise, the large 
enterprise will have the incentives to provide it with technical support in production and 
workers‘  training.  Thus  a  government  may  attempt  to  improve  the  level  of  production 
technology  of  SMEs  by  encouraging  them  to  develop  down-stream  relations  with  large 
enterprises. Such relations are ubiquitous across ESA. For example, in the auto industry in 
Thailand,  there  are  nearly  1800  SMEs  supplying  various  accessories  to  14  large  auto 
enterprises. Two government organizations in Thailand are charged with the responsibility to 
facilitate  links  between  SMEs  and  large  enterprises.  They  are,  namely,  the  Bureau  of 
Supporting Industries Development (BSID), and the Board of Investment (BOI). One agency 
under BOI, the  Unit  for  Industrial  Linkage Development  (BUILD), has been principally 
responsible for developing linkages between local SMEs and large enterprises (especially 
multinational  corporations).  It  actively  advertises  domestic  SMEs  to  international  large 164 
 
enterprises and helps them to develop linkages by organizing exhibitions of products by local 
SMEs and maintaining databases on them.   
4.5.4 Successful SME Development Policies in South Korea and Taiwan (China)   
(1) South Korea 
Between  the  immediate  postwar  years  and  the  1970s,  large  enterprises  had  been  given 
importance by the South Korean government. Since the late 1970s, however, both the share 
of employment and the share of value added of SMEs in the national economy have seen 
consistent increase. In 2004, over 95% of all the business establishments in South Korea 
were SMEs that provided nearly 70% of the employment in the country. SMEs have become 
a  solid  foundation  of  the  South  Korean  economy  and  society.  On  the  whole,  the  South 
Korean government has been highly successful in promoting the development of SMEs. Its 
experience can be generalized in terms of the following six areas. 
 
First, the South Korea government established in 1996 a special government agency, the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, to be in 
charge of formulating and implementing policies to promote the development of SMEs. It 
has since played an important role in furthering the development of SMEs in South Korea. 
Second, a special financial institution was founded in the 1980s to provide financial services 
to SMEs, which significantly relieved credit constraints on SMEs.  In addition, since the 
mid-1970s, credit support for SMEs has been linked to technological improvements. Those 
SMEs applying for credit support are required to provide technology improvement plans. 165 
 
They are eligible for long-term credit support only if their plans are approved. Third, the 
South Korean government actively helped SMEs with human resource training. Each year it 
devotes a considerable amount of resources to training SME workers in using advanced 
production technology. Current technical on-the-job training programs for SMEs have over 
30000  industrial  trainees  at  over  6500  SME  manufacturers,  greatly  contributing  to  the 
alleviation  of skilled worker shortages  (Gregory, 2002).  Indeed, it sometimes  even  went 
beyond assisting on-the-job training of existing SME employees, but provided direct human 
resources assistance. Thus to help ease skilled human resource shortages facing SMEs in the 
late 1990s, a total of 42850 industrial technicians were assigned to nearly 10000 SMEs in 
1998.  Fourth,  the  government  restructured  the  industries  by  restricting  the  monopolistic 
power of large enterprises, so as to assist the development of SMEs. It assisted SMEs in 
improving  their  management  and  operations,  expanding  markets  and  enhancing 
competitiveness.  Fifth,  not  only  did  the  government  actively  seek  to  promote  the 
competitiveness  of  SMEs  in  the  domestic  markets,  it  also  actively  sought  to  raise  their 
competitiveness  abroad.  Thus,  following  the  East  Asian  Financial  Crisis  in  1997,  the 
government sought to assist SMEs in developing their E-commerce capabilities so as to raise 
their international exposure and competitiveness. This involved research and information 
exchange, promoting online selling, and  allocating resources  to  developing products  and 
services that are fit for on-line selling. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy 
(MOCIE) was subsequently entrusted with the task of formulating, passing and enforcing 
relevant laws and policies, which included the passing of the Electronic Transaction Act in 
July  1999,  adopting  policies  aimed  to  encourage  collaboration  between  SMEs  and  large 166 
 
businesses, establishing an infrastructure for e-commerce, and strengthening international 
cooperation in e-commerce. Lastly, the South Korean government also encouraged SMEs to 
seek links with large enterprises through which SMEs could increase their market shares and 
gain  greater  technology  support.  As  early  as  in  1962,  it  established  the  Korea  Trade 
Promotion  Corporation  (KOTRA)  to  promote  networking  and  trade  cooperation  among 
Korean businesses (including SMEs). To assist SMEs in exploring markets globally, KOTRA 
has created a business matchmaking program that kinks Korean SMEs with potential foreign 
partners. These policies and measures similarly played an important role in promoting the 
development of SMEs in South Korea.   
 
(2) Taiwan 
Development  of  SMEs  has  also  been  given  great  importance  in  Taiwan  (China)  in  its 
economic  development.  SMEs  have  been  supported  by  a  variety  of  policies  that  can  be 
summarized as follows: 
 
First,  SMEs  in  Taiwan  have  been  served  by  a  comprehensive  support  system.  The 
government body Medium and Small Business Administration was founded in 1981 as the 
central agency for services toward SMEs. In addition, SMEs may obtain credit support from 
Small  and  Medium  Business  Credit  Guarantee  Fund  and  Small  Business  Integrated 
Assistance  Center,  and  technology  support  from  China  Productivity  Center  (CPC)  and 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), respectively. These agencies jointly provide 
a wide range of credit and technology support to SMEs. Second, Taiwan (China) instituted a 167 
 
special  Center-Satellite  Factory  Promotion  Program  even  in  the  early  years,  in  order  to 
promote  production  technologies  of  SMEs.  This  program  involved  vendor  assistance  to 
productivity  raising  efforts  of  an  enterprise,  and  a  rational  division  of  tasks  among 
participating enterprises. By 1989 there were 60 ― networks‖ of collaborating enterprises with 
1,186 satellite factories  in operation, mainly in  electronics. Third, a commercial bank to 
provide exclusive credit support to SMEs was founded in Taiwan (China). The Medium and 
Small Enterprise Bank came into operation in July 1976, with the mission to provide SMEs 
with  medium  and  long-term  credit,  to  assist  them  in  improving  production  equipments, 
financial  and  administrative  management,  and  marketing  strategies.  In  addition, 
governmental authorities also regulated a certain portion of the total loans by commercial 
banks to be issued to SMEs. They also established a variety of development funds to provide 
financial guarantees to qualified SMEs. Fourth, being the second largest production base for 
computer peripherals in the world, the government of Taiwan (China) actively sought to 
maintain and reinforce this position by assisting SMEs in the IT industry. Thus following the 
outbreak of the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the government, in recognition of the 
importance  of  SMEs‘  technological  upgrading,  and  the  fact  that  B2B  e-commerce  is  an 
important  tool  of  this,  launched  the  Program  of  Industry  Associations‘  E-Commerce 
Construction and Applications for SMEs. The program included assisting 2000 SMEs in 
establishing  data  bases,  introducing  an  enterprise  planning  software,  and  encouraging 
effective  use  of  e-commerce  by  SMEs  (Ngui,  2002).  Fifthly,  the  government  actively 
encouraged SMEs to develop collaborative networks among themselves, through which they 
could  share  technology,  production  and  marketing  information,  and  resources  to  achieve 168 
 
scale economies. 
4.6  Education Policy 
4.6.1 Market Failure, Inequality Trap and Educational Policy 
Education represents perhaps the most important means of human capital accumulation. An 
individual's education level is often the key determinant of his/her income level, and for a 
country, the overall education level of its residents is an important driving force of economic 
growth. However, the significant role education plays in promoting economic growth and 
other dimensions of human development cannot be a good reason for the government to 
intervene in education through public policies. From an economic viewpoint, human capital 
investment in education is a matter of personal decision. If private returns to education equal 
the social returns, then the individual (or family) will achieve a socially optimal level of 
investment in education. However, market failures in education, as well as the demands of 
equity, make government intervention in education necessary. In what follows, we explore 
the rationale for government‘s intervention in the education market more closely, from both 
the efficiency and equity points of view. 
 
Market Failures and Education Policy 
To begin with, education has an externality which causes the returns to the person investing 
in education to be less than its social returns. Education not only helps to raise the income 
level of the educated but also, through promoting technological innovation and dissemination, 
boost  overall  economic  development,  thereby  benefiting  other  individuals  and  families. 169 
 
Similarly,  the  enhancement  of  a  person's  educational  level  can  also  promote  the  social 
welfare in other non-economic fields. For example, education can improve a person's health 
awareness and enable him to have more health information, thereby reducing the possibility 
of, say, and infectious diseases. Individuals and families will make investment decisions on 
education solely on the basis of private returns, ignoring other social benefits. Thus, presence 
of  positive  externality  makes  private  investment  in  education  below  its  socially  optimal 
level. 
 
Secondly, imperfections in credit markets also tend to undermine individuals' and families' 
ability to invest in education, while the lack of adequate information and uncertainty about 
future  returns  further  decrease  their  willingness  to  invest.  As  an  influential  World  Bank 
(1993, p.197) report points  out:  ― The difficulty  of borrowing to  send  children to  school 
affects the poor especially. Creditors cannot easily stake a future claim on embodied human 
capital (as they can for other types of collateral). Even poor families, who might be willing to 
borrow, because schooling has high private returns, usually cannot. The poor are also likely 
to be less aware of future returns on education—and therefore invest less in their children‘s 
schooling than would make sense even from a strictly private point of view.‖ 
 
It is noteworthy that, in addition to the above-mentioned market failures, the lack of social 
security will further inhibit private investment in education by some individuals and families, 
and this phenomenon is quite common in developing economies. As another more recent 
report by ADB (2007b, p.84) observes, for those families lacking social security, ― [r]isk 170 
 
aversion  and vulnerability to  income shocks can curtail  other kinds of investments  with 
potentially  high  returns.  Vulnerable  households  tend  to  discount  the  future  highly,  and 
investment decisions of a longer-term nature are likely to be negatively affected by this 
discounting. Households sometimes hesitate to invest in the education of their children, or 
may pull them out of school as a result of economic shocks. This can have a detrimental 
impact on the economy in the long run where human capital investments are suboptimal.‖ 
 
―Inequality Trap‖ and Public Policy on Education 
From the equity point of view, education is about a person‘s basic capability. Equal access to 
education  can  help  ensure  that  individuals  will  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  economic 
opportunities provided on a level-playing field. However, due to the mutual feedback loops 
between education and income, income inequality may likely be translated into inequality in 
education, which in turn can further exacerbate income inequality, thus creating a vicious 
circle, known as the "inequality trap" (World Bank, 2005). Government bears a responsibility 
for helping people in this trap to escape from it through public policy.   
 
The  mutual  feedback  loop  between  education  and  income  has  been  confirmed  by  many 
studies.  In  many  developing  economies,  children's  access  to  education  is  often  closely 
related  to  their  family‘s  income.  For  low-income  families,  the  previously  mentioned 
imperfections of the credit market, lack of adequate information and uncertainty about the 
returns, and lack of social security, can all conspire to inhibit their investment in education 
for their children. Even if a free compulsory education system is introduced, the economic 171 
 
opportunity cost of receiving education can cause children from poor families easily to drop 
out.  As  can  be  seen  from  Figure  4.6.1,  domestic  economic  conditions  causes  males‘ 
completion rates of the fifth grade to differ significantly in four ESA economies, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines. 
 
Figure 4.6.1 Proportions of Males Who Have Completed Fifth Grade by Wealth 
Quintiles, Various Years (% of Males in the Household Aged 15–49 Who Have 











                             
 
                 Source: ADB, Key Indicators 2007b, p.5 
 
The effect of a person's education on his/her income is even more obvious. According to a 
recent  World  Bank  (2009b)  study,  in  China  differences  in  human  capital  endowments 
associated with differences in education attainment are the most important explanatory factor 
behind each of the three major components of income inequality: between urban and rural 
areas,  within  urban  areas  and  within  rural  areas.  Figure4.6.2  shows  income  differences 
between individuals of different educational status. In urban and rural areas, respectively, 
income for people with the highest educational attainment (more than 12 years) is on average 
1.85 and 3.56 times higher than for people with the lowest educational attainment (less than 172 
 
6 years). In another study by Sicular et al. (2007), a decomposition of the rural-urban income 
differences  in  1995  and  in  2002  using  a  nationally  representative  sample  reveals  that 
differences in the educational attainment of a household's workers explains 25% of the mean 
difference in rural-urban incomes in both years. 
 
Figure 4.6.2 Differences in Per-Capita Incomes by Educational Achievement 
In Rural and Urban China, 2003 (RMB) 
 
Source: World Bank (2009b). 
In  sum,  therefore,  income  inequalities  combined  with  credit  market  failures  and 
governmental  failures  in  service  delivery  translate  into  inequalities  in  human  capital 
endowments.  In  an  environment  where  incomes  increasingly  reflect  the  level  of  human 
capital endowments, these inequalities in turn reproduce income inequalities and propagate 
their inter-generational persistence, resulting in an ― inequality trap‖ (World Bank, 2005). 
Once caught in it, things can only get worse over time for those in it.
35  In order to prevent 
                                                        
35  In terms of our two sector labor market model developed in Section 3.4.1 (for skilled and unskilled labor), the idea of an 
inequality trap can be seen as a case where unskilled labor's income is so depressed that workers cannot make adequate 
private investment in their (or their children's) education. There is no possibility to borrow to finance such investment, and 
there is also no government support for them to undertake such education. That is, these workers are 'trapped' to the SA 
supply curve, at a wage equal to WAR, which is too low for them to save and to make private investment in education, even 
if they want to. 173 
 
people from falling into this trap, government should implement public policies to ensure 
basic education equity, thereby ensuring that everyone can have an equal chance to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities provided. 
4.6.2 Public Expenditure on Education in ESA Economies 
As  mentioned  in  Section  2.4,  government  should  overcome  existing  market  failures  in 
education through public policy and ensure basic educational equity. Generally speaking, the 
main content of such educational policies should include the two interrelated aspects: (1) 
government  raises  funds  for  education  through  taxation  or  other  means;  (2)  government 
provides direct educational services through public schools. 
 
Over the past 20 years, the enormous progress made by the ESA economies in universalizing 
basic education is a direct result of their public support for education. Firstly, the average per 
pupil public spending on education in the majority of ESA economies increased significantly 
in the past 20 years (see Figure 4.6.3). Secondly, public schools occupy a dominant position 
in basic education in the ESA economies. According to data released by World Bank (2009b), 
over the past 20 years, pupils enrolled in public schools for basic education account for over 
80%  of  total  enrollment,  which  reflects  the  predominant  role  of  public  schools  in  the 
development of basic education in the ESA economies. Because public schools are mainly 
financed through public finance,  government  investment  in  education has  therefore been 
central to the expansion of basic education. In the following part, we will examine the role of 




Table 4.6.1 per Pupil Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education 
  (PPP USD, 2000) 
    Primary    Secondary 
    1992  2005  1992  2005 
Japan  6457    8655    6366    8724   
Korea, Rep.  989    2321    944    2898   
Lao PDR  12    41    61    21   
Malaysia  352    591
b    573    857
b   
Thailand    275
a    347
b    233
a    382
b   
a. 1993 data; b: 2004 data 
Source: Computed from Edstats database, World Bank. 
 
(1) Impact of Structural Factors 
In  the  past  20  years,  the  two  most  important  structural  factors  on  public  investment  in 
education  in  the  ESA  economies  are  the  rapid  economic  growth  and  slowdowns  in 
population growth. The former has greatly expanded the fiscal capacity of the government, 
thereby increasing its resources available for investment in education. The latter has slowed 
down the growth rate of the number of school-age children (or even causes a decline in the 
number), thereby raising the level of public investment per student for the same level of total 
educational expenditure. 
 
A. Rapid Economic Growth 
In fact, economic growth in the ESA economies has helped to promote the development of 
education in  two aspects  of demand and supply.  In the aspect  of demand, rapid  growth 
created jobs, increased real wages, and raised the rate of return on labor force skills, thereby 175 
 
increasing the demand for education (King, Anderson, and Wang, 1993). In the aspect of 
supply,  rapid  economic  growth  enhanced  the  government's  financial  capacity,  thereby 
enabling the government to allocate more financial resources to education and increase the 
supply of education. For example, in the past 30 years, China's average economic growth 
rate has reached 9.8%, which means that at the same proportion of GDP publicly invested in 
education, public expenditure on education in the country will double about every seven 
years.  Experiences  from  other  economies  also  indicate  a  positive  correlation  between 
economic  development  and  investment  in  education.  Figure  4.6.3  (left  panel)  presents 
evidence that, internationally, economies with a higher per capita GDP also tend to have a 
proportionally higher per capita public expenditure on education. 
 
A noteworthy phenomenon is that in the world, economies with a higher level of economic 
development often have a higher proportion of GDP spent on education (Figure 4.6.3, right 
panel). The same phenomenon appears to have also arisen among the ESA economies. As 
can be seen from Table 4.6.2, in economies with a high level of human development such as 
Japan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, the ratio of public expenditure on education to 
GDP  is  generally  higher  than  in  those  economies  with  a  medium  level  of  human 
development. It is also noteworthy that the ratio in those economies with a high level of 
human development has by and large been increasing since 1990s, but it has been decreasing 
instead in those with a medium level of human development (except for Thailand), thereby 




Figure 4.6.3 per Capita Government Expenditure on Education, Government 













  Source: ADB, Key Indicators 2006, p.16-17 177 
 
 
Table 4.6.2 Public Expenditure on Education 
Notes: a. Data 2001 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
b.Data 1999 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
c. Data 2008 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
d. Data 2000 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
Data Sources：HDR 2004 p.172-174 HDR2007/2008 
 
B. Slowdowns in Population Growth 
Population growth rates in the ESA economies has been consistently falling in the past few 
decades, one significant impact of which is to slow down the increase in the number of 
school-age children. From 1990 to 2009, the proportion of population aged 0 to 14 to total 
population in almost all ESA economies except Timor-Leste has fallen, while in economies 
like China, South Korea, Thailand and Japan, the absolute number of children aged 0 to 14 
has actually been declining quite substantially (see Table 4.6.3). 
 
Public Expenditure on 
Education As % of GDP 
Public Expenditure on Education 
As % of Total Government 
Expenditure 









High HD             
Japan  ..  3.6  3.6  ..  10.5  9.8 
Hong Kong, China  2.8  4.1  4.2  17.4  21.9  23 
Singapore  3.1  3.1
a  3.7  18.2    .. 
Korea, Rep  3.8  3.6  4.6  25.6  17.4  16.5 
Malaysia  5.1  7.9  6.2  18  20  25.2 
Medium HD             
Thailand  3.1  5  4.2  20  31  25 
China  2.2  1.9
b  1.9  12.7    13 
Viet Nam  1.8    5.3
c  9.7     
Indonesia  1  1.3  0.9    9.8  9 
Lao PDR    2.8  2.3    11  11.7 
Cambodia    2  1.9    15.3  14.6 
Myanmar    0.6
d  1.3      18.1 178 
 
 
Table 4.6.3 Size of School-Age Population 
    % of Total    Total (Million) 
    1990  2009  Change  1990  2009  Change 
Cambodia  44.6%  34.3%  -10.4%  4.3    5.1    0.8   
China  28.4%  19.9%  -8.5%  322.2    267.8    -54.4   
Hong Kong, 
China 
21.5%  13.7%  -7.8%  1.2    1.0    -0.2   
Indonesia  35.8%  27.0%  -8.8%  63.8    64.0    0.2   
Japan  18.3%  13.5%  -4.8%  22.6    17.2    -5.4   
Korea, Dem. Rep.  26.2%  21.8%  -4.3%  5.3    5.2    0.0   
Korea, Rep.  25.6%  16.4%  -9.2%  11.0    8.0    -3.0   
Lao PDR  43.7%  36.4%  -7.2%  1.8    2.2    0.4   
Macao, China  25.7%  12.9%  -12.7%  0.1    0.1    0.0   
Malaysia  37.4%  29.6%  -7.8%  6.8    8.1    1.4   
Mongolia  41.7%  25.8%  -15.8%  0.9    0.7    -0.2   
Myanmar  36.6%  25.4%  -11.2%  14.7    12.6    -2.1   
Philippines  40.7%  34.7%  -6.0%  25.4    31.7    6.3   
Singapore  21.5%  16.3%  -5.2%  0.7    0.7    0.1   
Thailand  30.0%  20.8%  -9.2%  17.0    13.5    -3.6   
Timor-Leste  39.9%  44.8%  4.9%  0.3    0.6    0.3   
Vietnam  39.4%  26.8%  -12.6%  26.1    24.1    -2.0   
Data Source: World Bank, Edstats Database. 
 
The  slow  growth  of  or  even  a  decline  in  the  number  of  school-age  children  helps  a 
government to increase it's per pupil level of expenditure on education. If the number of 
school-age children increases rapidly, then the government must increase its expenditure on 
education just in order to maintain the original enrollment rate. In contrast, in economies 
with a slower growth rate of or even a decline in the number of school-age children, the 
increase in the education expenditure can be used to further raise the enrollment rate, or 
improve the education quality, or the government can lower the level of expenditure on 
education while maintaining the current rate of enrollment and level of quality. 
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(2) Impact of Institutional Changes on Investment in Education: The Case of China 
Subject  to  the  influence  of  these  structural  factors,  the  ESA  economies  have  made 
remarkable  achievements  in  basic  education  through  investment  in  education.  At  the 
institutional  level,  the  ESA  economies,  especially  the  developing  ones,  still  have  many 
deficiencies with the design of fiscal policy, the most important of which is the excessive 
fiscal decentralization in respect of education, which has led to a high level of educational 
inequity between different income groups and different regions. 
 
Decentralization in educational fiscal expenditure is one of the most important aspects of 
decentralization  in  educational  policy.  In  theory,  decentralization  in  educational  fiscal 
expenditure can help  improve the  efficiency of the use of the  resources,  since the local 
governments are expected to have a better understanding of the local economic, cultural and 
educational situations, and are in a better position to ensure a more targeted use of financial 
resources. To varying degrees, Asian developing economies have adopted some elements of 
fiscal  decentralization in respect  of education, but  the design and implementation  of the 
policy  have  been  aimed  to  a  large  extent  to  alleviate  the  financial  burden  on  central 
governments rather than to improve the efficiency of fund use (Behrman et al, 2003). 
 
The reform of the funding system for compulsory education in China since the 1980s is a 
typical  example of educational  decentralization reform.  Results  of this reform  show that 
excessive decentralization can lead to serious educational inequity problems among different 
income groups and different regions within the country. 180 
 
 
China's  compulsory  education  reform  was  gradually  conducted  in  the  context  of  fiscal 
decentralization. In 1985, the central government decided to pass on the responsibility for 
developing basic education to local governments. However, the subsequent adoption of a tax 
sharing system in 1994, which involved a centralization of huge amounts of fiscal resources 
to the central and provincial governments, while leaving many spending responsibilities to 
be borne by local (county and township) governments, has resulted in huge disparities in 
public  educational  expenditure  between  counties,  regions,  and  rural  and  urban  districts 
(UNDP, 2007/2008).   
 
A  study  conducted  by  China  Development  Research  Center  of  the  State  Council  (2005) 
shows  that  in  the  period  of  1994  to  2001,  approximately  80%  of  China's  compulsory 
education expenditures were borne by township governments, 9% by county governments, 
and only less than 2% by the central government. Due to serious limitations of local fiscal 
resources, some of the burden for rural compulsory education was further passed on to the 
farmers. According to a recent World Bank study, ― [i]t is estimated that between 1997 and 
2000, about 50% of the operational fees for basic education was paid by the farmers. In the 
survey of 3037 villages undertaken in connection with this report, primary school fees per 
year for a fifth grade student averaged 260 Yuan in 2004, while fees per student per year for 
middle  school  averaged  442  Yuan,  or  about  40%  and  70%,  respectively,  of  the  official 
poverty line.‖
36  As farmers took on a huge share of the compulsory education cost, family 
                                                        
36  World Bank, 2009, China from Poor Areas to Poor People: China‘s Evolving Poverty Reduction Agenda. p. 37 181 
 
economic  conditions  became  an  important  determinant  of  rural  residents‘  educational 
attainment, whereby income inequalities translate into inequities in educational attainment, 
causing poor rural households to be stuck in the previously mentioned "inequality trap".   
 
A  further  consequence  of  local  governments  bearing  the  responsibility  for  financing 
compulsory education is that regional financial investment in education depends to a large 
extent on local economic conditions and fiscal capacities of local governments. As a result, 
regional differences in the level of economic development translate into regional differences 
in fiscal investment in education, resulting in serious educational inequities between different 
regions. 
 
The  case  of  China's  public  educational  finance  decentralization  shows  that  whether 
decentralization  can  succeed  closely  depends  on  a  country's  overall  fiscal  system.  If  a 
country's  overall  fiscal  system  could  not  clearly  divide  the  responsibilities  for  financing 
educational  expenditures  between  different  levels  of  government,  or  fully  guarantee  the 
availability of resources to local governments, then decentralization of public educational 
finance  may  fail  to  ensure  that  educational  establishments  receive  adequate  amounts  of 
funding. The lesson for other ESA economies is that they should take full account of the 
conditions  and  limitations  of  their  overall  fiscal  system,  and  local  governments‘  fiscal 
capacities, in the implementation of their respective educational decentralization policies, if 
decentralization is really to improve the efficiency of fund use rather than being used as a 
way of easing the financial burden on higher-level governments. 182 
 
4.6.3 Education Policies Conducive to Inclusive Growth 
Though rapid economic development enabled the ESA economies to greatly enhance their 
ability to invest in education, most of them are nevertheless still developing economies, and 
their governments still lack the fiscal resources to support education, compared with the 
developed economies. Therefore, how to maximize the returns from such limited resources is 
a challenge for the ESA economies in the formulation of their public education policies. This 
report argues that educational policies in developing economies should focus on achieving 
the  goal  of  inclusive  growth,  by  ensuring  that  everyone  enjoys  equal  access  to  basic 
education,  thereby  enabling  even  the  most  disadvantaged  in  society  to  be  able  to  share 
economic opportunities  and escape poverty.  In  the following part, we  put  forward some 
specific proposal applicable to all ESA economies.   
 
(1) Focus Public Resources on Developing Basic Education 
In an education system where public resources are concentrated on higher education, basic 
education is likely to lack the adequate support of public resources, and consequently resort 
to charging pupils. If this fee is too high, pupils from low-income families may well be 
excluded from basic education, let alone having any chance to receive higher education. A 
public educational finance system that favors spending on higher education discriminates 
against low-income families. According to an early World Bank (1993), in all developing 
regions,  the  probability  of  going  to  university  is  markedly  higher  for  secondary  school 
graduates  from  high-  than  from  low-income  families.  If  this  is  true,  then  in  a  public 
education finance system that favors spending on higher education, those who are able to 183 
 
enjoy financial support tend, in fact, to be students from high-income families. It will be 
difficult  for  students  from  low-income  families  to  enter  university,  and  indeed  even  to 
receive the most basic education. On the other hand, in an education system where public 
resources  are  concentrated  on  basic  education,  the  government  could  provide  free  or 
near-free basic education to all school-aged children, including children from poor families. 




(2) Promote Private Investment in Higher Education through Student Loans 
Although public investment in basic education is an educational policy that will benefit the 
poor,  in  most  ESA  economies  today,  its  role  of  promoting  educational  equity  and 
contributing to inclusive growth is being diminished. Due to the importance attached to basic 
education by most of the ESA economies in the past, primary and secondary education is 
already close to being universalized. Thus an increasing part of the future differences in 
human capital and in its returns is to come from higher education. Indeed, as a recent ADB 
(2007a) study finds, wage differentials between the college and secondary educated have 
increased, while wage differentials between the secondary and primary educated have been 
stagnant or even declining in the economies studied, suggesting that the ― power of basic 
education systems to combat inequality has declined‖.
38   
 
Faced  with  this  new  challenge,  there  may  be  a  need  for  gradually  increasing  public 
                                                        
37  See Sen's article on India in 'Little Magazine'. 
38  ADB, 'Education and Structural Change in Four Asian Countries.' In Asian Development Outlook 2007. Manila. p.318. 184 
 
expenditure  on higher education as  well, in  addition  to  further raising the coverage  and 
quality of basic education. In particular, even though higher education is a sector where 
greater  reliance  should  be  placed  on  private  investments,  there  is  a  strong  need  for 
establishing a public-supported educational loan system. Student loans established with the 
support of government funding, if well administered, can enable a greater number of children 
from poorer families to enter universities and colleges. Student loans may not be entirely 
interest free, and may be administered by commercial banks on a commercial basis, but 
public  subsidy  for  it  is  crucial,  if  it  is  going  to  achieve  its  desired  aim.  In  developing 
economies,  to  establish  well-administered  student  loan  systems  may  face  a  series  of 
challenges.  Liu  et  al.  (2004)  studied  these  issues  for  China,  where  a  commercial 
bank-administered  student  loan  system  has  been  in  existence  since  1999.  Among  the 
problems that have arisen have been uncertainties about repayment, difficulties with access, 
and commercials banks‘ reluctance to enter into the market.   
4.7  Health Policy 
4.7.1 Market Failure and Health Policy 
In the perspective of human development, health is a basic capability for a person with 
important intrinsic value; at the same time, health, like education, forms an important part of 
human  capital  with  important  instrumental  value.  A  country's  healthcare  system  is  one 
important factor affecting people's health level. However, market failures in health generally 
tend  to  be  even  more  pronounced  and  more  complex  than  in  education,  which  call  for 
government intervention through various health policies. In this part, we begin by analyzing 185 
 
major failures in the healthcare market and the likely policy implications, followed by a 
review of major health policies in the ESA economies and tentative recommendations on 
future health policies. 
 
(1) Uncertainty and the Case for Insurance 
As the incidence of disease and injury is often unpredictable, people‘s demand for health 
services is subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
39  This causes enormous differences in 
health expenditure between people. In a study of a large population, researchers found that 
10% of the patients with the highest healthcare expenditure accounted for 75% of the total 
healthcare  expenditure.  This  also  suggests  that  individuals  may  be  quite  uncertain  as  to 
whether they will become the largest users of medical services in any given period (Kornai 
& Eggleston, 2003). The uncertainty of one‘s demand for health services leads people to seek 
health insurance. Insurance can help spread the cost of medical services over the healthy and 
the sick, as well as over the healthy period and the sick period of a person's life, thus easing 
the financial burden caused by falling ill.   
 
 
(2) Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry refers to that in a transaction one party has better information than 
the other about the nature of the transaction. This problem exists in both the health insurance 
market and health services market. 
                                                        
39  Compared with medical services, demand for public health services, such as reproductive health services and 
vaccination, and is relatively certain. 186 
 
 
Adverse selection and cream skimming due to  information asymmetry can render health 
insurance systems unable to perform their proper protection functions, or even cause them 
collapse. If consumers possess better information about their health than insurance providers, 
then it will be difficult for insurance providers to decide on premium rates for different 
consumers  according  to  their  conditions.  If  an  insurance  provider  charges  an  average 
premium rate to all potential customers with rather different conditions, then only those in 
poorer health status (those think they can benefit from the average premium rate) will buy 
the insurance. In so doing, the insurance provider is forced to raise the premiums in order to 
break even. However, this causes people in relatively better health conditions to stay out the 
transaction. This kind of adverse selection can unlimitedly raise the premiums by so much 
that they result in a complete collapse of insurance.   
 
On the other hand, if an insurance provider possesses better information, he will then have 
the incentives to exclude those consumers with higher health risks, and to attract more of 
those with low health risks into the contract. In this case, the insurance will fail to perform its 
intended social function of protecting the needy.   
 
In the health service market, doctors often possess more information than the patients. Under 
some incentive systems, doctors may use this superior information to their own advantage. A 
common problem that occurs under the system of fees for service is that doctors may then 




(3) Public Goods and Externalities 
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  because  public  goods  bear  the  non-exclusiveness  and 
non-rivalry features, it will be neither difficult nor desirable to charge consumers for the 
consumption of these goods. Therefore, a complete dependence on the market will lead to an 
insufficient provision of these goods. Many public health services, such as health education 
and disease prevention, are typical public goods. In general, these public health services have 
to be provided or funded by the government. 
 
Public  services  such  as  immunization  are  private  goods  but  with  extensive  positive 
externalities. Whether an individual chooses to buy such services will have a major impact 
on the welfare of others. However, without external interventions, individuals may choose 
not to purchase the service, or may only use the service based on a calculation of their own 
private costs and benefits, without taking into account the impact of their decisions on the 
public welfare. Therefore, there is a case for the government to subsidize the use of these 
services, to make individuals‘ purchasing decisions better in line with socially optimal levels 
of consumption.   
 
(4) The ―Inequality Trap‖ 
The ― inequality trap‖ problem exists not only in respect of education but also health. To 
begin with, the influence of income levels on health has well been proven by extensive 188 
 
empirical researches.
40  Secondly, people's health status can in turn affect their income levels 
by influencing their labor supply and human capital accumulation. A study by Lindelow and 
Wagstaff (2005) of China found that health shocks are associated with a substantial and 
significant reduction in income and labor supply. In addition, poor health status and the 
economic burden caused by receiving treatment may negatively affect a person's education 
attainment, thereby further affecting his or her future income level. Therefore, there is a case 
for the government to ensure some equitable degree of healthcare through public policy on 
health, and to reduce the economic burden associated with diseases so as to prevent people 
from falling into the ― inequality trap‖. 
4.7.2 Health Systems and Health Policy in ESA Economies 
In order to overcome the serious market failure in the field of healthcare and to ensure that 
all residents can receive equitable health services, the government needs to play a key role in 
the  design  of  an  adequate  healthcare  system.  Conditioned  by  the  level  of  economic 
development, nature of the political system, history, culture and geographic factors, huge 
differences  can  be  observed  between  the  healthcare  systems  established  by  different 
economies in the world today. However, the World Health Organization has put forward four 
general goals as targets for each healthcare system to aim to achieve:
41 
（1）  Improved health, both in the level of health and equity in health. 
（2）  Responsiveness of the health system to the desires and needs of people. 
（3）  Social and financial risk protection from health expenditure. 
                                                        
40  A more detailed literature review, see Wang et al. (2005) 
41  WHO, Health in Asia and the Pacific ,2008, p. 417 189 
 
（4）  Improved efficiency, namely that full value is received for the resources 
invested in health. 
In order to realize these goals, governments of all economies have variously adopted polices 
in respect of health financing, social health insurance and healthcare services provision.   
 
Although the overall levels of health outcome and healthcare in the ESA economies have 
generally improved in the past 20 years (see Section 2.3), that in itself is no proof of the 
success of their health policies. Rather, most ESA economies (especially developing ones) 
display important deficiencies in their health financing, health insurance and health service 
provision systems. 
 
(1) Health Expenditure 
A. Total Health Expenditure 
Total health expenditure could come from any one of the following sources: government 
budgets,  social  insurance,  private  health  insurance,  out-of-pocket  (OOP)  payments,  and 
external funding. An economy's total health expenditure limits the total amount of resources 
that it can (or actually does) spend on health. And although WHO has never made an official 
recommendation on the desired expenditure levels for health, its documents since 1981 have 
used  a  5%  of  GDP  figure  as  an  indicator  for  health-care  expenditure  that  should  be 
monitored.
42  In the majority of ESA economies, total health expenditure has accounted for a 
lower proportion of its GDP than 5%, but in Japan, the proportion exceeded 8% in 2006, the 
                                                        
42   Macroeconomics  and  health:  investing  in  health  for  economic  development.  Report  of  the  Commission  on 
Macroeconomics and Health. Geneva, World Health Organization 2001 190 
 
highest rate in the region for the year. Figure 4.7.1 presents a detailed picture on this for 
2006, listing both total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and its composition by 
private and public sources, for a range of ESA economies.   
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Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2009. 
B. Structure of Health Expenditure 
In the total expenditure on health, government expenditure is a principal component and has 
a significant impact on the performance of the healthcare system. Thus according to a WHO 
(2008a) report, evidence from the Asia Pacific Region and other parts of the world shows 
that  in  developed  and  developing  economies  having  good  quality  health  systems,  the 
aggregate share of public health expenditure is a key, though not the sole, determinant of the 
quality of the health system. Across the world, the proportion of public health expenditure to 191 
 
total health expenditure generally tends to be higher in developed economies. Indeed, even in 
the United States, which has a more market-oriented healthcare system, still as much as 
45.8% of health expenditure in 2006 came from the government. In the ESA region, there 
does not appear to be a consistent picture on this. While in Japan and South Korea, the share 
of  public  expenditure  is  quite  high,  reaching  81%  and  56%,  respectively,  in  2006,  in 
Singapore the same share was a mere 33% in that year, much lower than Mongolia (74%), 
Thailand  (66%),  and  even  China  (42%).  Huge  differences  indeed  exist  between  ESA 
economies  in  respect  of this  share. Thus while it stood at  81% and 74% for Japan and 
Mongolia in 2006, for Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, it was only 13%, 19%, 26% 
and 32%, respectively. 
 
The role of government health expenditure in the healthcare system is, in the main, two-fold. 
First, the government should provide sufficient funding to ensure an adequate provision of 
public health and basic health services. The Commission for Macroeconomics and Health 
(2001) estimates that to achieve the relevant MDG targets for health, a minimum government 
expenditure of US$ 34 per person per year is necessary in order to provide an essential 
package of public health interventions. According to Figure 4.7.2 below, three economies, 
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, failed to meet this target in 2006. Recall that they are also 
the economies which had the lowest proportion of government health expenditure to total 
health expenditure in 2006, and they are indeed also the ones which recorded the poorest 
health outcomes, as we reviewed earlier (Section 2).
43   
                                                        
43  In addition, Walford et. al (2006) has made the prediction, based on historical trends, that by 2015, the target year of the 
Millennium Development Goals, Cambodia still cannot achieve the 34 U.S. dollars per capita per year standard.       192 
 
 
Figure 4.7.2 per Capita Government Expenditure on Health in 2006


























Data Source: WHO, World Health Statistics 2009 
Secondly, the government should provide adequate support and funding for the establishment 
of a social health insurance system to ensure that people (especially the low-income groups) 
will not be unable to receive healthcare services for economic reasons, and to prevent them 
from being trapped in or falling back to poverty due to catastrophic health expenses. In many 
ESA economies with low government health expenditures, out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure 
accounts for a high proportion of total health expenditure in the economy, as in Myanmar 
(86.4%), Cambodia (62.7%), Laos (61.9) and Vietnam (61.1%)
45. OOP payments can result 
in catastrophic strains on a family when it spends a significant fraction of its net income on 
healthcare. Some households are pushed into poverty by borrowing and asset selling, and 
others may simply give up seeking the much needed care (WHO, 2008a). Data from 59 
                                                        
44  Countries with per capita government health expenditure more than 500 U.S. dollars are not listed in this figure including 
Japan (2097 U.S. dollars), Korea (817 U.S. dollars), Brunei (759 dollars) and Singapore (509 U.S. dollars). 
45  WHO, World Health Statistics 2009. OOP as % of total expenditure on health = Private expenditure on health as % of 
total expenditure on health×Out-of-pocket expenditure as % of private expenditure on health. 
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economies (Xu, et al., 2003) reveal a strong correlation between OOP and the incidence of 
catastrophic  health  expenditure.  An  increase  of  1%  in  the  proportion  of  total  health 
expenditure from OOP is associated with an average increase of 2.2% in the proportion of 
households  experiencing  catastrophic  payments.  In  Viet  Nam  and  Cambodia,  with  a 
relatively high proportion of OOP to total health expenditure, the proportion of households 
with  catastrophic  health  expenditure  was  as  high  as  10.5%  and  5.02%,  respectively, 
according to one study (see Table 4.7.1). 
 








Viet Nam  10.45 
Cambodia  5.02 
Republic of Korea  1.73 
Indonesia  1.26 
Thailand  0.80 
Philippines  0.78 
Note: a. Defined as the incidence of household payments for health 
services exceeding 40% of net income after subsistence needs have been 
met. Year of the data: Viet Nam (1997), Cambodia (1997), Korea, Rep 
(1999), Indonesia (1999), Thailand (1998), Philippines (1997). 
Source: Xu (2003).   
 
C. Equity in Health Expenditure 
Equity in government health expenditure is firstly reflected in whether public funding can 
effectively  subsidize  low-income  population  to  ensure  that  they  can  access  basic  health 
services. A study by O'Donnell et al. (2007) of equity in healthcare financing in nine Asian 
economies and three regions of China finds that the poorest income quintile of households 194 
 
accounted for only 5% to 10% of healthcare visits. In terms of benefit incidence by the poor, 
Hong Kong (China) was the most pro-poor with 38.7% of public subsidy going to the lowest 
quintile.  In the other economies and provinces (except Bangladesh), the poorest 20% of 
individuals received significantly less than 20% of the public health subsidy. The share going 
to the poorest 20% of individuals is very low in two Chinese provinces (8% and 10%). In 
Indonesia, the richest quintile receives more than 30% of the total subsidy. 
 
Another aspect of equity in government health expenditure is equity among regions within 
an economy. In China, like education expenditure, health expenditure is mostly borne by 
local governments, while the central government lacks a mechanism of transfer payments to 
poorer regions in matters of health. This causes health expenditure in various provinces and 
regions to be highly dependent on local fiscal resources and ultimately the level of local 
economic development. The disparity between China's regions in economic development 
causes  an  uneven  distribution  of  fiscal  revenues  across  these  regions,  and  an  uneven 
distribution  of  available  government  resources  to  be  spent  on  health,  resulting  in  huge 
inequities across regions in government funding for health. According to Liu et al. (2007), 
excluding Tibet, the correlation coefficient between a Chinese province's per capita GDP and 
its per capita Medical Service Operation Expenses is as high as 0.82 (see Figure 4.7.3).




                                                        
46  Medical Service Operation Expense is the major component of Chinese government health expenditure   195 
 
Figure 4.7.3 Relationship between Chinese Provinces’ per Capita GDP and per Capita 
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Source: Liu et al. (2007). 
 
(2) Health Insurance   
A. Development of National Health Insurance Systems in ESA   
In order to spread the financial risks due to diseases and to promote economic accessibility 
of health services, ESA economies have established various forms of social health insurance 
in the past few decades. The overall strategy in the social health insurance development in 
ESA economies is to begin with covering only the professionals and staff in the formal 
sectors, and subsequently to widen the coverage to other sections of the population, and 
eventually to the entire population. At the same time, reimbursement levels will be gradually 
raised with increases in fiscal resources and the level of economic development. 
 
The process of establishing a national social health insurance system in an ESA economy 
typically begins with some form of a compulsory employment based social health insurance 
program in the urban formal sectors. Health insurance premiums are generally shared by 196 
 
employers  and  employees,  and  the  premium  level  is  usually  a  fixed  percentage  of  the 
employees' wage. It is typically not adjusted with the insured's age, gender, health status and 
other factors. As WHO (2008a, p.452) points out, ― [t]his system of funding has the great 
advantage that contributions can be easily collected and inflows are as reliable as the overall 
economy. Compulsory  membership spreads  costs  and risks  over a large population  with 
predictable  financial  flows.‖  Employment  based  social  health  insurance  programs  were 
established  quite  early  on  in  Japan  and  South  Korea.  As  early  as  in  1927,  Japan  had 
established such a program for its formal  sector employees and South  Korea for certain 
professions in 1977 (when the country was experiencing the post-war economic take-off). 
The  coverage  was  then  gradually  expanded  to  other  professions  in  South  Korea. 
Employment based social health insurance programs in other developing ESA economies 
have  developed  rapidly  since  the  1990s.  For  example,  Thailand  began  establishing  its 
program for employees in both state-owned and private enterprises in 1991 and China set up 
its Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban Employees in 1998 for urban formal sector 
employees (WHO, 2008a). 
 
Since most developing ESA economies are still in the process of urbanization, the number of 
rural population has remained massive. After the establishment of social health insurance for 
formal sector employees, providing health insurance for the majority of rural population is 
becoming the next most urgent health policy objective for those economies. In this aspect, 
China and Thailand's initiatives are again noteworthy. In China, with the economic reforms 
that started in the late 1970s, the previous cooperative healthcare system established under 197 
 
the communes gradually disintegrated, depriving the rural population of any health insurance 
cover for the next two decades. In 2003, China started piloting a New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (NCMS) in rural areas, and gradually expanded it to the whole country, intended to 
provide  some  basic  health  insurance  protection  for  the  rural  population.  The  NCMS  is 
actually  a  voluntary  social  health  insurance  program  managed  and  subsided  by  the 
government.  The initial  funding for NCMS was  a 10  Yuan  premium  per person, plus  a 
government subsidy doubling that amount (i.e. 20 Yuan per person), to be contributed in 
equal measure by the central and local governments. Subsequently, premiums have increased 
and so have government contributions. Since 2008, the standard premium rate has been set at 
20  Yuan  per person,  with  central  and local  governments  each contributing 40  Yuan  (so 
totaling 100 Yuan per person), although there are also widely varied local models different 
from this. By the end of 2009, 730 million farmers and farm families had joining the NCMS, 
accounting for 89.7% of the total rural population.
47  In Thailand, prior to 2001, between 
25% and 39% of the population had enjoyed no health insurance whatsoever (Gu, 2008). In 
2001, Thailand started its Universal Coverage Initiative, which provided the rural population 
without health insurance with an insurance program known as the "30 baht project". In this 
voluntary scheme, those who are covered would receive a great variety of healthcare and 
public health services, after paying a small 30 baht co-payment (about 1 USD) at the point of 
delivery.  In  2006,  the  government  of  Thailand  abolished  the  30  baht  co-payment 
(Leethongdee, 2007). After the implementation of this project, coverage of health insurance 
in Thailand reached 95% by 2008 (Liu et al. 2007). 
                                                        
47  This is according to the findings from fourth health services survey conducted by Chinese Ministry of Health Statistical 
Information Centre and Chinese Ministry of Health in 2009. 198 
 
 
Other ESA economies have established other forms of social health insurance. Since 2003, 
Laos has piloted a community based health insurance scheme in some regions with coverage 
of 30% ~ 40%. And Malaysia adopted a health insurance system similar to the NHS in UK, 
in which the government provides health services to its residents either free of charge at a 
very low fee (Ramesh, 2000). Also worth noting is that Mongolia in 1994 had achieved close 
to 90 per cent coverage under very difficult circumstances, with a per capita GDP less than 
US$350 and a population 25 per cent nomadic.
48  (Walford, 2006) 
 
B. Problems of Health Insurance in the ESA Economies 
Low coverage of social health insurance and low reimbursement levels are the two general 
problems  faced  by  various  economies  in  the  world  in  the  initial  stage  of  social  health 
insurance development, and ESA economies are no exception. However, generally speaking, 
these two problems will be eased with economic development and increased fiscal resources. 
On the other hand, the issue of system design is actually crucial, and should receive proper 
attention.  A  defective  system  design  can  seriously  affect  both  the  equitableness  and 
sustainability of the social health insurance program. Below, we take a system perspective to 
focus on the problems faced by social health insurance in the ESA region. 
 
First, as the development of social health insurance in many ESA economies has followed a 
course of starting by covering the urban formal sector employees and then extending the 
                                                        
48  Due to funding issues, Mongolian health insurance coverage rate in 2003 dropped to 78%, but taking the country's 
economic development level and population distribution characteristics into consideration, this is still a relatively high 
proportion. 199 
 
coverage to other sections of the population, formal and informal sector employees, urban 
and rural residents are therefore often highly differentiated in their health insurance benefits 
and entitlements, from having an ample set of them to enjoying none of them. Needless to 
say, these differences in insurance entitlements can eventually translate into to differences in 
access to health services, and in the hardships to the persons and families concerned.   
 
China's social health insurance has the typical dualistic characteristics of the rural-urban split. 
In terms of the protection level, the basic health insurance of urban employees is far higher 
than NCMS, resulting in huge differences in health treatments a patient can receive between 
urban and rural areas. Although the per capita per year funding of NCMS has risen from the 
original 30 Yuan to 100 Yuan, in fact in 2005 the per capita per year healthcare expenditure 
in China's rural areas had already reached 168.1 Yuan. With a relatively low level of funding, 
NCMS has to maintain a low reimbursement rate in order to stay solvent. According to 
available statistics, in 2006, the average reimbursement rate under NCMS was only about 
26% of the actual expenses incurred by the farmers (Hu, 2007). In contrast, the funding level 
for basic health insurance for urban workers is far higher. In 2006, its per capita funding is 
around 1112.7 Yuan,
49  while in the same period China's average urban household healthcare 
expenditure is 600.8 Yuan.
50 
 
                                                        
49  This is calculated by dividing the annual income under the scheme, which is 174.7 billion Yuan, by 157 million people 
insured under the scheme nationwide. 
50 Sources for the data reported in this paragraph: data on NCMS are from the Ministry of Health Statistical Information 
Centre:  "2006  China  health  development  statistical  bulletin",  http://www.moh.gov.cn  /  newshtml/18903.htm;  health 
insurance for urban employees data are from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and China's National Bureau of 
Statistics:  "2006  Labor  and  Social  Security  Statistics  Bulletin",  http://www.molss.gov.cn  /  gb  /  news  / 
2007-05/18/content_178167.htm; urban and rural residents health-care expenditure data are from "2006 China Statistical 
Yearbook " 200 
 
To establish a unified social insurance system for the total population and to pool different 
health resources for such unified coverage is the future direction for social health insurance 
development. Taiwan, China had integrated its various social health insurance programs and 
established a unified National Health Insurance (NHI) program covering all the population in 
1995, with a coverage of 97% (WHO, 2008a). 
 
Second,  the  way  insurance  benefits  are  paid  out  is  a  key  issue.  If  the  scheme  simply 
reimburses  providers  for  the  services  they  provide,  this  can  lead  to  over-provision  with 
excessive treatments  and charges, pushing up costs and undermining the viability of the 
scheme.  According  to  Walford  (2006),  this  is  precisely  what  happened.  The  Philippines 
established it Medicare system in 1972, covering those formally employed (accounting for 
one-third of the population), for inpatient care, free at the point of delivery, at either private 
or public facilities up to a financial ceiling. This system was introduced, among other things, 
to shift the burden of financing and delivering care from the public to the private sector. 
However, costs have since risen. A study examining who benefits from the system has found 
that hospitals extracted 84 per cent of Medicare expenditures through increased margins; 
only the remaining 16 per cent financed increased patient care. China has also adopted a fee 
for services model, and it has experienced similar problems. One analysis has found that the 
China‘s urban insurance schemes actually increased the likelihood of heavier out of pocket 




Some ESA economies have tried other methods of payment. For example, in the ― 30 baht 
project‖ in Thailand, in order to mitigate the moral hazard problems stemming from low 
co-payment, the scheme introduced a ― capitation payment‖ method for outpatient and public 
health services, and diagnosis related groups (DRGs) method for inpatient and some special 
treatment services, replacing the Fee-for-Service payment method (Leethongdee, 2007).   
 
(3) Allocation of Health Resources and Health Services Supply 
Whichever financing and health insurance models a country's health system adopts, it is only 
through  the  efficient  and  effective  use  of  the  health  resources  and  providing  various 
healthcare services of an adequate quality that it can improve its people's health outcomes. 
Except for Japan, Korea and other economies of a high level of economic development, most 
ESA economies still seriously lack the resources that may usefully be invested in healthcare. 
Therefore, how to allocate the scarce health resources between different groups of people, 
and among different levels of health services, so as to enhance people‘s health to the greatest 
extent possible becomes a key issue for policy makers. 
 
Investing  limited  resources  in  Primary  Healthcare  (PHC)  for  all  residents  is  widely 
considered a health policy that is conductive to efficiency and promotes equity. According to 
a WHO (2008a) report, about 90% of medical conditions can be appropriately treated at the 
primary  level.  Furthermore,  while  in  economies  with  effective  health-care  networks  that 
have largely resolved problems of access, PHC is today mainly seen as a level of care, in 
low-resource  economies  where  there  are  still  significant  challenges  to  access,  ― the  PHC 202 
 
concept is a system-wide strategy for development with emphasis on the right to health care, 
social  justice  and  reducing  inequality‖  WHO  (2008a,  p.411).  Currently,  the  following 
common problems stand out in developing ESA economies as they attempt to improve basic 
health services.   
 
A. The Tilt to High Level Healthcare Institutions in Allocation of Health Resources 
Generally speaking, PHC is provided more by grass-roots healthcare providers. However, 
public health expenditures in most ESA economies have tended, in fact, to tilts towards 
high-level  healthcare  institutions,  thus  affecting  the  quality  and  quantity  of  primary 
healthcare provided by  grass-roots providers.  This  phenomenon is  particularly serious in 
China and Vietnam, and other developing economies (WHO, 2008a). 
 
In China's case, according to data from "China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009", in 2008 
China's grass-roots healthcare institutions, including community health services centers and 
township  health  centers,  received  a  financial  assistance  of  19.45  billion  Yuan  from  the 
government,  while in  the same  year  all levels  of hospitals  received financial assistances 
totaling 52 billion Yuan. Using similar data for 2005, Liu et al. (2007) has analyzed China's 
allocation of fiscal subsidies to hospitals/providers at different administrative levels, and its 
results show that the level of fiscal assistance fell as one moved from a high-level to a 
low-level hospital. As shown in Table 4.7.2, in 2005, while 1260 hospitals in China‘s large 
and medium cities received fiscal subsidy totaling 13.01 billion Yuan, only 6.56 billion Yuan 203 
 
(i.e. only half as much) went to hospitals in small cities.
51. It may be noted that hospitals in 
small  cities  (cities  governed  by  prefecture  and  counties  in  the  table),  besides  providing 
services to local urban residents, also bear the responsibility for providing services for the 
majority  of  residents  in  rural  areas.  The  population  they  serve  is  far  larger  than  the 
population  served  by  hospitals  located  in  large  and  medium  cities.  Thus  viewed,  the 
excessive imbalance in the allocation of fiscal resources in favor of hospitals in the large and 
medium cities is clearly an affront to equity, and reduces the extent and quality of PHC that 
might otherwise be achieved.   
 
Table 4.7.2 the Allocation of Fiscal Subsidy to Hospitals at Different Levels in China, 
2005 
    Large City  Small City 
   














40.0  19.0  8.0  2.0  1.7 
Total Fiscal Subsidy 
Received (Million) 
880  3860  8270  3060  3500 
Total (Million)  13010  6560 
Source: China Health Statistics Year Book, 2006 
 
B. Excessive Use of Advanced Medical Technology   
A  maximal  but  effective  supply  of  PHC  requires  health  institutions  to  use  medical 
technologies that are cost effective, while ensuring quality. A low cost of supply can help 
                                                        
51  In Liu et al. (2007), hospitals at the central and provincial levels and in cities governed by province are classified as large 
and medium urban hospitals, while hospitals in cities governed by prefecture and at county seats are classified as small city 
hospitals. This is clearly but a rough classification. See Liu et al. (2007) for details. 204 
 
ensure that PHC is widely and equitably extended, and contribute to the sustainability of the 
service. However, across the world, there appears a widespread and excessive pursuit for 
high-cost, advanced medical technology and these conflicts with the need for using low-cost 
but effective technologies for maximally extending PHC to the population. Excessive pursuit 
of high–cost modern technologies takes us a disproportionately large amount of resources, 
often public resources, and this places an undue strain on the limited public resources of an 
economy.
52  ― Thailand‖, as Chowdhury (2004, p.412) observes, ― Has a health system that 
places substantial reliance on modern medical technology. As a result, health costs have 
risen  at  a  much  faster  rate  than  even  their  fast-growing  economy.  Per  capita  health 
expenditure showed an average growth rate of 8.2% against an average GDP growth rate of 
5.8% in the period 1980–2000.‖ 
 
C. Lack of Human Resource in PHC Institutions 
An adequate supply of healthcare human resource is a key factor in ensuring PHC supply. 
However, due to the prevalent huge gap between urban and rural areas in the developing 
ESA economies, the more highly qualified a health worker (especially a doctors) is, the more 
likely he or she tends to want to stay in an urban and better-off area, with access to better 
schools and better living conditions, and probably with scope for private practice. Various 
economies have tried various ways to encourage trained health workers to work in areas 
where the poor live, with initiatives such as hardship allowances, permitting private practice 
and making rural postings as pre-requisites for career promotion. However, their effects have 
                                                        
52  'With rapid scientific advancement, new clinical testing procedures and sophisticated diagnostic equipment has flooded 
the market. The adoption of such innovations, while relevant in specific medical situations, is unduly driven by commercial 
forces, as distinct from medical requirements.' WHO, Health in Asia and the Pacific, 2008, p.412 205 
 
been rather limited (Walford, 2006).     
4.7.3 Summary 
Although in the past 20 years overall health outcomes in most ESA economies have been 
significantly  improved,  in  terms  of  healthcare  system  construction,  ESA  economies 
(especially  developing  ones)  still  have  a  long  way  to  go.  Firstly,  in  terms  of  health 
expenditure, ESA economies with a low income level have had serious problems with both 
the  level  and  composition  of  the  health  expenditure.  In  these  economies,  total  health 
expenditure has accounted for a rather low proportion of GDP, and the government health 
expenditure has been a rather low proportion of total health expenditure. Lower government 
health expenditure often means  an underinvestment  in  public health services  and a high 
reliance by citizens on their own Out-of-Pocket payments for services. These have caused 
severe  inequity  problems  in  health  for  these  economies.  In  response,  we  argue  that  the 
government  should  step  up  its  spending  on  health  along  with  economic  development. 
Moreover, the central government should more heavily subsidize poorer regions on health to 
achieve a more equitable regional distribution of health resources in the economy.   
 
In social health insurance, most developing ESA economies have sought to expand the 
coverage; however, the urban-rural divide and other divides in social health insurance in 
many economies has resulted in serious inequity problems in terms of access and benefits. 
Directions for future development must be to gradually integrate all existing schemes and 
eventually form a unified health insurance system covering the entire population. At the 206 
 
same  time,  governments  in  all  ESA  economies  should  choose  and  design  appropriate 
payment methods to avoid excessive moral hazard problems   
 
In terms of service supply, developing ESA economies should take primary healthcare as 
the focus of development so as to better take advantage of the limited health resources. 
Development of PHC requires the government to strengthen its policy guidance in use of 
modern  medical  technologies  in  favor  of  use  of  appropriate  technologies  that  are  more 
cost-effective. In addition, adequate supply of a well-qualified health workforce is crucial for 
the development of PHC. 
4.8 Poverty Alleviation and Social Protection 
One way of defining poverty is in terms of an income too low to meet the needs for basic 
survival and functioning of a person, and the poverty so defined is called ― absolute poverty‖. 
The concept of ― relative poverty‖ is, on the other hand, one where a person‘s income falls 
below the average income of the society by a certain margin. Thus while absolute poverty 
refers to cases where an individual faces certain basic survival risks, relative poverty has 
much to do with income inequality in a society. Social protection can play an important role 
both in the eradication of absolute poverty and in alleviating relative poverty.   
 
Within the capability approach, the concept of poverty has further been extended to refer to 
cases where a person's achieved functioning other than income falls below a certain level. 
The concept of poverty in this case is ― multidimensional‖. According to this view of poverty, 207 
 
poverty  can  mean  not  only  a  lack  of  income,  but  also  deprivations  in  terms  of  health, 
education, agency, etc. As extensive interactions exist among income, education, health and 
other dimensions of human development, so the elimination of a lack of or a reduction in the 
inequality of education and health through social protections can also play an active role in 
the elimination of absolute and relative income poverty, and visa versa. 
 
As  indicated  in  subsection  2.2.3,  the  ESA  economies  made  substantial  progress  in  the 
elimination of absolute income poverty in the last two decades. In this subsection, we shall 
first analyze the reasons for that success, followed by a brief look at the challenges ahead in 
anti-poverty efforts in the region. Finally, we consider the role that a comprehensive social 
welfare system can play in helping meet these new challenges. 
4.8.1 Policies that Have Contributed to These Achievements in the ESA Region 
An  extensive  range  of  studies  have  shown  that  sustained  rapid  economic  growth  is  an 
important reason for declines in poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2000; Kraay, 2006). Indeed, 
ADB (2004a) finds a strong negative correlation between the growth rate of a country's mean 
income and that of poverty internationally for the world's developing nations (Figure 4.8.1). 
In  the  ESA  region,  for  a  long  period  of  time  after  the  War,  most  of  the  economies 
experienced sustained and rapid economic growth, which has contributed significantly to the 
reduction of poverty in the region. However, although economic growth can under normal 
circumstances contribute to reductions in poverty, not all types of economic growth can have 
the same effect. Indeed, how to exercise effective policy intervention to enable the poor to 208 
 
have a greater access to the fruits of economic growth has been a key policy challenge for 
the governments in the region. What follows is an account of some of the key pro-poor 
policies in the region. 
 
Figure 4.8.1 Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in the Developing World 
        
Note: Each point depicts the experience during a ― spell‖ defined as a time period over which 
income/expenditure and poverty data from comparable and contiguous household surveys 
spaced at least 3 years apart are available. Over 100 such spells from 51 developing 
economies from around the world are used. For more detail, see ADB (2004a). 
Source: ADB (2004a).   
 
(1) Population Policies 
Compared with aggregate economic growth, increases in per capita income can have a more 
direct effect on poverty. An excessively high population growth rate can, by hindering per 
capita  income  growth,  impede  declines  in  income  poverty.  Since  the  1970s,  many  ESA 
economies have made significant progress in controlling population growth (see Table 3.7). 
As the world's most populous country, China's population growth rate declined from 2.76% 
in 1970 to 0.7% in 2003. At the same time, rates of population growth in Indonesia, Thailand, 
Vietnam and other ESA economies have also significantly declined. In contrast, population 209 
 
growth in two most populous South Asian countries, India and Pakistan, has been falling 
much more slowly. More effective population control policies in the ESA region appear to 
have played a significant role in the reduction of poverty, certainly in China.   
 
(2) Overcoming Barriers to Mobility 
Available evidence uniformly indicates that mobility can increase the per capita income of 
migrants.  Thus  removing  the  barriers  to  migration  and  increasing  mobility  itself  is  an 
important  pro-poor  policy.  The  ESA  region  is  one  with  some  of  the  most  extensive 
movements of persons in the world, which in turn has contributed to poverty reduction in the 
region  in  the  last  three  decades.  Mobility  among  the  economies  within  the  region  can 
significantly improve the income levels of the immigrants. For example, those low-skilled 
moving from Thailand to Hong Kong and Taiwan (China) can earn on average 4 times the 
income compared with their counterparts in native land (Sciortino and Punpuing, 2009). At 
the same time, the international movement of people also brings about a considerable amount 
of remittance to the economies of origin, which can further help ease the poverty situation of 
those economies (HDR, 2009). For example, in the Philippines in 1999-2003, the remittances 
from low-skilled labor abroad accounted for about 6.5% of the country's GNP (Chatterjee, 
2005). In addition, the movement of persons within borders can also play an important role 
in poverty reduction. 
 
However, in the ESA region, there are still economies putting administrative restrictions on 
internal migration, such as the household registration system in China and Vietnam. In other 210 
 
economies,  although  there  are  no  administrative  restrictions,  migrants  in  the  destination 
place may only be engaged in hard, informal work without legal protection. The situation of 
migrant workers in urban China is such case. Thus, in order for mobility to play a significant 
role in poverty reduction, not only should there be reduction in barriers to movements of 
people across borders,  but  also  there need to  be significant  reductions  in  all restrictions 
against mobility within borders. 
 
(3) SME Development Policy 
In some ESA economies, the development of SMEs has played an important role in the 
reduction of poverty. China's performance in this aspect is particularly conspicuous. Since 
the 1970s, along with the implementation of the reform and opening-up policies, a large 
number of SMEs (township and village enterprises) have emerged in China‘s rural areas. 
These  enterprises  have  provided  farmers  with  an  extra  opportunity  of  non-farming 
production, in addition to traditional farming. In accordance with the three-activity model in 
Section 3 of this report, when farmers in rural areas have both farming and non-farming 
employment  opportunities,  the  combined  income  opportunities  they  have  may  well  be 
greater than working in cities. In addition, the development of rural SMEs can also help rural 
households  to  establish  and/or  strengthen  their  relationship  with  the  outside  market  and 
extend their share of the links and therefore value in the value chain. In some cases, it can 
also promote the monetization of the rural economy and in that way generally create more 
economic opportunities for famers. For example, the study of Xiji County in China's Ningxia 
Hui Autonomous Region by CHEDS of Peking University finds that the county's potato 211 
 
processing SMEs contributed significantly to reducing local income poverty in 2003-2005. 
In two years, these SMEs created about 8000-10000 non-farm jobs for local farmers, which 
accounted for 55% of the total non-agricultural employment. Employees in these SMEs on 
average earned 1.83 times the local per capita income (Yu et al. 2007). In Lao, hand-weaving 
SMEs played an important role in poverty reduction, according to Huang et al. (2009). In 
part for this reason, the Lao Government has recently adopted a series of effective policy 
measures  to  promote  the  development  of  these  enterprises,  including  training  the  more 
capable farmers in urban environments for them to be better informed about urban demands 
for their products, and organizing trade fairs to help rural hand-weavers to establish contacts 
with urban and oversea markets. In still other ESA economies, export-oriented SMEs have 
played a similarly important role in poverty reduction. As Hasan et al. (2007) points out, a 
new strategy to eliminating income poverty in the future may well be that the government 
promotes the development of SMEs through such public policies as taxation, finance and 
market information services.   
 
(4) Microfinance 
Providing microfinance to the poor, although an important tool of poverty alleviation, has not 
been successful in all ESA economies. Successful cases that have benefited the poor farmers 
have included the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, 
and the Unit Desa System of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). BAAC has been prominent in 
supporting the poor and it has successfully covered more than 80% of peasant households 
(Chatterjee, 2005). BRI relies on rural deposits as the major source of its loans with little 212 
 
external  subsidies.  By  2004,  BRI  has  provided  deposit  services  to  nearly  30  million 
customers and loan services to 3.1 million customers. However, most clients of BRI are 
low-income  community  and  small  to  medium-sized  enterprises.  No  specific  service  is 
provided to those in absolute poverty, which has limited its capability to reduce poverty 
(Maurer,  2004).  In  view  of  various  deficiencies  of  traditional  microfinance,  China 
established its Community Development Fund in line with its national conditions, which has 
demonstrated  its  beneficial  effects  in  poverty  reduction  as  part  of  the  ― comprehensive 
community  development‖  strategy  (Cheng  et  al.,  2009).  However,  most  microfinance 
organizations in the ESA region are also facing many challenges. Governments need to adopt 
more  appropriate  monitoring  mechanisms  and  other  measures  to  foster  a  better  market 
environment so as to improve the profitability and sustainability of these institutions, which 
should enable them to make continuous contribution to poverty reduction. 
 
(5) Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization has been considered to have a positive effect on poverty eradication 
in the following three ways (Rao, 2005; UNESC, 2005; Boex, 2005): First, since the central 
government is usually burdened with a wide range of responsibilities, local governments are 
more likely to deliver education, health and other public services more effectively. Secondly, 
local governments have better access to information related to the needs and preference of 
the poor. Thus, under decentralization, public services are more likely to be delivered to the 
poor  and  the  underdeveloped  areas.  Thirdly,  fiscal  decentralization  can  facilitate  local 
governments  in  implementing  pro-poor  policies.  Needless  to  say,  to  ensure  that  fiscal 213 
 
decentralization indeed have a positive impact on poverty eradication, there will need to be 
adequate incentives for the local governments to so act. Since 1990s, some ESA economies 
have speeded up the process of fiscal decentralization. In 1991, a Local Government Code 
was adopted in the Philippines which required the central government to delegate additional 
power to local governments. In 2001, Indonesia also began to delegate a broader range of 
powers to local governments. Against this background, whether fiscal decentralization can 
promote poverty reduction will depend on how local governments utilize their newly gained 
powers.   
 
(6) Broadening Participation 
The core to participatory pro-poor policy is empowerment. With funds from the government 
and assistance from social organizations, the intended beneficiaries—the poor—are given 
opportunities to take part in decision-making and in the actual implementation of pro-poor 
actions. Participatory pro-poor policy allows the poor to express their demands, helps the 
poor to develop their own ability and independence in participation. Participatory pro-poor 
policies have been extensively practiced in ESA regions such as the Community Driven 
Development in China. In 2006, the World Bank, in collaboration with the Chinese State 
Council's Poverty Alleviation Office, selected four typical poor areas to pilot the Community 
Driven  Development  projects.  So  far,  such  an  empowerment-based  pro-poor  model  has 
yielded good results (see Figure 4.8.2), as reflected in the following respects: production and 
living conditions of the poor in the program communities have been improved; the capacity 
of these communities to organize themselves has been promoted; rural economic cooperation 214 
 
organizations have been expanded; women have been given an equal right to development 
(Yu  et  al.,  2009).  In  addition,  participatory  pro-poor  policies  in  Vietnam  have  also 
significantly improved the economic welfare of the poor (Turk, 2001). Given its sounder 
principles and favorable practical results, participatory pro-poor policies have a promising 
future.   
 
Figure 4.8.2 an Example of Poverty Alleviation through Community Driven 












Source: Yu et al. (2009) 
4.8.2 New Challenges to Poverty Alleviation in ESA 
(1) Continued Widespread Poverty Vulnerability 
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In poverty  reduction practices,  one needs  to pay  attention not  only to  those who  are in 
poverty but also to those who have a high vulnerability to it. These people often face many 
risks but may have only limited protection. Although they are currently not yet in poverty, 
they are highly likely to experience a fall or lapse into it when they are attacked by disasters, 
health problems, unemployment, rising commodity prices and other such events. Although in 
the last two decades, the ESA economies have made great achievements in poverty reduction, 
nevertheless there is still a sizable population who are vulnerable to it. 
 
Below, as an example, we cite a study by the World Bank (2009b) which uses data from 
China for the period 2001-2004 to measure the share of population who were vulnerable to 
poverty  over  the  period  2001-2004.  Table  4.8.1  shows  that  between  2001  and  2004,  on 
average 9.3% of the country's rural population were in poverty, with an income below the 
poverty line income of 888 RMB per person per year in 2003 prices. Over that same period, 
however, 18.8% of the population was in poverty in at least one year.
53  If we take these 
people as those who were vulnerable to poverty, then the proportion of the population at risk 
of poverty was over twice those who were actually in poverty (the latter measured by the 
period's  average  poverty  rate).  As  well  as  measuring  income  poverty,  Table  4.8.1  also 
presents estimates of the proportion of the population who were in consumption poverty and 
of those who were vulnerable to it. As can be seen, between 2001 and 2004, the proportion of 
the people who were vulnerable to consumption poverty was 1.7 times that in consumption 
poverty (World Bank, 2009b). In short, the share of the population vulnerable to poverty, 
                                                        
53  The data that were available for the World Bank study are for years 2001, 2003 and 2004. The poverty rate averaged over 
these three years is 9.3%. However, since different sets of people could be in poverty in different years, the union of these 
sets would clearly account for a greater proportion of the population that the average rate. 216 
 
whether measured as income or consumption poverty, is likely to be significantly greater 
than  the  actual  poverty  rate  in  a  period.  Viewed  in  this  way,  there  still  remain  great 
challenges to poverty alleviation in China, and it is likely that there also exist large numbers 
of poverty-vulnerable people in other developing economies in East and Southeast Asia. 
These vulnerable populations should be the target of future poverty alleviation policies.   
 
Table 4.8.1: Poverty and Poverty Vulnerability in Rural China: 2001-2004 
  Share of rural population (%) 
 
Poor In 
All 3 Years 
 
Poor In 2 




Only 1 Of 
The 3 Years 




















































69.1  17.8  1.7 
Sources and notes: World Bank estimates based on panel data from NBS' Rural Household 
Surveys for 2001, 2003 and 2004, using the poverty line of 888 Yuan per persons per year at 
2003 rural prices. The numbers in parentheses report the shares of the poor in all 3 years, in 2 
years and in one year respectively as percentages of the vulnerable population (poor in at 
least one year). 
 
(2) Rising Income Inequality 
Since  the  early  1990s,  income  and/or  consumption  inequalities  have  deteriorated 
significantly in some ESA economies. Table 4.8.2 shows the changes in Gini Coefficient in 
some ESA economies from the 1990s to the first decade of the 21st century. Except for 
Thailand, Malaysia, Mongolia and Indonesia, the Gini Coefficients increased sharply in other 
ESA economies. In particular, the Gini coefficient increased from 41.74 to 47.25 in China 217 
 
and from 30.80 to 38.05 in Cambodia, in both cases with an annual rate of increase above 
1%.   
 
Even when judged against international standards, the degree of income and/or consumption 
inequality reached rather high levels in some ESA economies at the start of the new century. 
In Figure 4.8.3, some ESA economies are shown to have a Gini level rather high in the group. 
In particular, China's consumption Gini coefficient was 47.4, behind only Brazil and Mexico, 
both  known  to  have  the  highest  inequality  in  the  world.  Note  that  even  though  China's 
consumption Gini Coefficient is by no means the highest in the world, its annual rate of 
increase in the period 1993-2004 was a phenomenal 1.35% (see Table 4.8.3). 218 
 
 










Initial Year  Final Year 
Cambodia  1993–2004  31.80  38.05  1.63 
China, People's 
Rep. of 
1993–2004  40.74  47.25  1.35 
Indonesia  1993–2002  34.37  34.30  -0.02 
Korea, Rep. of  1993–2004  28.68  31.55  0.87 
Lao PDR  1992–2002  30.40  34.68  1.32 
Malaysia  1993–2004  41.22  40.33  -0.2 
Mongolia  1995–2002  33.20  32.84  -0.16 
Philippines  1994–2003  42.89  43.97  0.28 
Taipei, China  1993–2003  31.32  33.85  0.78 
Thailand  1992–2002  46.22  41.96  -0.97 
Viet Nam  1993–2004  34.91  37.08  0.55 
Source: Key Indicator 2007(ADB, 2007b). 
 
Figure 4.8.3: Income inequality in ESA from a cross-country perspective 
(Gini indices of inequality for a number of countries) 
 
Source: China, From Poor Areas to Poor People, China's Evolving Poverty Reduction 
Agenda (World Bank, 2009b) 
 
The direct impact of income inequality on poverty is associated with the large income gap 
between the rich and the poor that a high income inequality generates. At the same level of 219 
 
per  capita  income,  economies  with  higher  levels  of  income  inequality  will  face  greater 
poverty.  This  point  is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.8.4:  the  length  of  the  blue  column  in  this 
diagram represents the proportion of the population who are poor in some Asian economies 
when the Gini coefficient remains at the baseline; while the combined length of the blue 
column  and  red  column  measures  the  percentage  of  the  poor  when  the  Gini  coefficient 
increases. We find that the deterioration of expenditure inequality invariably worsened the 
poverty situation in these economies. For Cambodia, China and Vietnam, the three ESA 
economies, the share of poverty that resulted from increases in expenditure inequality even 
accounted for more than half of the overall poverty. 
 
Figure 4.8.4: $1-a-day Poverty Rates, Actual versus Simulated 
 
Notes:  Poverty  rates  are  for  the  following  years:  Bangladesh  (2005);  Cambodia(2004); 
People's Republic of China (2004); India (2004); Lao PDR (2002);Nepal (2003); Pakistan 
(2004); Philippines (2003); Sri Lanka (2002); and Viet Nam (2004). Simulated poverty rates 
are computed using expenditure distributions for the following years: Bangladesh (1991); 
Cambodia (1993); People‘s Republic of China (1993); India (1993); Lao PDR (1992); Nepal 
(1995); Pakistan (1992); Philippines (1994); Sri Lanka (1995); and Viet Nam (1993). 
Source: Key Indicator 2007(ADB, 2007b). 
 
(3) Severe Inequality in Other Aspects of Human Development   
Over the last two decades, although ESA economies have made great achievements in health, 220 
 
education and in other fields, inequality in these areas has remained rather severe. This is 
both  a  reflection  of  the  worsening  income  inequality  in  the  region,  and  a  case  of 
multidimensional poverty.   
 
In  Section  4.6  we  have  looked  at  the  educational  inequality  in  Indonesia,  Cambodia, 
Philippines and Vietnam, four Southeast Asian economies (See Figure 4.6.1). It can be seen 
that in these economies, there is widespread inequality among different income groups in 
access to basic education. The bottom quintile of people with the lowest income received 
much  less  basic  education  than  the  top  quintile  with  the  highest  income  level.  This  is 
particularly  evident  in  Cambodia.  The  gap  in  health,  education  and  other  human 
development dimensions not only exists between different income groups but also between 
urban and rural areas in some economies. Figure 4.8.5 shows the urban-rural gap among 
Chinese adult family members in the average number of years of schooling. We can see that 
the majority of rural adults (67%) received less than nine years of schooling, while more than 
76% of the urban adults received over nine years of schooling. Education inequality not only 
contributes  to  income  inequality  but  also  causes  those  with  less  education  to  fall  into 
multidimensional poverty. 221 
 
 
Figure 4.8.5: Differences in the Average Number of Years of Education of Adult 
Household Members between Rural and Urban Areas in 2003, China. 
 
Source: World Bank estimates from national samples of NBS‘ 2003 Rural and Urban 
Household Surveys. 
4.8.3 to Meet New Challenges – The Construction of a More Comprehensive Social 
Welfare Scheme   
Overall sound social welfare systems can play an important role in the alleviation of absolute 
income poverty, relative income poverty and multidimensional poverty. First of all, many 
households in the ESA region face various kinds of risk, including natural disasters, health 
problems,  fluctuations  in  agricultural  production  and  prices,  unemployment,  and  so  on, 
which pose severe risks of potentially falling into poverty. The social welfare system can 
help  these  families  to  cope  with  these  risks,  and  contribute  to  alleviating  and  possibly 
eliminating absolute poverty through social insurance and social relief, etc. At the same time, 
a sound social welfare system can help reduce income or consumption inequality, and the 
inequalities in health, education, and other dimensions of human development, contribute to 
the alleviation of relative poverty and multidimensional poverty. For future pro-poor practice 
in the ESA region, we propose to establish a more comprehensive social welfare scheme on 222 
 
the basis of previous successful experiences in dealing with the new challenges in poverty 
alleviation.   
 
(1) To Provide Social Security for the Vulnerable Groups to Reduce Absolute Poverty 
One of the most important functions of the social welfare system is to help the poor cope 
with the various risks that they face. In 1601, the first ― poor law‖ was enacted in Britain, 
which was the first to implement some kind of a social relief system by means of national 
legislation, putting poverty relief as its main objective. After the War many ESA economies 
experienced rapid economic growth, while at the same time many problems appeared in 
respect of income distribution and other social aspects, putting many families in high danger 
of falling into poverty. In around the 1990s, some economies in the region began to build a 
more  comprehensive  social  welfare  system,  with  a  view  to  providing  better  support  to 
vulnerable groups, thereby eliminating absolute poverty. 
 
In  the  process  of  economic  reform  during  the  1980s  and  1990s,  the  traditional 
community-based and enterprise-based Chinese social security systems also disintegrated. 
By  the  mid-90s,  China  began  to  rebuild  the  urban  social  security  system,  while  the 
reconstruction of rural social security system has also become an important policy concern in 
the  past  few  years.  In  the  past  decade,  China  has  made  considerable  progress  in  the 
redevelopment  of  urban  and  rural  minimum  income  support,  old-age  insurance,  medical 
insurance and medical relief, disaster relief, unemployment insurance, housing security, the 




In other ESA economies, notably between 1980 and 1997 South Korea implemented the 
universal  health  insurance  scheme,  the  national  pension  plan,  the  minimum  wage  and 
employment  insurance  system.  After  the  successive  promulgations  of  "National  Health 
Insurance Act" and "National Basic Livelihood Security Act" in 1997, the South Korean 
social  welfare  system  has  gradually  entered  a  mature  period.  Singapore's  social  welfare 
system  includes  not  only  the  Central  Provident  Fund  system  that  incorporates  old-age 
pension,  housing,  medical  and  other  benefits,  but  also  a  series  of  other  social  welfare 
programs aimed at improving the living conditions of the low-income population by housing 
allowance, basic needs  relief, education benefits,  medical  benefits,  employment services, 
child  subsidies  and  transport  subsidies.  Hong  Kong's  social  welfare  system  provides 
protective  cover  for  the  old  age,  disability,  illness,  unemployment,  single-parent  and 
low-income families, victims of violent crimes and enforcement action, natural disasters and 
other accidents. The security these programs provide plays an irreplaceable role in helping 
the poor and vulnerable groups to withstand risks (CDRF, 2009). 
 
(2)  To  Fully  Utilize  the  Redistributive  Function  of  the  Social  Welfare  System  in 
Alleviating Relative Poverty 
In addition to protecting vulnerable groups against risks of falling into absolute poverty, the 
social  welfare  system  can  also  redistribute  income  to  low-income  groups  to  alleviate 
relatively poverty. Table 4.8.3 shows the changes in the relative poverty rate in the selected 224 
 
developed countries before and after the implementation of social welfare programs. As can 
be seen, after the implementation of social welfare programs, relative poverty rates of all 
countries in the table decreased significantly, an example of how social welfare programs can 
contribute significantly relative poverty alleviation. 
 
Table 4.8.3: Social Welfare Policy and Relative Poverty Rates (percent), circa 1991 
 
Source: Kenworthy (1999). 
 
In many ESA economies (e.g. China), income inequality between urban and rural areas has 
been a serious problem. Provided that there is an adequate financial capacity, building a 
social welfare system with extensive coverage can effectively alleviate income inequality. As 
for the majority of ESA economies, a large number of the poor people reside in the rural area 
with little social protection. The expansion of social welfare programs in rural areas is the 
future policy priority. In recent years, the rural security system in China has been greatly 225 
 
strengthened. In 2008, more than 90% of the rural population came under the cover of the 
new rural cooperative medical scheme. At the same time, active promotion of rural old-age 
insurance scheme is also in process (MOH, 2009; CDRF, 2009). Nevertheless, there exists a 
wide  gap  between  the  urban  and  rural  social  security  systems  in  the  level  of  benefits 
provided. The integration of the urban and rural social security systems in the country can 
help raise the level of benefits provided to the rural people, including the rural migrants 
working in cities. At the same time, it can contribute to the building of a more flexible and 
competitive labor market (World Bank, 2009b). 
 
(3) To Provide Basic Health and Basic Education to Reduce Multidimensional Poverty 
Health  and  education  are  two  key  forms  of  human  capitals.  Improvements  in  these  can 
extend  the  working  time  of  the  poor  and  raise  their  labor  productivity,  and  hence  their 
income levels. Health and education are also important dimensions of human development, 
so a lack of basic education and basic healthcare can mean serious multidimensional poverty. 
Thus,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  ensure  that  people  can  access  these  two  basic  public 
services. 
 
Most ESA economies have done quite well in universalizing the coverage of basic education. 
For example, in 2004, basic education coverage is close to 100% in China, South Korea, and 
Cambodia. However, some countries such as Mongolia and Laos have done relatively poorly 
in  this  regard,  both  achieving  a  coverage  below  85%  in  2004.  Through  social  welfare 
systems to guarantee access to affordable basic education to people has been an important 226 
 
policy success in many ESA economies. China's free nine-year compulsory education is an 
example.  Incorporating  basic  education  into  a  country's  social  welfare  system  may  be  a 
future trend, as other countries and economies realize the importance of basic education in 
poverty  reduction and in promoting economic  growth, in  addition  to  its  intrinsic human 
development value.   
 
Another key policy challenges too many ESA economies is the provision of basic medical 
services through the social welfare system. Many ESA economies have begun exploration on 
this  policy  practice  (see  section  4.7.2).  So  far,  China  has  established  a  health  insurance 
system including medical insurance for urban workers, medical insurance for urban residents, 
new rural cooperative medical insurance for rural people, and the system of urban and rural 
medical relief. It is an important policy objective to provide access to basic medical services 
for every citizen, announced in China's new medical reform program. However, in some 
other countries in the region (such as Laos and Cambodia), it will still be a long way to go 
before they can achieve the goal of providing basic medical services access for their citizens.   
4.9  Inclusive Urbanization 
4.9.1 The Problem of Dualistic Segmentations within Cities: Unjust Distribution of the 
Benefits of Urbanization 
Most  ESA  economies  are  experiencing  urbanization  at  rapid  rates,  which  are  likely  to 
continue into the next 20 years (as shown in Figure 4.9.1). Urbanization in this region is 
mainly driven by the  rural-urban migration  (Iimi,  2005), which can be  seen from Table 227 
 
4.9.1
54. In China, the rural migrants, known as ― migrant workers‖, have become an important 
force in China's industrial labor. In 2006, the number of migrant workers accounts for 46.7% 
of the urban employed population
55. They are widely distributed across all sectors of the 
national  economy.  The  proportion  of  migrant  workers  is  over  50%  in  sanitation,  home 
economics, catering and other service industries, 68% in the processing and manufacturing 
industry and nearly 80% in the construction and extractive industries (CDRF, 2009: p. 54). 
 
Sometimes known as the ― floating population‖, the migrant workers have made tremendous 
contributions to the ESA's economic and social development as well as urban constructions 
and prosperities. However, they have received patently incommensurate treatments in public 
service and social welfare provisions. In cities, the ubiquitous divisions between floating 
population and urban residents in employment, education, health care or other social welfare 
systems not only give rise to the unjust distribution of urban wealth, it also impedes the 
quality improvement of urbanization 
                                                        
54  There are three factors of urbanization: natural increase in urban population, rural-urban migration and reclassification 
from rural to urban areas due to a population increase. One of the characteristics of urbanization in the Asian region is that 
rural-urban migration is the largest factor of urban population growth (Iimi, 2005:97). 




Figure 4.9.1 Trends of Urbanization Rates in East and Southeast Asian Regions 
 
Source: Iimi, 2005.229 
 
 
Table 4.9.1 Proportions of Migration or Reclassification to Urban Population Growth 
in East Asian Economies
56 
 
Source: Iimi, 2005: p98 
 
(1) The Dualistic Segmentation in Employment 
The  dualistic  segmentation  in  employment  is  the  most  common  problem  of  injustice 
encountered by floating population in cities. Although the segmentation is not enforced by 
the laws of many ESA economics, its extensive presence in labor-market as a result of the 
                                                        
56  Source and note: This table shows the estimates of the proportion of rural-urban migration to urban population growth in 
East  Asian  countries,  which  is  based  on  a  simple  calculation  using  macro  data,  the  'residual  method.'  Based  on  the 
population in 1985 (N1985) and assuming that the annual death rate (μ) and the younger population rate under the age of 15 
(d) are constant, the urban population only due to natural increase by 2000 is estimated (P2000). Then, the proportion of 
rural-urban migration or reclassification can be computed by the difference between the estimated urban population by 
natural increase and the actual urban population (N2000).That is, the proportion of change in migration or reclassification to 
urban population growth (ρ) is calculated as follows:  .See more details in (Iimi, 2005: 
pp97-98). 230 
 
discriminations deeply embedded in the social ideologies has a severely adverse impact on 
the development prospects of the floating population in cities. The following phenomenon 
can be observed across many economies and regions: priorities will be given to the local 
people when job opportunities become scarce. With their concerns that the ― migrants‖ may 
affect local employment, a number of regions, especially some mega-cities, even introduce 
intervening policies and regulations against migrant employment (UNDP, 2009). In  ESA 
regions, most rural migrants belong to the lower classes, usually living in urban slums or 
squatter settlements. Slum dwellers have limited access to credit and formal job markets due 
to  stigmatization,  discrimination  and  geographic  isolation  (UN-Habitat,  2003:  vi).  Many 
migrants are employed in informal urban sectors. For example, the migrants in Mongolia, 
China,  Malaysia  and  other  economies  are  mainly  engaged  in  temporary,  arduous  and 
informal work without legal protections. On the basis of China's census data in 2000, Table 
4.9.2 summarizes the distinctions between the occupations of migrant workers and urban 
residents in China: Migrants are most likely to be production or transport workers (51.0%) 
followed by commercial or service workers (36.4%). This is also true for local residents, but 
the share of workers in white collar jobs is much higher for local residents (38.8%) than for 
migrants (12.5%). Similarly, migrant jobs are concentrated in manufacturing (40.3%) and 
retail  and  wholesale  trade  (28.8%),  while  local  residents  are  spread  more  evenly  across 
sectors and are much more likely to be working in high-skill sectors such as finance or 
education (The World Bank, 2009a: 179-180). Moreover, migrants are generally working 
longer hours with lower payments than the local residents. According to the survey of some 
Chinese provinces by UNDP (2009), the working hours of low-skilled migrants are 1.5 times 231 
 
those of the local workers. The result of China‘s Urban Labor Survey 2005 showed that in 
Shanghai, Fuzhou, Shenyang, Xi'an and Wuhan, the migrants on average worked 304 hours 
per month, as compared with 198 hours for the local residents. The migrants earned 3.83 
Yuan per hour, while it was 7.74 for local residents (Park, Wang, and Cai, 2006). In addition, 
the segmentation in China‘s labor market is also reflected by the differences between the 
migrants and local residents in social welfare and insurance provisions by their work units. 
According to China‘s Population and Labor Economics Research Institute's survey, China‘s 
floating population in both the formal sectors and informal sectors have much poorer access 
to social welfare than the local residents (for details see Table 4.9.3) (Lu and Feng, 2008: p. 
75). 
Table 4.9.2 Occupations and Sectors of Local Residents and Migrants in Chinese Cities, 
2000 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009b: p. 180.232 
 
 
Table 4.9.3 Social Security Coverage for Local Population and Floating Population 
(percent), China 
Social Security  Local Population    Floating Population 
Informal employment     
Old-age support  54.8  2.1 
Unemployment insurance  12.6  0.4 
Industrial injury  6.0  1.2 
Health care  32.6  1.3 
Formal employment     
Old-age support  82.1  29.0 
Unemployment insurance 









a As the floating peasant workers are engaged in special types of work, their risks of injury 
are higher than those for the local workers; therefore, the percentage of their population 
participating in industrial injury insurances at regular institutions is higher than that of local 
workers (Source: Lu and Feng,2008:76). 
 
(2) The Dualistic Segmentation in Education 
The  dualistic  segmentation  within  cities  is  mainly  reflected  from  the  disparities  in 
educational services between the migrant children and local children. Due to the social and 
cultural isolations, a number of temporary migrant children who move with their parents 
from rural areas into cities or those born by migrant parents in cities without hukou, usually 
cannot  attend  good  schools.  Some  children  are  deprived  of  education  opportunities  by 
poverty, poor health or autism fears, while others have to move around with their parents and 
discontinue  their  education.  In  China,  the  dualistic  system  built  upon  the  household 
registration  scheme  has  posed  many  obstacles  to  the  education  of  migrant  children  and 
greatly limited their access to urban educational resources and services. According to the 
2001 and 2005 China Urban Labor Survey in 4 large Chinese cities (Wuhan, Xian, Shanghai 233 
 
and Fuzhou), children of non-local residents are usually declined by local schools or are 
asked to pay extra fees. In some cities, migrants have established their own schools with 
privately-hired teachers. However, such schools usually have expensive charges due to their 
inadequate  public  funding.  As  shown  in  Table  4.9.4,  the  mean  school  fees  for  migrant 
children in 2005 would have been 35% lower than they were if migrants had local hukou, as 
compared with 43% in 2001. In 2005, 69% of migrants report that school fees would be 
lower with a local hukou, as compared with 74% in 2001. Although these results suggest 
slight reductions in educational discriminations against migrants from 2001 to 2005, further 
breakdown of the results by city reveals that the improvements were entirely caused by the 
substantial reductions of educational discriminations in Shanghai against migrants. By 2005, 
only 22% of migrants in Shanghai reported having to pay extra school fees due to non-local 
hukou as compared with 80% in 2001, and the differences between mean school fees with 
and without local hukou were negligible. In the other three cities, the percentage differences 
in school fees associated with hukou status and the percentages of migrants reporting having 
to pay extra fees due to their lack of hukou actually demonstrated slight rises from 2001 to 
2005.  Overall,  it  appears  that  in  most  Chinese  cities,  little  progress  has  been  made  in 
reducing educational discriminations against migrants. In 2004, the government passed a 
new  regulation  requiring  urban  governments  to  provide  educational  access  to  migrant 
children. However, it remains unclear to what extent the new law has been implemented 





Table 4.9.4 City Educational Costs of Migrant Children with and Without Local Hukou 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009b, p.182. 
 
(3) The Dualistic Segmentation of Health Care 
There is also severe dualistic segmentation of health care within cities. Although cities have 
more adequate health facilities and health human resources, they cannot be accessed by all 
floating population. In many cities, health care services accessible to the migrants are much 
less than those to the local residents. Health insurance in China is linked to their hukou status. 
It is difficult for migrants either to join the urban health care system that covers regular 
workers, or to participate in the rural cooperative health care system since they work in cities 
all year round. Therefore, the migrants are in the most awkward position in the whole health 
care  system  (Lu  and  Feng,  2008).  The  labor  force  survey  of  12  Chinese  cities  in  2005 
showed that the health insurance coverage for urban residents was 52.3%, while merely 6.8% 235 
 
for floating population (The World Bank, 2009a). As a model city for its health care service 
provisions to migrants, Shanghai had full vaccination coverage for local children in 2004 
while it was only 2/3 among migrant children (UNDP, 2009). In 2007, among the nearly 140 
million  Chinese  migrant  workers,  only  3133  migrant  workers  participated  in  the  health 
insurance programs (CDRF, 2009). According to the survey of some Chinese provinces by 
UNDP  (2009),  no  more  than  1/10  of the  low-skilled  migrants  have  health  insurance.  In 
recent years, the reported rate of communicable diseases including AIDS among the migrant 
population increases rapidly, with an annual growth rate of higher than 15% (CDRF, 2009). 
Family  planning,  reproductive  health  services  and  other  basic  services  have  not  been 
extended to  most migrant  workers. Box 4.9.1 presents  the differences  between the local 
residents and the immigrants in maternal and child health conditions and their access to the 
related services at one eastern coastal city in Jiangsu Province, China.236 
 
 
BOX 4.9.1 The Maternal and Child Health of the Migrant Population in Wujiang 
Wujiang City is located in the southern tip of Jiangsu Province of China. In the list of the top 
100 Chinese counties in 2006, Wujiang was ranked ninth. Immigration is one of the forces 
driving  local  economic  development  and  rapid  urbanization.  By  the  end  of  2004,  the 
immigrant population had already reached 353,200, 45.4% of the registered population in 
Wujiang.   
 
1. The MCH Situation among Wujiang's Migrant Population   
The  migrant  population's  utilization  of  MCH  services  and  their  health  conditions  have 
already reached a relatively high level, and are better than the national averages in many 
ways. However, there is still a substantial gap between the MCH conditions of the local 
registered residents and those of the migrants, which is shown in TableⅠand Table  Ⅱ. 
 
TableⅠ  Comparison of Maternal and Child Health Indicators in Wujiang 2006 









































  90.1  99.85  0  99.85  4.26  5.77 
Migrant 
  41.6  99.62  21.34  99.62  5.06  7.76 
National 
 
76.50  88.40  34.8  97.8  （19）
*  （22.5）
* 
* Data in brackets are for 2005.   
Data source:"China Health Statistics Yearbook 2007", "2007 Jiangsu Province Statistical 




TableⅡ  Comparison of Child Health Indices Among Wujiang Local, Immigrant 
Population and the Country Average Level 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Perinatal infant mortality 
rate (‰) 
 
Average level in 
Wujiang   
 
10.25  6.63  9.3  10.64  9.44  8.5  6.95 
local   
  10.25  6.63  8.57  8.34  7.58  5.72  5.35 
migrant   
        11.75  14.09  12.13  11.62  8.28 
National wide    13.99  13.28  12.47  12.24  11.08  10.27  9.68 
Low birth weight 
rate (%) 
 
Average level in 
Wujiang   
 
1.32  1.03  1.28  2.66  3.01  2.48  3.28 
local   
  13.2  1.03  1.51  2.01  2.65  2.03  2.25 
migrant   
        0.53  3.64  3.52  2.99  4.14 




Average level in 
Wujiang   
 
96.96  95.73  93.22  97.86  99.83  97.92  99.4 
local   
  96.96  95.73  94.11  100  99.97  99.54  99.54 
migrant   
        90.24  94.75  99.91  96.08  99 
National wide    85.8  86.27  86.12  84.65  84.96  85.03  84.7 
Systematic management rate of child 
under 3-year (%) 
 
Average level in 
Wujiang   
 
95.24  92.34  87.59  91.47  94.05  95.29  86.32 
local   
  95.24  92.34  94.15  93.03  95.83  98.26  93.61 
migrant   
        22.85  72.99  80.96  89.89  79.9 
National wide    73.84  74.65  73.88  72.77  73.73  73.88  73.9 
Management rate of child 
health (%)   
 
Average level in 
Wujiang   
 
96.48  95.82  95.6  92.92  95.13  95.29  96.48 
local   
  96.48  95.82  95.82  95.67  95.89  98.26  98.17 
migrant   
        90.29  42.2  85.28  89.89  94.07 
National wide    73.37  74.47  74.03  72.68  74.44  74.79  75 
Data source: Wujiang health department survey data; web of Jiangsu Health Department; 




2. The Main Reasons of the Gap   
  The restrictive nature of the residency system 
Resident  welfare  is  awarded  to  local  (registered)  residents.  Migrants,  however,  are, 
excluded.   
  The pressure on local finances 
As one part of China's public financial system, a large portion of the local government's 
revenues siphoned off to the higher-level government bodies. In Wujiang, only 50% of 
the municipal total revenues can be retained locally. Meanwhile, the migrant population 
growth has actually raised the demand for MCH services. Under these conditions, the 
local government tends to prioritize services for the resident population, whereas public 
spending on the migrants is allocated on an ad hoc basis. 
 
3. Policy recommendations 
Central  and  local  governments  should  jointly  subsidize  the  service  providers  (MCH 
institutions) in order to improve its  ability to  supply those services. Central  government 
should take the lead role in planning and financing, using medical insurance as a way to 
reduce the MCH-related financial burden on the migrant population. 
 
Source: Liu et al., 2008. The Role of Government Funding in the Promotion of Universal 
Access  to  Maternal  and  Child  Health  Services.  A  study  of  government  funding  for  the 





(4) The Dualistic Segmentation in Housing Conditions 
In ESA cities, many migrant populations live in urban slums or squatter settlements. Slums 
have the least endurable conditions as follows: insecurity of tenure; lack of basic services, 
especially  water  and  sanitation;  inadequate  and  sometimes  unsafe  building  structures; 
overcrowding;  and  location  on  contaminated  land.  In  addition,  slum  areas  have  high 
concentrations  of  poverty  and  other  social  and  economic  deprivations  such  as  broken 
families,  unemployment  and  economic,  physical  and  social  exclusions.  Slums  are  often 
recipients of the city's nuisances, including industrial effluents and noxious wastes, and the 
only  land  accessible  to  slum  dwellers  is  often  fragile,  dangerous  or  polluted  –  land  not 
desired by anyone else. People in slum areas suffer inordinately from water-borne diseases 
such as typhoid and cholera, as well as more opportunistic ones that accompany HIV/AIDS. 
Women slum dwellers – and their children – are the greatest victims among all (UN-Habitat, 
2003: vi). According to the statistics, in 2001, 28% of urban population of Southeast Asia 
lived in slums. During the rapid industrialization between 1970s and 1980s, it was estimated 
that 20 to 25 percent of Jakarta (in Indonesia) residents lived in kampongs, with an additional 
4 to 5 per cent squatting illegally along riverbanks, empty lots and floodplains (UN-Habitat, 
2003:212). In Philippines, slums are now scattered over 526 communities in all cities and 
municipalities of Metro Manila, housing 2.5 million people on vacant private or public lands, 
usually along rivers, near garbage dumps, along railroad tracks, under bridges and beside 
industrial establishments (UN-Habitat, 2003: p.215). 
 
Although  the  intractable-slums  are  few  in  China‘s  major  cities,  the  migrant  population's 240 
 
housing conditions are also quite poor. There is a substantial disparity of housing conditions 
between the migrants and the local residents. According to a survey, in 2006, 29.19% of the 
migrant workers lived in dormitories, 20.14% in rooms without kitchens and washrooms, 
7.88% at their workplaces, and 6.45% in temporarily erected sheds
57. The housing needs of 
migrant  workers  are  not  incorporated  into  the  planning  of  many  cities  (CDRF，2009). 
Housing reforms  in  the late 1990s  have deepened the market  for rental  units.  However, 
because most local residents were allowed to purchase housing at subsidized prices while 
migrants had to pay market rental rates, housing reforms have increased wealth and income 
inequality in urban areas (Sicular et al, 2007). Using 1999 survey data from 13 cities in 6 
provinces, Sato (2006) found that 67% of migrant households in urban areas rented their 
housing, and the average annual rent was 2281 Yuan ($285), 26% of the average migrant 
household expenditures. In contrast, local residents spent only 7% of their expenditures on 
housing. The 2005 China Urban Labor Survey asked questions about the housing situation of 
migrants. As seen in Figure 4.9.2, compared to local residents, migrants live in housing with 
much less space (10.7 m
2 versus 18.4 m
2) with less access to drinking water (78.1% versus 
98.8%), toilets (45.5% versus 88.2%) and heating (31.8% versus 61.7%). Sato (2006) and 
Logan, Fang and Zhang (2006), using earlier data also found significant differences in the 
housing qualities of migrants versus those of local residents. With the rocketing housing 
prices across many large cities in China, finding affordable housing may become a greater 
challenge for migrants in the future. Migrant ― villages‖ in outlying urban areas already have 
a long history in many Chinese cities (The World Bank, 2009b, p. 183-184). 
                                                        





Figure 4.9.2 Housing Conditions of Local Residents and Migrants 
 
Source: World Bank 2009b, p. 184 
(5) Wealth Disparity 
Tremendous wealth disparities exist in many ESA cities. For example, in some major cities 
of Philippines, most wealth is controlled only by a handful of people; the juxtaposition of 
skyscrapers and slums is quite common at those cities. Since the Reform and Opening-up of 
China in 1978, the income gaps between urban residents are also widening with the progress 
of its urbanization (see Figure 4.9.3). A report on urban poverty by the ADB uses data from a 
one-time urban survey by NBS in provincial capital cities in 1999 to analyze the poverty 
situation of migrants and local residents (ADB, 2004b). This report estimates income poverty 
headcount rates of 10.3% for local residents and 15.2% for migrants. A recent study using 
data from the China Income Distribution Survey (CIDS) conducted in 2002 in cities in 6 
provinces estimates on the basis of urban Di Bao lines that the income poverty headcount 
rates for local residents to be 3% and for migrants 10%. The re-estimates based on a higher 242 
 
poverty line are 6% for local residents and 16% for migrants (Du, Gregory, and Meng, 2006). 
If the poverty line is set to be two dollars per person per day, China's urban impoverished 
population  should  reach  30  million  (CDRF,  2009).  In  China,  under  the  influence  of  the 
household registration system, the proportion of impoverished population among migrants is 
twice that among urban residents (UNDP, 2009).   
 
Figure 4.9.3: Gini Index of Income Inequality within Rural and Urban Areas, 
1981-2005 
 
Sources:  Chen  and  Ravallion  (2008)  for  all  years  except  2003;  for  2003,  World  Bank 
estimates from NBS Rural and Urban Household Surveys. 
4.9.2 Inclusive Urbanization: Reflections on the Existing Policies and Countermeasures 
Inclusive urbanization aims at a just distribution of the wealth associated with urbanization. 
The dualistic segmentations within cities leading to the injustice in distribution should be 
abolished. They result from a variety of reasons, most of which are problems of cities. For 
example, the low capacities of urban economic structure for the labor force; the inadequate 
carrying capacities of infrastructure's; injustice in employment, education, health care and 
other social insurance systems; mechanisms limiting free flow of factors (such as land use 
system  and  China's  household  registration  system).  Certainly,  the  individual  factors  of 
migrants, such as their inadequate skills and knowledge, their physical and psychological 243 
 
fitness, are also important. 
(1) Enhance Accommodation and Carrying Capacities of Cities; Ease and Avoid Slum 
Problems; Improve the Quality of Urbanization 
Urbanization  is  driven  both  by  the  pulling  forces  of  agglomeration  economy  and  scale 
economy and by the pushing forces associated with the backwardness of economy, lowness 
of income and the lack of education and health resources in the rural areas. It is obvious the 
rural-urban migration as attracted by the urban demand for labor is voluntary. Cities provide 
the migrants with work and living space, adapting them to urban production and life more 
effectively. Migration, however, may lead to urban unemployment, urban slums and other 
negative  consequences  if  the  sizes  of  urban  economies  and  infrastructures  do  not  have 
supporting capacities. In that case, the quality of urbanization would be poor even though it 
may demonstrate a rising quantitative rate.   
 
For East Timor, Cambodia, Vietnam and other economies that are still in the early stage of 
urbanization,  they  should  on  one  hand  secure  basic  public  service  provisions  such  as 
education, health care and transportation infrastructures in the rural areas so that the pushing 
forces of migration produced by the inadequacy of infrastructures can be minimized; and on 
the  other  hand,  they  should  also  proactively  develop  urban  economy  and  urban 
infrastructures, expand urban carrying capacities, and guide urbanization with space-neutral 
policies.  For  Indonesia,  Mongolia  and  other  economies  that  are  experiencing  rapid 
urbanization, the governments must secure connecting infrastructures so that the benefits 
generated by the continuously rising economic densities may have wider coverage; and at the 244 
 
same time, they should reduce the forced and helpless migrant population in order to ease 
and  avoid  the  slums  and  other  problems  caused  by  over-urbanization.  For  South  Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and other economies that are in the mature stage of urbanization, they 
need to further improve their infrastructure conditions and deal with slums by enhancing the 
urban economic capacities. South Korea has drawn certain lessons concerning this aspect. In 
the mid-1960s, South Korea initiated redevelopment policies of the slum areas in Seoul. Due 
to the lack of market force participation and necessary infrastructure constructions, however, 
these policies simply geographically relocated the slums into new places (The World Bank, 
2009a).  In  the  absence  of  adequate  job  positions,  transportation,  housing  and  other 
infrastructures, urban slums cannot be entirely eliminated. Therefore, it is critical to adjust 
urban economic structure and reinforce infrastructure constructions.   
 
(2) Abolish Dualism in Social Welfare System; Improve the Land Management System; 
Ease the Dualistic Segmentations   
A.  Abolish Dualism in Social Welfare System 
Dualism  exists  within  the  social  welfare  systems  of  many  ESA  economies.  Take  the 
insurance  system  as  an  example.  Economies  in  this  region  have  all  established  social 
insurance  systems  covering  pensions,  unemployment  compensations,  paid  sick  leave, 
industrial  and  commercial  compensations,  and  child  allowances,  etc.,  but  only  those 
employed in modern formal sectors such as regular firms, public organizations, governments 
and  military  in  manufacturing  and  service  industries  may  benefit  (Gu,  2008:110).  Many 
migrants are employed by urban informal sectors with quite limited social insurance services. 245 
 
Even  the  coverage  of  social  insurance  in  the  formal  sectors  of  many  economies  is  also 
extremely limited. The social insurance coverage of Vietnam is merely 16% of the total labor 
force (Gu, 2008:111). 
 
The dualistic structure of social  welfare system  aggravates the divisions within cities. It 
should be abolished for the justice between the migrants and the local residents. Such justice, 
however, may not be actively pursued by local governments under fiscal decentralization 
system  and  the  ensuing  great  financial  pressures.  Therefore,  both  central  and  local 
governments should have their roles in the abolition of social insurance dualism. In China, 
the social insurance of people is tied to their hukou statuses, which poses many obstacles to 
the establishment of the social insurance system for the migrant population. The government 
should  abolish  the  household  registration  system,  eliminate  differential  institutional  and 
policy  treatments  toward  the  migrants  and  urban  residents,  and  build  just  and  inclusive 
employment, education, health care, housing and other social insurance systems covering the 
migrants.   
 
Although there are no laws and regulations to distinguish migrant population from the local 
residents  in  most  cities  in  ESA  region,  discriminations  and  disgust  against  the  migrant 
population are embedded in their social ideologies, which to some extent results from the 
dualistic social system. Ideological shift cannot be achieved through government fiats, but 
cities can gradually abolish their dualistic systems, ease the tensions and oppositions through 
the improvement of urban infrastructures, employment promotions and etc., and gradually 246 
 
shift the social ideology against the adaption of migrants to urban life.   
B.  Improve Land Management System 
Social  polarization  caused  by  land  privatization  and  free  trading  occurs  during  the 
urbanization processes in some economies. Polarization even in today's India, Philippines, 
Malaysia and other  economies that pursue private ownership of land is still astonishing. 
Dualistic society, however, is not the inevitable consequence of private land ownership and 
free trading system. Japan is such a good case in point. Most rural migration to cities is based 
on voluntary choices made. Most peasants do not move blindly. Rather, they believe that 
they can lead a better life in cities than in rural areas after carefully weighing the costs and 
benefits. This is a natural and steady historical process (Nan, 1989). Distinct from many ESA 
economics, China has public ownership of land and collective ownership of land in rural 
areas. The peasants only have the right to use, but have no right to free leasing and trading. If 
the peasants work in cities for a long period, their land may be unconditionally reclaimed and 
re-distributed by the collectivities. That upsets a lot of floating migrant workers in cities and 
makes their adaptations to urban life and self-identifications as members of city difficult. 
Private ownership of land is not the only culprit for dualism and public ownership of land is 
not fee of social dualistic segmentation. Although China has much fewer slums as those in 
India or Philippines, the disparities between the rich and the poor are severe. The dreadful 
slums might be paradises as relative to some poor rural areas. Public ownership of land is not 
a panacea to social polarization. Instead, it is against the efficient allocation of resources and 
aggravates the conflicts between massive population and scarce land. Land transactions and 
distributions should be conducted through market mechanisms in stead of power wills land 247 
 
acquisition  should  be  further  institutionalized  where  land  is  privately  owned.  In  China, 
DPRK and other economies with public ownership of land, clear land property rights and 
transferring  system  should  be  established,  and  land  acquisitions  should  be  subject  to 
professional assessments and public processes. 
 
(3)  Improve  the  Quality  of  the  Floating  Population;  Enhance  the  Abilities  of  the 
Migrants to Adapt to Cities 
To prevent urban dualistic segmentations caused by the individual factors of the migrant 
population,  it  is  necessary  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  migrants.  In  ESA,  the  migrant 
population  is  generally  poorly  educated.  According  to  the  sample  survey  conducted  by 
Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 55.7% of Chinese migrant workers attended 
only secondary schools or below (CDRF, 2009:58). Chinese researchers suggested the ― 9+1‖ 
compulsory  education58  for  graduates  of  rural  secondary  schools  should  be  gradually 
implemented  so  that  those  who  discontinue  their  schooling  after  secondary  school  may 
receive a one-year free career education and the employment skills of migrant workers can 
be improved (CDRF, 2009:59). This proposal deserves serious attention by the government 
and may also be applicable to other economies' settings. Besides, the government should 
develop more approaches to enhance the abilities of the migrant population to adapt to urban 
society, provide the migrant population with vocational trainings and other services, and 
grant incentives to those training organizations as well as firms recruiting the trained migrant 
workers. 
                                                        
58  China has nine-year compulsory education. 248 
 
 
4.10 Governance and Public Policy   
In terms of human development, governance has two important meanings. As pointed out in 
UNDP (2002, p.51-52), firstly, ― it is partly about having efficient institutions and rules that 
promote development by making markets work and ensuring public services live up to their 
name.‖ Secondly, ― it is also about protecting human rights, promoting wider participation in 
the institutions and rules that affect people‘s lives and achieving more equitable economic 
and social outcomes.‖   
 
While public participation itself has important intrinsic values to human development, and 
hence constitutes a key part of good governance, at one level institutions and rules and public 
participations in them are but key instruments to ensure good governance. As well as being 
participatory, other key demands of good governance include transparency of policy making 
rules and processes, better accountability of policy makers for their decisions, and a due 
emphasis on fairness and efficiency. 
 
Corruption is one of the consequences of bad governance. It involves public officials using 
their positions and power to make personal gains or curry personal favors. Other important 
consequences  of  bad  governance  including  public  policy  making  being  held  captive  by 
powerful  vested  interests,  inefficient  and  ineffective  policy  making  and  implementation 




It is not possible to review the vast field of governance, its various dimensions and roles, and 
how good governance may or may not be achieved across the board in all public policy 
sectors and all economies in the region. Below, we shall limit ourselves to considering, first, 
how governance as institutions and rules has faired in ESA in supporting particular public 
policies,  and  secondly  how  public  participation,  in  its  diverse  forms,  has  facilitated  the 
establishment of public policy programs. We choose one particular such policy program, the 
health insurance systems, in selected ESA economies. These are then followed by some brief 
remarks as to how progress in governance may further support and improve various public 
policy programs in the region. The intrinsic value of agency and participation, and good 
governance, is taken to be well understood and no further emphasis will be given to it.   
4.10.1. Governance as Institutions and Rules
59   
Institutions and rules are simply incentive systems that structure human interaction (North, 
2003).  ― Public  sector  institutions  include,  on  the  one  hand,  the  explicitly  defined 
constitutions  and  laws,  rules  and  regulations,  which  together  are  meant  to  ensure  good 
governance, and on the other hand, the informal or internalized norms—tacit but no less real 
and effective ‗ways of doing things‘‖ (UNDP, 2009, p.1-2). Thus governance as institutions 
and  rules  can  be  seen  primarily  as  an  incentive  system  that  is  meant  to  provide  good 
governance. 
                                                        
59  This part of the discussion draws heavily on UNDP Human Development Report 2002, UNDP (2008b), and ADB Key 
Indicators 2006. 250 
 
 
This incentives system first and foremost concerns government officials and the crucial role 
they play in policy making and policy implementation. From the perspective of economics, 
good governance requires that the interests of government officials and the interests of the 
public are compatible. This can be explained by the public choice theory, which holds that 
government officials will follow their own maximization principle, just as the enterprises and 
consumers do. If officials‘ behaviors cannot be restricted effectively by appropriate rules and 
regulations, they may  well act, in policy making and implementation, to maximize their 
personal  gains  at  the  expense  of  public  interests.  On  the  other  hand,  the  building  and 
sustaining of these rules and institutions may well require public participation.   
 
Corruption 
According to the Asia Development Bank‘s Key Indicator 2006 (p.18), corruption, whereby 
public officials use the power of their office to pursue their own interests, can have a serious 
effect on the composition of public expenditure, in a way that matters to human development. 
Of particular importance to human development is the weight in this composition that is 
given to health and education, both being core dimensions of human development. Figure 
4.10.1  shows  that  government  health  and  education  outlays  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  are 
negatively correlated with  the extent of corruption  in  a country, whether for East  Asian 
economies, or across the world. And this relationship holds even after controlling for income 
and the size of the  government,  with  the  effect being  more negative  and significant  for 
education  spending  than  for  health  (Mauro,  1998).  Mauro  argues  that  this  negative  link 251 
 
between corruption and social expenditure is because opportunities for rent-seeking behavior 
are lower in the social sector. Corrupt governments may be more likely to favor large-scale 
capital-intensive public projects where possibilities of kickbacks are higher. 
 
Figure 4.10.1 Government Health and Education Expenditure as Proportion of GDP 
versus Extent of Corruption 
 
Note:    Higher values of control of corruption index imply lower corruption; date for the 
year 2000. 
Source: World Bank WDI online; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi(2003); ADB Key 
Indicators 2006. p.19. 
Not only do more corrupt governments tend to spend less on health and education, but also 
much of this expenditure tends to be dissipated through corruption. According to UNDP 
(2008, p.57-63), this is also true of ESA. ― As a result even basic preventive measures such as 
vaccination program can be undermined, while families already in distress as a result of 
illness face the added anxiety of unpredictable extra costs or are driven towards the private 252 
 
sector. Health funds can disappear at the highest level of government. In some countries 10 
percent of the health budget can disappear en route from the Ministry of Finance to the 
Ministry of Health, and more subsequently leaks out through various side channels, as the 
funds flow from national governments to provinces and to local hospitals and clinics. Much 
of this corruption is linked with procurement as companies pay bribes for public contracts for 
major construction projects. There can also be kickbacks from suppliers of equipment or of 
ongoing  services,  such  as  meals  or  cleaning.  Health  ministry  officials  and  hospital 
administrators can inflate the cost many times, colluding with private suppliers to share the 
difference.‖ (UNDP, 2008, p.58) In the education sector, ― corruption in the procurement of 
material and labor for school construction can increase costs between two and eight times, as 
funds for school buildings are siphoned off by corrupt officials. As a result of the corruption, 
many countries in this region are vulnerable to earthquakes which have often laid waste to 
hundreds of schools, burying children within them.‖(UNDP, 2008, p.63) 
 
It  has  to  be  added  that  while  many  ESA  economies  have  been  troubled  by  extensive 
corruptions, by wide recognition some ESA economies have witnessed the world‘s cleanest 
government. So the picture of corruption is a mixed one in ESA.   
 
Vested Interests 
Good  governance  requires  that  the  policy  making  and  implementation  processes  are  not 
unduly  influenced  by  vested  interests.  Transparency  of  these  processes  and  widespread 
political participation in them can help ensure that these processes are broadly ― fair‖, and 253 
 
that the outcomes broadly represent the interests of the public. In the absence of such wide 
political  participations,  ― technocratic  insulation‖  through  system  design  (rules  and 
institutions)  may  also,  to  an  extent,  help  ensure  that  policy  making  and  implementation 
processes  are  free  from  the  influence  of  the  vested  interests.  Ultimately,  however,  such 
system  design  has  to  be  buttressed  by  political  participation  in  the  related  rules  and 
institutions.   
 
According to the East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993), a system-design approach appears 
to  be  exactly  what  had  happened  in  the  earlier  decades  in  the  HPAEs  that  achieved 
shared-growth.   
 
― Implementing  Shared  Growth  to  solve  the  problem  of  political  legitimacy 
requires sharing but it also requires growth. We now discuss HPAE institutional 
traits that have been critical to achieving both these goals. Foremost among 
them  is  technocratic  insulation—the  ability  of  economic  technocrats  to 
formulate  and  implement  policies  in  keeping  with  politically  formulated 
national goals with a minimum of lobbying for special favors from politicians 
and  interest  groups.  Without  it,  technocrats  in  the  high-performing  Asian 
economies would have been unable to introduce and sustain rational economic 
policies,  and  some  vital  wealth-sharing  mechanisms  would  have  been 
neutralized soon after their inception, as was land reform in the Philippines.‖ 
(World Bank, 1993, 167.)   254 
 
Box 4.10.1 Vested Interests Doomed the Philippine Land Reform 
Philippine policymaking has historically been captive to powerful vested interests 
that have shaped economic policy to protect and enhance their privileged position, 
often  to  the  detriment  of  national  well-being.  The  difficulty  of  reforming  the 
economy in the face of their opposition was especially evident after the 1986 
― People Power‖ revolt that toppled Ferdinand Marcos and swept Corazon Aquino 
to power. 
 
The many loopholes in the land reform law in Philippine illustrate the hazards of a 
weak bureaucracy, which can easily permit vested interests to shape key economic 
policies. While the ostensible goal of the reform was redistribution, enforcement 
was nearly impossible.   
 
The failure of the Philippine program is a sharp contrast to the highly successful 
reform programs in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (China). In each of those instances, 
land reform was backed and in some cases actively guided by U.S. officials who 
had little interest in protecting the landed elites. As a result, land retention limits 
were lower, compensation formulas were straightforward, and the pace of reform 
was too rapid to permit delaying tactics and widespread evasion. In each of these 
economies,  successful  land  reform  helped  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  rapid, 
shared growth that has continued to elude the Philippines. 
Source: (World Bank, 1993, 169). 255 
 
 
On the other hand, according to the same report (World Bank, 1993), ― [w]hile insulation of 
the technocracy may be necessary, it is hardly sufficient in the long term. To sustain growth, 
a bureaucracy must have the competence to formulate effective policies and the integrity to 
implement them fairly. The more policymakers attempt to fine tune the economy, the greater 
the  need  for  competence  and  honesty.  Among  the  HPAEs,  Hong  Kong,  Japan,  Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan (China), have been successful in building relatively competent and 
honest  bureaucracies.  The  Southeast  Asian  NIEs  (the  newly  industrialized  economies), 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, have gradually introduced measures to upgrade theirs, 
with  Malaysia  in  the  forefront  of  the  process,  but  they  still  clearly  lag  behind  more 
industrialized economies. Despite the stress on culture in much popular writing about the 
Asian miracle, the most successful bureaucracies have not relied on culture alone. HPAE 
bureaucracies  have  employed  numerous  mechanisms  to  increase  the  appeal  of  a  public 
service career, thereby heightening competition and improving the pool of applicants. The 
overall principles of these mechanisms, readily applicable to any society, are: (1) recruitment 
and  promotion  must  be  merit-based  and  highly  competitive;  (2)  total  compensation, 
including pay, perks, and prestige, must be competitive with the private sector; (3) those who 
make it to the top should be amply rewarded.‖ (World Bank, 1993, 174-175.) 
 
A competent and honest civil service is not only necessary for sustaining growth, it is also 
important for implementing the right social policies, including those on education, health, 
social protection, environment, etc. But in the long run, it is unlikely that such a system can 256 
 
sustain itself on its ― internal strength‖, so to speak. Without the participation of the wide 
public in monitoring its conduct, the corrosive forces of corruption are likely to soon or later 
destroy  it.  Even  more  importantly,  political  participation  in  policy  making  and 
implementation processes can help formulate national strategies and shape the direction of 
public policy, in ways that better reflect the preference and interests of the population.   
4.10.2  Governance  and  Public  Participation  in  Policy  Making  and  Implementation 
Processes 
Governance for human development is more than about effective institutions and rules, It 
also requires that the policy making process is transparent and involves public participation. 
UNDP (2002, p.51) has stressed the vital importance of good governance in this respect: 
First of all, ― participating in the rules and institutions that shape one‘s community is a basic 
human right and part of human development.‖ Second, ― more inclusive governance can be 
more effective. When local people are consulted about the location of a new health clinic, for 
example,  there  is  a  better  chance  it  will  be  built  in  the  right  place.‖  Third,  ― more 
participatory governance also can be more equitable. Much is known about the economic and 
social  policies  that  help  eradicate  poverty  and  promote  more  inclusive  growth.  But  few 
countries  pursue  such  policies  vigorously,  often  because  the  potential  beneficiaries  lack 
political power and their interests are not fully represented in policy decisions.‖ 
 
Democracy 
In general, democracy has an advantage in helping achieve incentive compatibility between 257 
 
government  interests  and  public  interests.  ― Competition  for  political  power—through 
elections  and  other  features  of  democracy—makes  politicians  more  likely  to  respond  to 
people‘s needs and aspirations‖ (UNDP, 2002, p.56). In terms of social policies, Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) argue that the social expenditure is determined in a majority rule system by 
the median income voter. When income is skewed such that the median income is lower than 
average income, there will be a tendency for the government to spend more on health and 
education. That is, democracies with high poverty rates and high inequality should, at least in 
theory, spend more on the social sector. Using panel data of 78 countries for the period 
1985-1998, Baqir (2002) finds a significant impact of democracy on social spending, after 
taking  into  account  factors  such  as  income,  population,  openness,  urbanization,  and  the 
population‘s age structure.
60   
 
Many  ESA  countries  have  made  great  progress  in  democratization in  the  past  30  years, 
exerting a significant positive impact on public policy. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
democratization  in  both  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  brought  about  the  establishment  of  a 
national health insurance program, which is of tremendous significance to both economies.
61   
 
Before the 1980s, both economies adopted a fragmented system of health insurance that 
operated along industry and professional lines. The main beneficiaries were public servants, 
teachers,  and  workers  of  certain  core  industries.  The  system  stressed  the  feasibility  and 
                                                        
60  Using cross-section data for 78 countries, Baqir (2002) at first finds no evidence that democracy is related to social 
sector outlays. He argues this is because the level of decentralization is an important intermediating factor, and its omission 
in the cross-section regression makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of democracy on social expenditure. 
61  The following discussion of the south Korean and Taiwanese cases draws on the account given in Li, Lianhua (2008). 
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survivability of the various programs. However, by not offering protection to those in real 
need, the system is hardly equitable. And it was not meant to be! In Taiwan, the fragmented 
system arose out of a need for social mobilization and control, while in South Korea it was 
established  in  order  to  reduce  social  tensions  within  the  country  following  rapid 
industrialization. In both cases, it actually took on a developmentalist bend, and the level of 
financial support from the public budget was rather low.       
 
In the 1980s, just as the South Korean government was hesitant over moves to establish 
national health insurance plans, the increased force of the opposition parties in the parliament 
threatened the survival  of the  government.  Under pressure, the  ruling  party  promised to 
speed up the establishment of a national health plan for rural and urban residents, separately, 
and  exerted  pressures  on  the  government  to  act  on  it.  In  Taiwan,  with  the  start  of  the 
democratization processes in 1987, demands of electoral politics forced all parties vying for 
power to adopt national health plans in their election manifestos. In 1995, the Nationalist 
Party government eventually succumbed to the pressure and established the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) program, 5 years in advance of its original target date. In 2005, the coverage 
of NHI had reached 97% (WHO, 2008a, 451). 
 
It appears that democracy in South Korea and Taiwan has had a marked impact on their 
public policy. Nevertheless, the role of democracy in this respect can also be limited. To 
begin with, the influence of democracy on public policy varies greatly in different countries 
each of a democratic system. Indeed, according to Keefer and Khemani (2005), the median 259 
 
voter income prediction does not appear to hold in low-income countries, even though the 
median voter is poor. The authors point to the abysmal government provision of health and 
education services in these countries, highlighting the role of political market imperfections 
in explaining this, where the poor in democratic countries are simply unable to exercise their 
numeric advantage to their benefit. In particular information problems distort the incentives 
of politicians so that they prefer to provide more visible and tangible outputs such as roads, 
landmark buildings, and public-sector jobs, rather than focusing their efforts on improving 
the quality of social provisions. Indeed, according to Commission for Racial Equality (2002), 
even  in  those  highly  democratized  countries,  democracy  is  not  sufficient  for  ensuring 
equitability of public policy. Discrimination against ethnic minorities, women, the elderly 
and others continues even in long-established democracies. As UNDP (2002. p.59) points out, 
― [P]olitical incentives to respond to the needs of ordinary people may be offset by incentives 
to respond to the demands of the powerful or the wealthy.‖ 
 
On  the  other  hand,  even  in  those  relatively  less-democratized  countries,  the  outcome  of 
public policy also can be improved through appropriate institutional arrangements. Abrami et 
al.  (2008,  p.38)  compared  the  institutions  in  China  and  Vietnam,  the  two  high-growth 
single-party regimes, and concluded that ― Vietnam‗s institutions empower a larger group of 
insiders (winning coalition) and place far more constraints  on the party  leadership, both 
through vertical checks and semi-competitive elections. As a result, Vietnamese economic 
policies must consider a larger cross-section of society. Consequently, Vietnam spends a far 
larger portion of its revenue on transfers and has been able to engender greater equalization 260 
 
among provinces and individuals.‖ 
 
Besides voting in elections, participation can take many different forms including through 
research  institutions  which  serve  as  independent  or  commissioned  think  tanks  for  the 
government, and providing consulting services on public policy making. The next part of this 
subsection  discusses  the  development  of  this  form  of  participation  in  ESA,  taking  the 
example of the contribution of think tanks to the current healthcare system reform in China. 
 
The Role of Think Tanks in China’s Healthcare System Reform
62 
Like other areas of policy making in China, policy making in health in the early phases of the 
reform when China had just emerged out of the Cultural Revolution was highly bureaucratic 
and  non-participatory;  that  is,  decision  making  was  done  by  only  a  few  responsible 
government bureaus and their officials. This process of decision making may well produce a 
correct policy, but generally it has some important flaws. First, the objective for which the 
decision is made might be misplaced. Secondly, even if the objective is correct, decisions on 
the means to achieve the objective are often made on rather slim evidence, which could be 
based on mere personal experiences and observations of the officials and leaders involved, or 
questionable data and analyses produced by the research staff belonging to the government 
bureau in question.   
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in light of many previous policy errors and in view of the 
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increasing  complexity  of  most  policy  issues  and  the  increasing  magnitude  of  the 
consequences if a mistake were to be made, the leadership stressed the need for ― scientific 
and democratic‖ decision making, which we may understand to mean a more evidence-based 
and  more  participatory  decision  making  process.  (Participation  here  need  not  mean 
participation by all stakeholders, but by the relevant sections of the scientific community.) 
During  this  period,  many  government  and  semi-government  think  tanks  and  research 
institutions  emerged.  In  the  health  sector,  for  example,  the  Health  Economics  Research 
Institute of the Ministry of Health was set up in 1988. The emergence of these research 
institutes improved the evidence base of many polices but because they were so connected 
with and indeed were a close part of their respective super-ordinate government ministry or 
department, their role in initiating a policy debate and challenging an existing policy was 
understandably limited.     
 
Health policy making had generally been closed to think tanks and research institutions other 
than those immediately affiliated to the MOH and other related government ministries and 
departments,  and  closed to  the general  public,  until  the most recent  round of healthcare 
system reform. With the rise of a much more liberal political leadership taking over the helm 
of the Chinese economic and social reforms in 2003, a report by the Development Research 
Center (DRC) of the State Council on past healthcare reforms was released in 2005. The 
report was critical of the past polices, and the subsequent process eventually galvanized both 
government and independent think tanks and research institutions and, indeed, the media and 
the general public. This greater degree of democratization politically paved the way for a 262 
 
period  of  heated,  sustained  and  wide-ranging  public  debates  on  existing  situations,  past 
policy errors, and future policy directions that China has never seen either in health and in 
any other policy sector in recent decades. 
 
The participation of the media and the general public in the debate, beyond the formal think 
tanks and research institutes, has contributed to the enshrining of some minimum health 
equity as a basic principle in health policy making. However, subsequent government driven 
research, focused on finding adequate policy solutions to the problems, have largely been 
confined to a few research institutes and think tanks. These research  institutes and think 
tanks have, however, not only acted as producers of knowledge and evidence, but also as 
advocators for their favored policy position. 
 
In September 2006, led by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
the Ministry of Health (MOH), 14 national ministries formed a multi-ministry Health Care 
Reform  Coordination  Team  (HCRCT)  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of  preparing  a 
comprehensive plan for national healthcare system reform. According to the arrangement, 
each ministry would put forward its own proposal, and they would then meet to discuss how 
these separate proposals could be merged into one comprehensive plan. However, after three 
months, they failed to do so. The reason was that each ministry very much prepared its 
proposal in line with its own departmental interests, rather than the larger aim of improving 
the national healthcare system. By and large, the MOH argued for a supply side oriented 
reform package involving the government principally investing in public hospitals, while the 263 
 
Ministry of Labor and Social security (MOLSS), another member of the 14-member team, 
favored  a  demand  side  oriented  reform  package  involving  the  government  principally 
subsidizing individual citizens to participate in health insurance schemes with a view to fully 
achieving  national  coverage.  Clearly,  it  was  difficult  to  reach  any  agreement  within  the 
HCRCT. To solve this impasse, a new form of policy deliberation and consultation was 
subsequently adopted. 
 
At the beginning of 2007, the HCRCT invited six organizations each to organize an expert 
team  to  make  independent  recommendations  on  the  healthcare  system  reform.  The  six 
organizations were Peking University, Fudan University, DRC, WHO, McKensy, and the 
World Bank. These six organizations were later joined by Peking Normal University in April 
2007, Renmin University of China in May 2007, Tsinghua University in collaboration with 
Harvard University in June 2007, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences in February 2008. In 
May 2007, experts of the first eight organizations met with the members of the HCRCT to 
discuss the submitted proposals. Since the recommendations of the eight proposals differed 
widely, the discussion was extremely heated, which went on for the following months.   
 
Based upon a total of 10 proposals eventually submitted, the government finally released a 
draft master plan in October 2008, integrating as much as possible recommendations from 
various proposals. For those parts where major disagreements still existed, it kept a rather 
open stance by allowing different models to be adopted in future pilot implementations in 
different  regions.  Additionally,  this  draft  master  plan  proposal  has  been  released  to  the 264 
 
general public for further comments and feedbacks. And after the general public has had an 
opportunity to have its opinions heard, the State Council released a new medical reform 
program in April 2009. 
 
Clearly, the active participation of think tanks and research institutions in policy making and 
their achievements in this respect in the recent healthcare system reform debates was made 
possible by a highly liberal stance of the government and the accompanying unprecedented 
level of openness towards the matter. However, while this serves to indicate that China has 
made enormous strides in democratization and in progress towards open and transparent 
policy making, it also reminds us that as yet this progress has been haphazard, in that the 
course of recent health policy making has by no means been typical of policy making in 
China, and that almost all other policy sectors have not been characterized by the same 
degree of openness and transparency, and the same active involvement of the media, civil 
society    organizations and the public at large. As yet, there are in fact few institutional 
underpinnings in place that would enforce a similar process of policy making in all policy 
sectors  as  we  have  seen  in  health.  It  is  important  that  China  develop  such  institutional 
underpinnings so that openness, transparency, and the involvement of the large civil society 
become an essential and necessary part of all public policy making in China.     
4.10.3 Summary 
This subsection has discussed the relationship between governance and public policy from 
two respects: first, the effect of governance as institutions and rules on public policy; second, 265 
 
the effect of governance on the policy making and implementation processes through civic 
and political participation. Good governance means incentive compatible institutions and 
rules that can make government officials act in the public interest. Empirical studies show 
that corruption can undermine the efficacy and adoption of certain public policies. Rules and 
institutions are also important to ensure that government policies doe not fall captive to 
vested interests, especially at the implementation stage, through ― technocratic insulation‖ of 
the civil service. And although democracy can be considered as an incentive compatible 
institutional  arrangement  for  policy  makers,  it  does  not  automatically  lead  to  effective, 
efficient and fair public policy. Enabling the disadvantaged social groups to have a say in 
policy  making  can  help  ensure  that  this  does  happen.  Moreover,  aside  from  individuals 
voting  in  election,  the  agent  of  civic  and  political  participation  can  be  think  tanks,  too. 
China‘s  experience  in  the  healthcare  system  reform  illustrates  how  think  tanks  can  be 
effectively involved in policy making processes.   
4.11 Environmental Policy 
Most environmental problems are a public bad, that is, the reach of its harmful impact can be 
far  and  wide,  sometimes  even  on  a  global  scale.  Moreover,  the  impact  of  many 
environmental problems, be they the destruction of a local or global ecology, or the erosion 
of a natural resource base, are long-term, that is,    its impact can be long-lasting, affecting 
not only the present generation, but future generations as well. Hence, when considering the 
impact of environmental problems, ― environmental sustainability‖ of our production systems 
and, indeed, our ways of life, that is, whether our productions systems and ways of life could 266 
 
continue  over  generations  as  well  as  within  the  present  generation,  becomes  important 
concerns.   
 
Subsection 2.5 has provided a brief review of the range of emerging environmental problems 
in the ESA region. In this subsection, we consider public polices that a government may 
employ  to  combat  them.  By  environmental  public  policy  is  meant  not  only  the  specific 
policies (such as an emission ceiling or tax) that a government may adopt to deal with a 
particular environmental problem, but also our very notion of development and, indeed, our 
very  concept  of  environmental  sustainability  itself.  Below  we  first  briefly  review  the 
controversy surrounding the concept of ― sustainability‖. We argue that while that concept has 
often been used in terms of the need to preserve the general productive capacity for future 
generations, and is often limited to that, there is a strong case for arguing that beyond their 
― instrumental‖ value of contributing to productive capacity, certain natural resources and 
ecologies may have intrinsic values for the well-being of all generations, in a way that is not 
substitutable in terms of productive capacity. Next we explore the notion of ― development‖, 
and we argue how the adoption of an explicit human development paradigm in place of the 
traditional  growth  centered  paradigm  can  better  harmonize  growth  imperatives  and 
environmental concerns of a society. This is then followed by a quick look at the kinds of 
public  policies  adopted  by  the  governments  in  the  region  aimed  to  reduce  specific 
environmental  pollutions,  where  we  will  argue  that  in  terms  of  dealing  with  specific 
environmental problems, there is a need to promote a better use of market-based approaches, 
but this has to be balanced by explicit equity considerations.   267 
 
4.11.1 Environmental Sustainability 
The  widely  used  Brundtland  Commission's  definition  of  sustainable  development  is 
― development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs‖ (WCED, 1987, p.43). Thus the concept is defined 
based on an ethical theory of intergenerational equity. And according to Solow, whose view 
on  sustainability  has  also  been  widely  influential,  to  realize  intergenerational  equity
（sustainability）is to maintain a certain level of capacity to generate well-being for the 
present and future generations. In principle, this definition is wide enough for a case to be 
made for the preservation and sustaining of any specific resource or ecology that are deemed 
to have an intrinsic value to human well-being, across generations. However, in practice, the 
― capacity  to  generate  well-being‖  has  often  been  interpreted  to  mean,  more  narrowly,  a 
― general capacity to produce‖ for which all resources may be substitutable, if not at present 
then perhaps at some point of time in the future, when technological possibilities may be 
extensive. Thus manmade capital may be used to substitute for a particular natural resource 
(though manmade and natural diamonds have yet be equally valued by diamond lovers). In 
this narrow interpretation of sustainability, the intrinsic values that certain resources  and 
ecologies may have for human well-being are downplayed. This narrow interpretation of 
sustainability becomes especially dominant where the focus of development is one-sidedly 
placed on economic growth. Indeed, in his own writings, Solow has emphasized the need 
only to main the ― general capacity‖, and stressed substitution possibilities, to the neglect of 
the need to preserve specific resources and ecologies. He speaks thus:   
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If you don't eat one species of fish, you can eat another species of fish…. That is 
extremely  important  because  it  suggests  that  we  do  not  owe  to  the  future  any 
particular  thing.  There  is  no  specific  object  that  the  goal  of  sustainability,  the 
obligation of sustainability, requires us to leave untouched. (Solow, 1991, p. 3-4) 
 
However, this hard-nosed view on sustainability is, in fact, deeply worrying. For one thing, 
in the absence of perfect information and foresight, the future value of a particular resource 
and ecology to a future generation cannot be clear, and yet decisions whether to destroy or 
run down on them, irreversibly, are often made now. Its future value in question can be 
intrinsic, in  that it may impact  the well-being  of some future  generations  directly  (even 
though it may not do so in respect of the present generation). But it can be instrumental as 
well, in that new technological possibilities in the future may raise their value, beyond any 
value that it may presently hold. Thus, a particular herb species, for example, may not have 
any economic value now, but with new medical technologies it may be discovered to possess 
a powerful remedial function, and hence a high economic value as well.   
 
Thus in the absence of perfect knowledge and foresight about the future value of a particular 
resource, be it a particular animal or plant species, or a mineral deposit, it would seem that 
precaution is in order. Thus the injunction that one should ensure that development that 
meets the needs of the present generation do not compromise the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs may indeed mean that one should deplete any specific resource, be it 
a plant or animal species, or some other resource, beyond a certain critical mass. Needless to 269 
 
say, if such a principle is indeed accepted, one will then need to determine precisely what 
such a ― critical mass‖ is in each and every case.   
 
Some such a principle does appear to be accepted in the case of organic organisms, even 
though its enforcement has left much to be desired (witness the recent record of biodiversity 
losses). In the case of other resources, the issue has hardly received much attention. One 
suspects that its failure to be more widely accepted probably does not have do with its lack 
of merit—it clearly has—but has to do with the fact that it clashes with one fundamental 
principle  of  a  capitalist  economic  system,  namely,  the  discounting  principle.  The  latter 
principle owes itself to the fact that in order to induce one person to part with one dollar 
today, he or she needs to be paid more than one dollar tomorrow, implying that one dollar 
tomorrow  is  not  valued  as  much  as  one  dollar  today.  Extended  to  an  inter-generational 
context, it means that one dollar‘s worth next generation will not be valued as much as one 
dollar‘s worth this generation. In other words, damages to the next generation‘s welfare due 
to environmental pollutions or resource depletion today can be discounted, and after many 
generations successive discounting may well reduce the negative value of an environmental 
damage or resource depletion inflicted today to a negligible level.   
 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  discounting  principle  can  be  abandoned  under  a  capitalist 
economic system. On the other hand, full intergenerational equity would require one dollar‘s 
worth  many  generations  later  is  valued  as  much  as  one  dollar‘s  worth  today.  It  seems 
unlikely that one can pin any hope of realizing inter-generational equity at any acceptable 270 
 
level on changing the discounting principle. Rather, remedial measures have to be sought 
elsewhere, not only in terms of using specific policies to influence polluters‘ (and potential 
polluters‘) behavior, but also in terms of the choice of ― development paradigm‖ that we 
follow.   
4.11.2 Economic Growth and the Human Development Paradigm
63 
Different development paradigms attach different levels of importance to the environment 
and thus would imply different environmental policies. Here, we will compare three such 
paradigms,  the  traditional  GDP  paradigm,  the  Green  GDP  paradigm,  and  the  Human 
Development paradigm.   
 
Most  economies  currently  use  a  GDP  paradigm  to  measure  the  level  of  economic 
development and social welfare. However, according to the way GDP is accounted, it is the 
market value of all final goods and services produced within an economy in a given period of 
time. As such, it is but a measure of the level of economic activity, and not development or 
performance.  Some  economic  activities  may  be  good  for  development  (understood  as 
― human progress‖, or advancement of people‘s well-being), while others may not be, or may 
exert a negative as well as a positive impact on it.   
 
As a measure of the level of performance or development of an economy, GDP is far from an 
adequate choice for many reasons. For the purpose at hand, it leaves environmental costs of 
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the  economic  activities  out  of  account,  in  the  following  respects:  (1)  damage  to  the 
environment is not considered; (2) damage to economic production due to environmental 
pollution  and  degradation  is  not  counted;  (3)  environmental  control  costs  (including 
governmental  expenditures,  non-governmental  investments  in  pollution  prevention,  and 
compensations) are not subtracted from the value of the activities giving rise to them but are 
actually calculated as a ― service‖, and are included as a part of final consumption and hence 
national  income;  (4)  health  costs  caused  by  environmental  exposure  is  likewise  not 
subtracted from any measure of welfare but is, in fact, included as part of final consumption 
and  national  income.  As  a  result  of  these  ― mis-countings‖,  a  GDP-based  measure  of 
economic and social progress is unlikely to provide a true measure of the level of progress or 
social welfare.   
 
Rather, a GDP-based development paradigm can well give rise to single-minded pursuits of 
GDP growth, and catching-up impulses in GDP terms, at the expense of the environment. 
Evidence abounds that indeed this has happened, across continents and economies. Its effect 
on human welfare has been dramatic, but here is not the place to dwell on the point. 
 
In response to the problem, a modified paradigm, the green GDP paradigm, has been put 
forward,  which  takes  environmental  costs  into  consideration  when  measuring  GDP. 
Methodologies  for  calculating  green  GDP  are  many,  of  which  the  most  recognized 
accounting  system  is  the  SEEA  system  (System  of  Integrated  Environmental  Economic 
Accounting) designed by UNEP and the World Bank in 1989.   272 
 
 
Although Green GDP takes into account environmental costs, it has its weaknesses. For one 
thing, it is an enormous challenge to provide a monetary valuation of any natural resource 
decrease or environmental degradation. Often, the exercise is so technical that it is left to a 
small  group  of  experts-cum-technocrats.  While  the  numerous  underlying  technical 
relationships involved clearly need the inputs of experts, they are, however, no better placed 
than people themselves to judge the trade off between, say, the cost of a measured emission 
to a person‘s health, and the cost to income if that emission is stopped. And even if they 
could do so, correctly, for one person, another may well have a different ranking of the two. 
However,  these  trade-offs  are  frequently  made  by  ― expert‖  on  behalf  the  people.  The 
― weights‖ they use in solving these difficult trade-off problems are often arbitrarily chosen, 
the approach they take to treating the entire issue smacks of a high level of presumption, and 
the results they arrive at often have little policy guidance.       
 
Different from Green GDP, the human development paradigm explicitly recognizes that such 
difficulties may be insurmountable by any technical approach, that there may indeed be not a 
universally agreed set of weights to use to get round trade-offs, and that the right approach 
may actually be to involve people directly in expressing their preferences and valuations 
through public debates and discussions, and that the eventual social choice may well have to 
emerge  from  a  democratic  process.  Thus  the  human  development  paradigm  differs 
thoroughly from the Green GDP approach in respect of the role to be assigned and attitudes 
to public participation.   273 
 
 
At the same time, by stressing the importance of such dimensions as health and education, 
the HD paradigm has a natural tendency to attach due importance to environment. For one 
thing,  emphasis  on  good  health  with  a  decent  standard  of  living  imposes  demands  on 
environmental quality and discourages over-exploitation of the environment and resources. 
For another, emphasis on knowledge and education would benefit the environment because 
better education tends to make people have a better regard for the environment. 
 
To summarize, compared with the Green GDP paradigm, the human development paradigm, 
by emphasizing a person's  such capabilities as  health and education rather than GDP or 
income per se, and by emphasizing the role of agency and participation in environmental 
protection,  would  appear  to  be  better  disposed  towards  protecting  the  environment  and 
achieving environmental sustainability. 
4.11.3 Types of Environmental Policy 
In terms of types of policies aimed specifically at environmental control and protection, there 
are two broad approaches. One can be characterized as the laissez faire approach, or inaction 
on  the  part  of  the  government,  and  the  other  the  non-laissez  faire  approach,  where  the 
government  does  intervene.  The  theoretical  underpinning  of  the  former  is  the  so-called 
Coase theorem, which argues that provided that the property rights are clear and there are 
no transaction costs, where externality exists bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome 
irrespective  of  the  initial  allocation  of  property  rights.  If  the  property  rights  are  clear, 274 
 
pollution problems can be solved by transfer payments from the polluting to the polluted 
party, or the other way round. As such, the Coasian approach depends entirely on the market, 
and the function of the government is only to maintain the market order, rather than taking 
any policy to intervene in an externality generating activity.   
 
In the real world, however, successful examples of such decentralized solutions are generally 
rare.  The  reason  is  that  two  parties  to  an  externality  often  face  enormous  informational 
problems in negotiation, even if property rights are clear, and in many cases the property 
rights  are  simply  not  clear,  or  could  not  be  established.  As  a  result,  in  practice  most 
governments  do  intervene  if  an  environmental  pollution  becomes  a  serious  concern  (the 
non-laissez  faire  approach).  And  where  a  government  does  intervene,  it  usually  uses 
instruments  belonging  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  following  two  types:  the 
command-and-control (or non-market-based) instruments, and market-based ones. 
 
Of the two, command-and-control instruments are the more commonly used type. Virtually 
all countries in the world use these instruments to address environmental problems (Stavins, 
1997).  These  usually  involve  the  government  setting  and  enforcing  specific  emission 
standards or non-tradable emission ceilings on firms and individuals in order to regulate their 
activity. However, as Tietenberg (1985) argues, although these policy instruments can be 
effective in achieving established environmental goals and standards, they tend to lead to 
non-cost-effective outcomes in which firms use unduly expensive means to control pollution. 
Further,  as  Stavins  (1997,  p.301)  points  out,  ― [E]ven  if  the  government  could  use 275 
 
conventional  technology  or  uniform  performance  standards  to  achieve  a  cost-effective 
allocation  of  pollution  control  at  present,  such  standards  would  not  provide  dynamic 
incentives for the development, adoption, and diffusion of environmentally and economically 
superior control technologies. Once a performance standard has been satisfied, an individual 
firm can gain little from developing or adopting cleaner technology. In addition, regulated 
firms may fear that adopting a superior technology will cause performance standards to be 
tightened.‖ 
 
In contrast, market-based instruments can be employed by governments to alter the price 
signals to firms in order to ensure that polluters face direct cost incentives so as to control 
emission (Stavins, 1997). These instruments, which mainly include emission tax and tradable 
emission rights, can offer cost-effective alternatives and at the same time provide dynamic 
incentives  for  technological  change.  As  pointed  out  by  Stavins  (1997,  p.302),  ― At  the 
greatest level of abstraction, in a perfectly competitive market place, an emission tax or 
tradable permit scheme would allow polluters to reduce emissions up to the point where the 
marginal  cost  of  control  equals  the  emissions  tax  rate  or  the  equilibrium  price  of  an 
emissions permit. Both instruments would promote dynamic efficiency, as each provides a 
continuous incentive for adopting better abatement technologies.‖ 
 
These apart, in recent  years another type of instrument, the ― voluntary agreements‖, has 
appeared.  Voluntary  agreements  are  ― essentially  a  contract  between  the  government  and 
industry,  or  negotiated  targets  with  commitments  and  time  schedules  on  the  part  of  all 276 
 
participating  parties‖  (IEA,  1997a,  p.11).  As  suggested  by  Price  (2005,  p.1),  ― voluntary 
agreement programs can be roughly divided into three broad categories: (1) programs that 
are  completely  voluntary;  (2)  programs  that  use  the  threat  of  future  regulations  or 
energy/greenhouse gas emissions taxes as a motivation for participation; and (3) programs 
that are implemented in conjunction with an existing energy/GHG emissions tax policy or 
with  strict  regulations.‖
64  The  first  type  of  voluntary  agreements  may  be  thought  of  as 
independent of any government action while the second and third types clearly betray a hand 
of the government. However, even in the case of first type, whether or not they can be seen 
as a negotiated settlement between the externality generating and recipient parties, as Coase 
had  envisaged,  remains  to  be  clarified.  It  could  well  be  that  rather  than  being  such  a 
negotiated settlement, they in fact arise for rather different reasons,    for example, as a case 
of ― corporate social responsibility‖.   
 
The above provides a brief discussion of the three commonly used types of environmental 
policy instruments. Below we review how these policies have been practiced in the ESA 
region. We begin, however, with the history of the establishment of National Environmental 
Management Programs in the ESA economies. 
4.11.4 Environmental Management and Policies in ESA Economies 
(1) National Environmental Management Systems 
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By a national environmental management system is meant the entire set up of government 
administrative  agencies,  basic  legislations  and  policies,  legislation  and  polices  aimed  at 
environmental  control  and  protection  in  particular  sectors,  and  other  related  policies, 
procedures  and  mechanisms.  The  establishments  of  national  environmental  ministries  or 
agencies in the ESA region took place in roughly two waves, the first in the 1970s and the 
second in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For most economies in the region, passage of basic 
environmental  legislations  lagged  behind  the  establishment  of  environmental  ministries. 
Japan was the first economy to pass a basic environmental law (1967), and Malaysia was the 
second  to  do  so  in  1974.  Taiwan  and  Thailand  followed  in  1975.  Singapore  passed  its 
comprehensive environmental legislation in 1999. 
 
Figure 4.11.1 Establishment of Environmental Ministries and Basic Environmental 
Laws in ESA Economies, 1967 to 2000 
 
Source: Sonnefeld and Mol (2006, p.122). 
 
As  well  as  basic  environmental  laws,  many  economies  also  passed  more  specific 278 
 
environmental legislations targeting particular sectors. Thus Singapore, even before it passed 
its  comprehensive  national  legislations,  had  enacted  a  long  series  of  more  specific 
environment-related acts several decades before. In the 1990s, Vietnam adopted a number of 
laws  related  to  natural  resources  and  environmental  protection,  including  the  Law  on 
Protection and Development of Forest (1991), Law on Land and Territory (1993), Law on 
Environmental Protection (1994), Law on Minerals (1996), and Law on Water Resources 
(1999).  Under  these  laws,  natural  resources  belong  to  all  Vietnamese  people,  and  the 
government  exercises  unified  management  over  natural  resources  and  environmental 
protection throughout the country (Organizers of the First Regional Environmental Forum, 
2003, p.85). 
 
Among  the  region‘s  economies,  enormous  variations  also  exist  in  the  extent  of  the 
environmental protection legislations passed. Table 4.11.1 compares these for five selected 
economies. Of them, Japan, South Korea and China have relatively well-developed systems 
of environmental legislations. In contrast, in Thailand and the Philippines, although basic 
environmental  laws  are  in  place,  for  many  specific  sectors  there  are  as  yet  no  specific 
environmental laws targeting them. Unlike in the three East Asia economies, there are also 
no additional mechanisms to address issues such as the environmental impact assessment, 





Table 4.11.1 National Environmental Protection Legislations in ESA Economies   
Countries/Policies  Japan  China  S. Korea  Thailand  Philippines 















   
Air  Yes (68)  Yes (87, 95)  Yes (90, 99)    Yes (99) 
Water  Yes (70)  Yes(67, 93)  Yes (90, 99)  Yes  Yes 
Sea  Yes (70)  Yes (82)      Yes 
Automobile exhausts  Yes (72, 92)  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Soil  Yes (70)    Yes  Yes (95, 99)     
Noise  Yes (68)  Yes (96)  Yes (96)     
Solid waste  Yes (70)  Yes (95)  Yes (86, 99)     
Toxic materials  Yes (73)  Yes  Yes (90, 99)  Yes (92)  Yes (90) 
Sewage  Yes  Yes  Yes (66, 99)       
Nature Conservation  Yes (72)  Yes  Yes (91, 99)    Yes (78) 
Environmental Impact Assessment  Yes (97)  Yes  Yes (93, 99)     
Financing  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Environmental disputes resolution  Yes    Yes     
Environmental R&D      Yes  Yes (94, 99)       
Notes:  'Yes'  indicates  that  there  is  a  specific  law/policy  in  place  and  a  number(s)  in 
parenthesis ('93, 99') indicates the year in which the law/policy was adopted (and amended); 
a 'blank' cell means that no specific law/policy is in place. 
Sources: Imura and Schreurs (2005); Zhao X. (2006).   
 
Even  though  an  economy  might  enact  a  particular  environmental  protections  law, 
enforcement of it can be another matter. Often, governments have opportunities to intervene 
in protecting the environment, but they lack the political will to do so. Thus in Thailand, the 
government attempts to strengthen the ability of local organizations to manage their own 
local  environment,  but  often  only  if  it  is  politically  expedient  to  do.  ― Furthermore, 
governments  can  play  an  important  role  in  the  use  of  monetary  policy,  such  as  the 
application of environmental taxes based on the polluter pays principle, or by charging for 
services such as for waste collection and treatment. Politically, though, this is not an easy 
option (Organizers of the First Regional Environmental Forum, 2003, p.76).   
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(2) Command-and-Control vs Market Based Instruments 
Most of environmental policy instruments sued in ESA economies are of the ― command and 
control‖ type. These include technology and performance standards. These standards are 
imposed  on  the  producers/consumers  in  the  form  of  permissible  choice  of  production 
technologies and maximum allowable discharges of known pollutants into the atmosphere or 
waterways. This is usually done by imposing a common emission limit on all plants in a 
given industry; imposing firm-specific or industry sector-specific limits; or imposing on all 
producers a standard technology that meets the limits. Exceeding the imposed limits would 
be punishable by closure and steep fines (Habito, 2007). However, as pointed out above 
already, the costs of meeting such command-and-control targets will often be higher than the 
comparable market based instruments.   
 
While command-and-control approaches have dominated environmental policies in the ESA 
region, market-based instruments are nevertheless receiving increasing emphasis. Thus some 
economies  have  begun  to  levy  emission  charges.  Examples  of  these  include  the  SO2 
emission  charge  in  Japan,  and  the  SO2  and  NOX  emission  charges  in  China.  Some 
economies  have  used  subsidies  to  encourage  the  adoption  of  particular  environmentally 
friendly technologies. Thus tax deductions were used in South Korea and the Philippines to 
stimulate the installation of industrial antipollution equipments (Gunatilake and De Guzman, 
2006). Another success story is the Demand-side Management Program in the power sector 
of Thailand, partly funded by the Global Environment Facility (UNEP, 2000).   
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A further example is the road/area pricing introduced in Singapore in the early 1970s to 
reduce road congestion. Highly effective area licensing schemes were adopted which, by 
charging drivers to use the roads in the city center during peak hours, reduced congestion 
significantly during these times. Indeed, this scheme has been considered the best example of 
a modern area pricing system. In 1990, to further control the growth of private vehicles, 
Singapore introduced a vehicle quota system in which anybody wishing to own a car had to 
bid  for  a  Certificate  of  Entitlement  (Gunatilake  and  De  Guzman,  2006,  p.8).  Further 
examples of market-based policy instruments can be seen in Table 4.11.2. 
 
Table 4.11.2 Use of Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Protection in the 
ESA Region 
 
Note: PRC means ―the  People‘s Republic of China‖. 
Source: ADB(2001); Gunatilake and De Guzman(2006) 
 
While market based instruments are increasingly being used in the region, nevertheless they 
remain a small appendix in the overall environmental management programs of an economy. 
In recent years, possibilities of a new area of environmental tax, the carbon tax, have also 282 
 
received a high level of attention from some ESA governments. Box 4.11.1 provides further 
details on this.   
 
Box 4.11.1 Carbon Tax 
 
In recent years, climate change has become a hot topic in global environmental debates. 
Carbon tax, based as it does on the carbon content of energy inputs, is considered as one of 
the  most  effective  instruments  of  GHG  reduction,  and  has  received  much  attention 
internationally. To date, some industrialized countries have already implemented carbon tax, 
including Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Netherlands. So have some regions in US 
and Canada. However, the tax has not as yet been put into practice in any ESA economy. It 
has, though, attracted much attention from the governments of Japan and China. 
 
Carbon tax can play an important role in reducing GHG. Take Denmark for example, the 
Danish Green Tax Package consisting of a carbon tax was put into force in 1996. The tax 
package is estimated to have reduced industrial emission by nearly 4% in 2005 compared to 
the 1985 level (Hansen, 2001).   
 
Though  carbon  tax  can  exert  a  positive  influence  on  environment,  nevertheless  it  may 
undermine international competitiveness of an economy levying the tax. As pointed out by 
World Bank (2008, p.20), ― [a] carbon tax would affect competitiveness by increasing the 
costs of polluting inputs (e.g., coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity). Hence, a carbon tax may 283 
 
significantly increase production costs, leading to lower profits, either through lower margins 
or through a reduction in sales (or both).‖ 
 
In a country that imposes a carbon tax, the expectation is that international competitiveness 
of energy-intensive industries will most likely be impaired. Thus, as World Bank (2008, 
p.24)  observes,  ― [I]n  anticipation  of  the  adverse  terms  of  trade  affecting  their  most 
competitive  sectors,  many  countries  provide  either  a  full  or  partial  exemption  for 
energy-intensive  industries  and  export  industries.  In  many  cases,  energy  products  used 
mainly by heavy industries are exempted from tax. Most countries do not tax coal at all, 
while a few countries that have taxes on these products grant very significant exemptions. In 
other  cases  (Denmark,  Germany,  Sweden,  and  the  United  Kingdom),  reduced  tax  rates 
combined  with  generous  rebates  are  applied  to  industry  with  respect  to  carbon  or  other 
energy taxes.‖ 
 
From the carbon tax practice of the developed countries in question, some experiences can 
be learned by ESA economies. In the ESA region, market-based instruments are still rather 
rarely used and their more widespread adoption should be encouraged by the government. 
Given the fact that carbon tax has a negative influence on the competitiveness of an economy 
in the short run, we can mitigate this influence by keeping to the following points at the stage 
of  policy  design.  First,  move  progressively  when  formulating  it,  that  is,  stipulate  only 
relatively  loose  regulation  at  the  beginning  so  as  to  allow  enough  adjustment  time  for 
companies and then gradually tighten the regulation. Second, differentiate the more heavily 284 
 
influenced sectors (such as the energy-intensive sectors) from other sectors and take related 
measures to moderate the burden of the regulation on them. Last but not least, revenues from 
those profitable regulation instruments such as tax and auctioned permits should be used to 
mitigate negative influence of the regulation.   
 
(3) Voluntary Approaches 
Voluntary agreements have arisen mostly over improving energy efficiency and reducing 
energy-related GHG emissions. Since the 1990s, they have been adopted as a popular policy 
instrument in many industrialized countries. Currently, a number of national-level voluntary 
agreement programs are being modified and strengthened, while other countries, including 
some newly industrialized and developing countries, are beginning to adopt these types of 
agreements as well in order to increase the energy efficiency of their industrial sectors. Table 
4.11.3 provides an overview of 23 voluntary agreement programs found around the world, 
identifying in which of the three broad categories they fit and indicating which incentives 
and penalties are included in each program. Of the list, three programs are from Japan, South 
Korea and Chinese Taipei of the ESA region.   
 
The  programs  from  South  Korea  and  Chinese  Taipei  are,  respectively,  the  Voluntary 
Agreement  System  for  Energy  Conservation  and  Reduction  of  GHG  Emissions,  and  the 
Energy Auditing Program. Both are categorized as ― Completely Voluntary Programs‖, that is, 
without any serious pressure exerted by the government to join the program. On the other 
hand, the program from Japan (the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment) is 285 
 
based on an implied threat of future regulations and future energy and GHG emissions taxes.   
 
These programs did make a contribution to the cause of environmental protection in these 
economies.  In  particular,  the  program  in  Japan  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to 
environmental protection in the country. However, even so, the effect has been relatively 
limited, especially when compared with those other programs that are backed up with either 
a threatened or real imposition of regulations or taxes. Compared with the OECD countries‘ 
voluntary agreements, the effect of these three ESA programs has been relatively weak.   
 
From our above review, it does seem quite clear that most ESA economies have made great 
improvements in the formulation and implementation of environmental policies. 
Nevertheless, shortcomings still remain. For one thing, the command-and-control approaches 
have been the main policy instruments used. These usually impose a high level cost. On the 
other hand, even if implemented, many of these laws and rules are often not effectively 
enforced. Although being increasingly adopted, market-based instruments are on the whole 
still rare in the region. On the other hand, market-based instruments are generally more 
cost-effective, and provide more incentives for enterprise innovation.286 
 
Table 4.11.3 Overview of Industrial Sector Voluntary Agreement Schemes 
 
     Source: Price(2005).287 
 
4.11.5 Recommendations 
The above review leads us to the following recommendations: First, there needs to be a 
broader understanding of requirements of sustainability, beyond the narrow requirement of 
sustaining the general capacity of production, or general capacity of generating welfare. It 
may  well  be  that  certain  specific  resources,  living  organisms  or  otherwise,  need  to  be 
preserved.  Secondly,  environmental  policy-making  should  best  be  guided  by  the  human 
development paradigm, which has a natural tendency to emphasize environmental concerns 
and the need for protection. The goal of the development is to expand human capabilities 
(and substantial freedom of human beings), including health, education, a decent standard of 
living,  and  agency.  The  goal  of  expanding  these  capabilities  calls  for  a  sustainable 
exploitation of the natural environment and a sustainable utilization of the resources, both 
important for achieving sustainable human development.   
 
Thirdly,  in  terms  of  actual  environmental  management,  it  is  important  to  set  up  a 
comprehensive  frame  of  policies  about  the  environment  and  development.  Public 
participation in environmental policy making is important, in order to raise public awareness 
of  the  issues  and  cement  political  commitment  to  the  policies.  Such  awareness  and 
participation  may  also  contribute  to  the  emergence  and  popularization  and  voluntary 
programs, with or with out the threat of penalizing policies and regulations.   
 
Fourthly,  in  terms  of  corrective  policy  instruments,  a  greater  role  should  be  given  to 288 
 
market-based environmental policy instruments. Compared with command-and-control ones, 
market-based instruments are more cost-effective and can provide stronger incentives for 
technology change. It is worth noting that when introducing new market-based instruments, 
the government should try to offset the negative impacts on competiveness through a well 
thought-out approach to minimize them.289 
 
5. Conclusion 
This report has reviewed patterns and trends of human development in the past two decades in 
East and Southeast Asian (ESA) economies. As we have seen, progress in HD in the last two 
decades in all ESA economies has been extensive. In HDI terms, those which started from a 
low level of HDI in particular made rapid progress. In component dimensions that make up the 
HDI (health, education and per capita income), all economies for which we have data appear 
to have achieved substantial progress. A similar picture emerges for governance. Indeed, many 
ESA  economies  have  undergone  a  fundamental  process  of  democratization  in  these  two 
decades, but other economies without going such a process has also made significant progress 
in governance. In short, progress in HD over the last two decades in the region has been 
extensive and widespread.   
 
On the other hand, substantial disparities are also observed both across economies and within 
each economy in respect of both the overall HD progress and progress in each component 
dimension. Thus in terms of    the overall level of HD reached, Japan's HDI score was 0.96 in 
2007, followed closely by Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea (Rep). Timor-Leste had an HDI 
score of only 0.489, and Myanmar 0.586, with Cambodia and Lao PDR not very much far 
ahead. In terms of health, wide gaps exist between the economies in all indictors that we 
looked at. The same is true of education and governance.   
 
Wide  disparities  also  exist  between  social  groups  within  each  economy.  Indeed,  such 290 
 
disparities even appear to have widened in the last two decades. Thus income inequalities in 
the region have generally worsened, although exceptions have also existed (notably Malaysia, 
which has experienced a marked fall in its income Gini). Similarly, inequalities in health and 
education have generally persisted across EAS economies. These different kinds of inequality 
tend to strike the same group of victims, giving rise to what are known as inequality traps, 
whereby unfavorable outcomes in one dimension cause and/or reinforce unfavorable outcomes 
in other dimensions. Given the importance of these inequalities, and the poverty they often 
imply (in income or otherwise), it is important to find effective ways to reverse them, and 
herein lies a key goal of public policy. 
 
Besides  the  widening  social  and  economic  disparities,  the  last  two  decades  have  also 
witnessed  worsening  environmental  problems  in  the  region,  in  terms  of  both  ecological 
destruction and resource depletion. While some environmental indicators (such as air quality 
in the region‘s major cities) have shown significant improvements, in most other aspects a 
significant worsening of the environment took place, including deforestation, biodiversity loss, 
water pollution, and carbon emission. If these trends are not checked in time, they are likely to 
threaten major human development reversals in the region in the future. 
 
While public policy can play an important role in reversing the aforementioned inequality 
traps and worsening environmental trends, it is also important to recognize the possible role of 
structural factors, that is, forces that are given rise to by the very nature of the developmental 
process, and that cannot be entirely countervailed by public policy. These structural factors 291 
 
include  industrialization  and  urbanization,  trade  expansion  and  globalization  (which 
characterize the process of modern economic development), and their implications for various 
economic  and  social  inequalities  and  environmental  sustainability.  In  the  literatures,  two 
important hypotheses, the so-called Kuznets Curve and the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 
address respectively the relationship (if any) between economic growth and income inequality, 
and  between  economic  growth  and  environmental  sustainability.  While  these  hypotheses 
appear to have held true for some economies in the world for some stages of their economic 
development, generally they do not appear to have done so in respect of ESA economies. In 
particular, the Kuznets hypothesis appears to have been negated by the evidence from some 
important ESA economies, notably Korea (Rep) and Taiwan.   
 
It was argued in this report that in understanding the relationship between income inequality 
and economic growth, it is important to give attention to the role of initial asset (principally 
land) distribution, agricultural and rural development policies, industrial and trade policies, 
SME development policies, and human capital accumulation (especially education). To the 
extent  that  public  policy  can  exert  a  strong  impact  on  these,  it  can  materially  affect  the 
trajectory of income distribution in the course of an economy's development.   
 
The above-mentioned public polices target at the primary phase of distribution, that is, income 
distribution before tax and transfer. Social welfare programs aim to affect the income and 
expenditure that persons and families eventually receive, save and spend. In a modern society, 
a wide range of social welfare programs typically exist on health, education, pension, housing, 292 
 
unemployment benefits, low income support, reliefs, etc. Typically, economies in the early 
stage of their development have less of these programs, and even if one is introduced, usually 
with only a small coverage and few benefits. This appears to have been exactly the pattern of 
evolution in ESA economies, with more developed economies (e.g. Japan and South Korea) 
having more of these programs each offering a greater coverage and more benefits, and less 
developed ones have few of these which offer a smaller coverage and less benefits. In more 
recent years, attempts were also made in more developed economies in the region (e.g. Taiwan) 
to equalize and universalize many welfare programs.   
 
Indeed, inequalities in entitlements to these programs and in the level of benefits received 
between  different  social  groups  have  been  an  important  social  and  policy  issue  in  some 
economies. In China, where the rural-urban divide is particular pronounced, such welfare gaps 
have been a highly contentious social issue that appears to have contributed significantly to the 
tension within the society. One key consequence has been the emergence of dualistic cities, 
whereby  urban  migrant  workers  suffer  extensive  discriminations  in  welfare  entitlements 
compared with locally registered city dwellers. All this comes on top of other discrimination 
they have already suffered in terms of employment, and disadvantages they have had in terms 
of  skills  and  education.  It  will  be  difficult  to  remove  personal  disadvantages  for  migrant 
workers, but it is possible and, indeed, public policy must try to reduce if not entirely eliminate 
institutionalized discriminations in welfare entitlements and employment.   
 
Primary and secondary distributions of income and expenditure are about intra-generational 293 
 
equity. Sustainability concerns inter-generational equity. It is argued in this report that it is not 
only necessary to ensure the sustainability of some general capacity to produce goods and 
services for future generations, but also, given imperfect foresight, a case can be made to 
preserve some specific natural resources and ecologies at some threshold level. Environmental 
challenges,  both  global  and  local,  are  mounting  in  ESA  as  in  other  economies,  and  the 
approach to tackle these challenges can take place at two levels. In addition to utilizing an 
extensive array of environmental policy instruments, the choice of development paradigm is 
also  critical.  For  various  reasons,  a  GDP  centered  development  paradigm  discounts  the 
importance  of  the  environment  by  evaluating  development  exclusively  in  terms  of  GDP. 
However, the alternative to this is not a green GDP paradigm, not only because the accounting 
framework this has entailed is still embedded in GDP, but also, more importantly, because it in 
essence  attempts  to  address  an  essentially  social  and  political  problem  by  a  technocratic 
approach.  The  human  development  paradigm,  on  the  other  hand,  recognizes  that 
environmental  concerns  are  essentially  social  and  political  issues  and,  hence,  advocates  a 
participatory approach to settle the issues  through public debates  and  democratic decision 
making.   
 
Environmental problems are a good example which underlines the importance of governance 
and agency, and in particular civic and political rights and participation. This is an area where 
some ESA economies have made immense progress while others less so. There is a natural 
tendency to associate formal democratization with progress in political rights, empowerment 
and governance. But even in economies where formal democratization has been missing, still 294 
 
significant progress can be made in these areas. China appears to be a case in point, where 
there have in recent years been major improvements in governance, as attested by the recent 
round of healthcare policy debates. Such improvements are vital, not only for their intrinsic 
values but also because they improve the quality of public policy making and implementation 
as well.   
 
It appears from this report that the following six principles are critical to a successful human 
development strategy: agricultural and rural development to facilitate economic and social 
structural  transformation  and  to  increase  employment  opportunities;  human  capital 
accumulation  to  promote  economic  and  income  growth;  inclusive  urbanization  to  reduce 
dualism  and  enhance  social  integration;  cleaner  industrialization  to  ensure  sustainability; 
people's participation and empowerment to improve decision making and governance; closer 
regional  and  international  cooperation  to  ensure  a  better  common  future  for  all 
on our fragile planet. While these principles appear to concern the instrumental role of the 
policies  in  question  in  promoting  human  development,  the  intrinsic  values  to  human 
development that successful implementations of these principles can ensure are, of course, 
equally important.   295 
 
 
  Reference 
Abrami. R, E. Malesky and Y. Zheng. 2008. ― Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party 
Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China‖. Working Paper 2008-0130, 
Cambridge: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 
Adams M. 1995. Land and Reform: New Seeds on Old Ground? 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2163.pdf. Accessed April 2010.   
Albert, P., S.G. Wang and F. Cai. 2006. ― Migration and Urban Poverty and Inequality in 
China‖. 
http://iple.cass.cn/file/Migration_and_Urban_Poverty_and_Inequality_in_China.pdf . 
Accessed April 2010. 
Aldaba, R. 2008. ― SMEs in the Philippine Manufacturing Industry and Globalization: 
Meeting Development Challenges‖. In ASEAN SMEs and Globalization. ERIA Research 
Project Report 2007 No.5, edited by Hank Lim. Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE)-Japan External Trade Organization. 
Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik. 1994. ― Distributive Politics and Economic Growth‖. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 109(2): 465-490. 
Ando, M, and F. Kimura. 2003. ― The Forming of International Production and Distribution 
Networks in East Asia‖. NBER Working Paper 10167, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economics Research. 
Annear, P. and D. Wilkinson. 2006. ― Study of Access to Health Services for the Poor in 
Cambodia‖. Phnom Penh, WHO Office in Cambodia and Australian Agency for 296 
 
International Development. 
http://www.who.int/health_financing/countries/cam-healthaccess.pdf. Accessed April 
2010.   
Arrow, K., B. Bolin, R. Costanza, P. Dasgupta, C. Folke, C.S. Halling, B. Jansson, S. 
Levin, K. Maler, C. Perrings and D. Pimental. 1995. ― Economic Growth, Carrying 
Capacity, and the Environment‖. Ecological Economics 15: 1-95. 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2001. Asian Environment Outlook 2001. Asian 
Development Bank, Manila. 
—. 2004a. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2004: Poverty in Asia: Measurement, 
Estimates, and Prospects. Philippines: Asian Development Bank. 
—. 2004b. ― Poverty Profile of the People‘s Republic of China‖. 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Poverty_Profile_PRC/PRC.pdf. Accessed April 
2010. 
—. 2006. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2006: Measuring Policy Effectiveness in 
Health and Education. Philippines: Asian Development Bank. 
— 2007a. ― Education and Structural Change in Four Asian Countries‖. In Asian Development 
Outlook 2007. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
—. 2007b. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2007: Inequality in Asia. Philippines: Asian 
Development Bank. 
—. 2009. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009: Enterprises in Asia: Fostering 
Dynamism in SMEs. Philippines: Asian Development Bank. 
Ayyagari, M., A. Demirg-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. 2006. ― How Important are Financing 
Constraints? The Role of Finance in the Business Environment‖. World Bank Policy 297 
 
Research Working Paper No. 3820. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Banerjee, A. V., P. J. Gertler and M. Ghatak. 2002. ― Empowerment and Efficiency: 
Tenancy Reform in West Bengal‖. Journal of Political Economy 110(2): 239-280. 
Baqir, R. 2002. ― Social Sector Spending in a Panel of Countries‖. IMF Working Paper No. 
WP/02/35. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Basa, J. 2005. ― Creating Linkages Between National and Community-based Insurance 
Schemes in the Philippines‖. Paper presented at the Conference of the GTZ-ILO-WHO 
Consortium on Social Health Protection in Developing Countries, 05-07 December 2007, 
Berlin, Germany.   
Beck, T., A. Demirgü c-Kunt, L. Laeven and R. Levine. 2005. ― Finance, Firm Size and 
Growth‖. Policy Research Working Paper 3485, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Behrman, J.R. 2003. ― The Role of Decentralization in Promoting Effective Schooling in 
Developing Asia‖. Asian Development Review 20(1): 57-99. 
Berry and Cline. 1979. Berry RA, Cline WR. Agrarian Structure and productivity in 
developing countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Besley, T. 2000. ― Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India‖. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 389-430. 
Boex, J., E. Heredia-Ortiz, J. Martinez-Vezquez, A. Timofeev and G. Yao. 2005. ― Fighting 
Poverty Through Fiscal Decentralization‖. USAID report. 
CDRF. 2009. Construction of Universal Access to Developmental Social Welfare System. 
Beijing: China Development Press. 
Chatterjee, S. 2005. ― Poverty Reduction Strategies–Lessons from the Asian and Pacific 
Region on Inclusive Development‖. Asian Development Review 22(1): 12-44. 298 
 
Chen, S.H. and M. Ravallion. 2008. ― The Developing World is Poorer Than We Thought, 
But No Less Successful in the Fight Against Poverty‖. Poverty Research Working Paper 
4703, Washington DC: World Bank. 
Chenery, H. 1959. ―The Interdependence of Investment Decisions‖. In Moses Abramovitz, ed. 
The Allocation of Economics Resource. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Cheng, E.and R.Y. Li. 2009. ― Key Indicators for Poverty Alleviation in China‖. Public 
Finance and Management 9(1). 
China Development Research Center of the State Council. 2005. Public Finance of County 
and Township Government and the Burden of Rural Population in China (in Chinese). 
Taiyuan: Shanxin Economic Press. 
Chowdhury, J.A. 2004. ― Towards Universal Health Coverage in Thailand‖. New Delhi: 
World Health Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia. 
Coase, R.H. 1960. ― The Problem of Social Cost‖. Journal of Law and Economics 3(1): 1-44. 
 
Commission  for  Racial  Equality.  2002.  ― Disadvantage  &  Discrimination  in  Britain 
Today-The  Facts‖.   
http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1017217454933.  Accessed 
April 2010. 
Dankelman I.and J. Davidson.1988. Women and Environment in the Third World：Alliance 
for the Future. London：Earthscan in association with IUCN,1988. 
Deininger,  K.  and  L. Squire.  1998.  ― New  ways  of  looking  at  old  issues:  inequality  and 
growth‖. Journal of Development Economics 57: 259-287. 
Deininger,K.,  S.  Jin  and  H.  Nagarajan.  2007.  ― Land  Reforms,  Poverty  Reduction,  and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from India‖. World Bank Policy Research working Paper 
No.4448. Washington DC: World Bank. 299 
 
Dept.  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  Taiwan  Provincial  Government.  1996.  Taiwan 
Agricultural  Yearbook.  Taiwan:  Dept.  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  Taiwan  Provincial 
Government 
Deyo, F.1989. Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in East Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay. 2000. ― Growth is Good for the Poor‖. Washington DC: World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/22015_Growth_is_Good_for_Poor.pd
f. Accessed April 2010. 




is-ind. Accessed April 2010. 
Fujita, M., P. Krugman and A.J. Venables. 1999. The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and 
International Trade. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Fujita, M., T. Mori, J.V. Henderson and Y. Kanemoto. 2004. ― Spatial Distribution of 
Economic Activities in Japan and China‖. In J. V. Henderson and T. 
Jacques-Francois(Eds), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics: 2911-77. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Galor, O., O. Moav and D. Vollrath. 2009. ― Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of 
Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence‖. Review of Economic 
Studies 76(1): 143-179. 
Gary  Gregory.  2002.  ― Promoting  SMEs  in  Korea:  Government  Response  to  the  Asian 300 
 
Financial Crisis‖, in The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East Asia, edited by 
Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gersbach, G. and Lars-H. R. Siemers. 2010. ― Land Reforms and Economic Development.‖ 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 1. 
Ghatak, M., S. Roy. 2007. ― Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity in India: A Review of 
the Evidence‖. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23(2): 251-269. 
Gordon,  B.,  Mackay,  R.  and  Rehfuess,  E.  2004.  Inheriting  the  World.  The  Atlas  of 
Children‘s Health and the Environment. World Health Organization, Geneva. 
Gregory, P. and D. Lal. 1977. ― Demand, supply and structure: A cross-sectional analysis of 
manufacturing  wages‖.  Employment  and  Rural  Development  Division  Working Paper. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Grossman, G.M. and A.B. Krueger. 1991. ― Environmental Impacts of a North American Free 
Trade Agreement‖. NBER Working Paper No. W3914. Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Gu, X. 2008. Institution building on Social Safety Net of China (in Chinese). HangZhou: 
Zhejiang University Press. 
Gunatilake H. and De Guzman F.D. 2008. Market-Based Approaches for Managing the 
Asian Environment: A Review. ADB Economics Working Paper Series No.124. 
Guo H. and M. Liu. 2010. ― The Environmental Effect of International Trade‖. Twenty-First 
Century (2): 4-13. 
—. 2010. ― Environmental regulation and international competitiveness‖. International 
Economic Review. Accepted. 301 
 
Habito, C. 2007. ― Pricing Pollution‖. Philippine Daily Inquirer. 10 December. 
Hamaguchi, N. 2009. ―Regional Integration, Agglomeration, and Income Distribution in East 
Asia‖,    In  Yukon  Huang  and  Alessandro  Magnoli  Bocchi(Eds.),  Reshaping  Economic 
Geography in East Asia: 1-18. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Hamilton, C .1983. ― Capitalist industrialization in East Asia‘s four little tigers‖. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 13 (1): 35-73. 
Han, Y. 1994. ― Taiwan‘s Agricultural Development: Retrospect and Prospect‖. In Yi. G, X. Xu, 
edt.The Taiwan Experience and its implications for the Economic Reforms of Mainland 
China. Beijing: China Economic Publishing House.     
Hansen M.D. 2001. ― The Danish Experience with Efficiency Improvement in Industrial and 
Commercial Sectors‖, paper presented at the UNFCCC workshop on good practices in 
policies and measures, 8-10, October 2001, Copenhagen. 
http://unfccc.int/sessions/workshop/010810/hansen.pdf. Accessed April 2010. 
Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro. 1970. ― Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two 
Sector Analysis‖. American Review of Economics 60: 126-142. 
Hasan, R., D. Mitra, and M. Ulubasoglu. 2007. ― Institutions and Policies for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction: The Role of Private Sector Development‖. Asian Development 
Review 24(1): 69−116. 
He, K. and H.Feng. 2008. ― A Path to Democracy: In Search of China‘s Democratization 
Model‖. Aslan Perspective 32(3): 139-169. 
Hidefumi Imura. 2003. Comparative Study of Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Shanghai. 
Conference paper presented in IGES/APN Workshop, Feb. 2003. 302 
 
http://www.iges.or.jp/en/ue/activity/mega-city/article/htm/far41.htm. Accessed April 
2010. 
Hillier, B. and M. Ibrahimo. 1993. ― Asymmetric Information and Models of Credit 
Rationing‖. Bulletin of Economic Research 45: 271-301. 
Holden, S. T., K. Deininger and H. Ghebru. 2009. ― Impacts of Low-Cost Land Certification 
on Investment and Productivity‖.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(2): 
359-373 
Hombergh H.V.D.,1993. Gender,Environment and Development. Published for the Institute 
for Development Research Amsterdam by International Books, March, 1993. 
Hsiao, Michael H.H. .1996. ― Agricultural reforms in Taiwan and South Korea‖. In John 
Borrego, Alejandro Alvarez Bejar, and Jomo K.S. (eds). Capital, the State and Late 
Industrialization: Comparative Perspectives from the Pacifi c Rim: 97-112. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Hsieh, P.C.R. 1993. ― Principles and Practices of Farmland Consolidation in Taiwan‖. Mimeo, 
Taiwan: Land Reform Training Institute. 
Hu, Shanlian. 2007. ― The Establishment of New Cooperative Medical Scheme: Achievement 
and Challenge (in Chinese) ‖. Paper Collection of Westlake Forum 2007, Hangzhou, 
China. 
Huang, Y. and A. Bocchi. 2009. Reshaping Economic Geography in East Asia. Washington 
DC: The World Bank. 
Hughes, D. and S. Leethongdee. 2007. ― Universal Coverage in the Land of Smiles: Lessons 
from Thailand's 30 Baht Health Reforms‖. Health Affairs 26 (4): 999–1008. 303 
 
IEA  (International  Energy  Agency).  1997a.  Voluntary  Actions  for  Energy-Related  CO2 
Abatement. Paris: OECD/IEA. 
—.  1997b.  Voluntary  Approaches  for  Mitigating  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions.  Conference 
Proceedings, Bonn, Germany 30-31 October 1995. Paris: OECD/IEA.   
Iimi, A. 2005. ― Urbanization and Development of Infrastructure in the East Asian Region‖. 
JBICI Review (Japan Bank for International Cooperation Institute Review ) (10): 88-109. 
Imura, H. and M. A. Schreurs. 2005. Environmental Policy in Japan: 290, Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Inter-Parliamentary  Union.  2009.  ― Inter-Parliamentary  Union‖. 
http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm. Accessed April 2010. 
Jiang, H. 1998. ― Discussion on SME Financing‖. The Study of Finance and Economics 7: 
28–34. 
Jomo K.S. 2000. ― Rethinking the Role of Government Policy in Southeast Asia‖. In Stiglitz 
and Yusuf (Eds.), Rethinking the east Asia miracle: 509-25. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
—. 2006. ―Growth with Equity in East Asia?‖. Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) Working Paper, No.33. United Nations: Department of Economics and Social 
Affairs 
Juliano J. Assunç ã o. 2008. ― Rural Organization and Land Reform in Brazil: The Role of 
Nonagricultural Benefits of Landholding‖. Economic Development and Cultural Change 
56(4): 851-870. 304 
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. ― Governance Matters III: Governance 
Indicators for 1996–2002‖. Policy Research Working Paper No 3106. Washington, DC: 
Word Bank. 
Keefer,  P.  and  S.  Khemani.  2005.  ― Democracy,  Public  Expenditures,  and  the  Poor: 
Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services‖. World Bank Research 
Observer 20(1): 1–27. 
Keidanren. 2003. ― Results of the Fiscal 2003 Follow-up to the Keidanren Voluntary Action 
Plan on the Environment‖. http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2003/113/report.pdf. 
Accessed April 2010. 
Kenworthy, L. 1999. ― Do Social-welfare Policies Reduce Poverty? A cross-national 
assessment‖. Social Forces 77(3): 1119-1139. 
Ki Hyuk Pak. 1956. ― Outcome of Land Reform in the Republic of Korea‖. Journal of Farm 
Economics 38(4): 1015-1023. 
King, E., K. Anderson and Y. Wang. 1993. ― Feedback Effects on the Labor Market on 
Schooling Choice in Malaysia?‖ Paper presented at the April 1992 Meetings of the 
Population Association of America, Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Kojima, K. and T. Flying-Geese. 2000. ― Model of Asian Economic Development: Origin, 
Theoretical Extensions, and Regional Policy Implications ‖. Journal of Asian Economics 
11(4): 375-401. 
Kornai, J. and Eggleston, K. 2003. Welfare, Choice and Solidarity in Transition, Reforming 
the Health Sector in Eastern Europe. Beijing: CITIC Publishing House. 
Kraay, A. 2006. ― When is Growth Pro-poor? Evidence from a Panel of Countries‖. Journal of 305 
 
Development Economics 80: 198– 227. 
Krarup, S. and S. Ramesohl. 2000. Voluntary Agreements in Energy Policy-Implementation 
and Efficiency. Kobenhavn: AKF Forlaget.   
Kuznets, S. 1955. ― Economic Growth and Income Inequality‖. American Economic Review 
45(1): 1-28. 
Lee, J.S. 1994. ― The Role of the State in Economic Restructuring and Development: The Case 
of Taiwan‖. Occasional Paper Series No. 9403, Taipei: Chung-Hua Institute for 
Economic Research. 
Li, L. 2008. ― Establishment of National Health Insurances in South Korea and Taiwan‖, 
Study and Practice, October (in Chinese). 
Lin, J. Y. and Liu, P. 2008. ― Achieving Equity and Efficiency Simultaneously in the Primary 
Distribution Stage in the People‘s Republic of China‖. Asian Development Review 25(1): 
34-58. 
Lin, Y., F. Cai, and Z. Li. 1999. ― Comparative Advantage and Developing Strategy: A 
Reinterpretation of East Asian Miracle‖. CCER Working Paper No. C1999006. Beijing: 
Peking University. 
Lindelow, M. and A. Wagstaff. 2005. ― Health Shocks in China: Are the Poor and Uninsured 
Less Protected? ‖. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3740.Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
Liu, C. 2006. ― The Development of Aged Welfare in Taiwan: A View Concerning of Social 
Inequality‖. 2006 Taiwan Sociology Annual Conference paper. http :// soc. thu. edu.tw / 
2006TSAconference /_notes/ 2006TSApaper/ 4-7.pdf. Accessed April 2010. 
Liu, M. 2002. ― Sustained Agricultural Growth and Economic Structural Change: Some 306 
 
Reflections on Farmland Consolidation Programmes in Taiwan and Mainland China‖. 
China Economic Quarterly 1(2): 455-484. 
Liu, M. et al. 2007. ― A Study of the Role of Central Funding for Maternal and Child 
Healthcare Services in Rural China‖, A report of a project commissioned by UNICEF and 
Chinese Ministry of Finance. 
Liu, M. and J. Yu. 2008. ― Financial Structure, Development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises, and Income Distribution in the People‘s Republic of China‖. Asian 
Development Review 25: 137-155. 
Liu, M., J. Yu and Q. Wang. 2008. ― Human Development: Perspective and Sustainability‖, 
Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 
2009 (1), in Chinese.   
Liu, M. and Q. Wang. 2009. ― The Role of Research Institution and Think-Tanks in Linking 
up Governance Evidence with Policy Making in China: The Case of Healthcare System 
Reform‖. Report commissioned by UNDP Governance Centre (Oslo), 
http://www.gaportal.org/support/workshops/cairo-roundtable-evidence-governance-policy. 
Accessed April 2010. 
Liu, M. and Xu, L. 2001. ― FDI and Linkages: Some Survey Findings from Guangdong‖, In J. 
Wen et al. (Eds.), The WTO and China: Developing through Globalization: 303-321. 
Beijing: Renmin University Press. 
Liu, M., J. Yu and Z. Xu. 2006. Research on Rural Finance Markets in China (in 
Chinese).Beijing: China Renmin University Press. 
Liu, M., Liu, Tru-Gin and Z. Wu. 1998. ― Farmland Consolidation in Mainland China and 
Taiwan: Impacts and Implementation‖. A report to Department for International 307 
 
Development, UK. 
Liu, M., X. Li and J. Yu. 2007. ― Chinese Government Health Expenditure and Its Equity‖(in 
Chinese). Journal of Nanjing University 44(3): 23-33. 
Liu, M., L. Xu, and L. Liu. 2003. ― Labor standards and FDI in China: Some Survey Findings 
from Guangdong Province‖. In R. Hasan et al. (Eds.), The impact of Trade on Labour: 
Issues, Perspective and Experience from Developing Asia: 189-243. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science (North Holland). 
—. 2004. ― Wage-related Labour Standards and FDI in China: Some Survey Findings from 
Guangdong Province‖, Pacific Economic Review 9(3): 225-243. 
—. 2006. ― Foreign Direct Investment and Labor Reforms: Some Evidence from Guangdong 
Province in China‖. In K. Zhang (Eds.), China as a World Workshop, London: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
Logan,  J.,  Y.  Fang  and  Z.  Zhang.  2006.  ― Access  to  Housing  in  Urban  China‖,  Brown 
University, 
http://www.hku.hk/cusup/pdf/Seminar%20flyer%2013Jan10%20Prof%20Logan.pdf. 
Accessed April 2010. 
Lu, M. and M. Feng. 2008. ― Reforming the Welfare System in the People‘s Repulbic of 
China‖. Asian Development Review 25(1): 58-80. 
Madison. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Matt Ngui. 2002. ― Government Policies and Programs for SMEs in Taiwan‖, in The Role of 
SMEs in National Economies in East Asia, edited by Charles Harvie and Boon-Chye Lee. 308 
 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Marei. 2004. Social Protection in Southeast and East Asia:385, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung. 
Maurer, K. 2004. ― Bank Rakyat Indonesia: Twenty Years of Large-Scale Microfinance‖. 
Scaling Up Poverty Reduction: A Global Learning Process and Conference. May 25-27, 
Shanghai, China. 
Mauro, P. 1998. ― Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure‖. Journal of 
Public Economics 69: 263–279. 
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard. 1981. ― A Rational Theory of the Size of Government‖. Journal 
of Political Economy, 89(5): 914-927. 
Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs(MOEA).  2000.  ― White  Paper  on  Small  and  Medium 
Enterprises  in  Taiwan(China)‖,  Taiwan(China):  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises 
Administration. 
Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China (MOH). 2007. China Health 
Statistics Yearbook 2007., Beijing: Peking Union Medical College Press. 
—. 2009. China Health Statistics Yearbook 2009. Beijing: Peking Union Medical College 
Press. 
Nan, L. 1989. Tr. by Jing W. etc. Japan's Economic Development. Beijing: Foreign Trade 
Education Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. 1991. China Statistical Yearbook 1991, Beijing: 
China Statistical Press. 309 
 
—. 1996. China Statistical Yearbook 1996. Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
—. 2001. China Statistical Yearbook 2001. Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
—. 2006. China Statistical Yearbook 2006. Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
—. 2007. China Statistical Yearbook 2007. Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
—. 2008. China Statistical Yearbook 2008. Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
NEAA (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency). 2007. Vulnerability of people and 
the environment – challenges and opportunities. Background Report on Chapter 7 of the 
Fourth  UNEP  Global  Environment  Outlook  (GEO-4).  
http://www.unep.org/dewa/pdf/GEO_chpt7_Background_Report.pdf.  Accessed  April 
2010. 
North, D.C. 2003. ― The Role of Institutions in Economic Development‖. UNECE Discussion 
Paper Series No. 2003.2 (October). 
O’Donnell, O., et al. 2007. ― The Incidence of Public Spending on Healthcare: Comparative 
Evidence from Asia‖. The World Bank Economic Review 21(1): 93-123. 
OECD  (Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development).  1999.  Voluntary 
Approaches for Environmental Policy: 45-98, Paris, France: OECD. 
—. 2006. The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes. Paris: OECD 
Ohno, A. 2009. Rural Clustering at Incipient Stages of Economic Development: Hand-weaving 
Clusters in Lao PDR, In Yukon Huang and Alessandro Magnoli Bocchi(Eds.), Reshaping 
Economic Geography in East Asia: 33-46. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Onchan, T. 1995. ―Economic Growth, Income Distribution and Poverty in Thailand‖. Paper 310 
 
presented at the Fifth Tun Abdul Razak Conference, April 12-13, Athens, Ohio. 
Organizers of the first Regional Environmental Forum. 2003. Advancing Environmental 
Governance: Perspectives from Mainland Southeast Asia. Outcome of the first meeting of 
the Regional Environmental Forum (REF) for mainland Southeast Asia. Nov. 2002. 
http://www.ref-msea.org/aeg.pdf. Accessed June 2010. 
Pack, H, and L. Westphal. 1986. ― Accumulation, Exports, and Growth in the 
High-Performing Asian Economies‖. Background Paper for The East Asian Miracle . 
Washington DC: Policy Research Department, World Bank. 
Palmer-Jones,  R.  and  K.  Sen.  2006.  ― It  is  Where  You  are  that  Matters:  the  Spatial 
Determinants of Rural Poverty in India‖. Agricultural Economics 34(3): 229-242. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1994. ― Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?‖ American Economic 
Review 84(3): 600-621. 
Philippine Human Development Network (HDN), in collaboration with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the New Zealand Agency for 
International Assistance (NZAID), 2009. Philippine Human Development Report 
2008/2009. Quezon: Human Development Network (HDN). 
Pongsapich, A., R. Leecanawanichphan and N. Bunjongjit. 2002. ― Social Protection in 
Tailand‖. In E. Adam, M. von Hauff and M. John (eds.), Social Protection in Southeast 
and East Asia: 313-330. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Price, L. 2005. Voluntary Agreements for Energy Efficiency or GHG Emissions Reduction in 
Industry:  An  Assessment  of  Programs  Around  the  World. 
http://www.sei.ie/uploadedfiles/InfoCentre/voluntaryagreementsfinalreport.pdf. Accessed 311 
 
April 2010. 
Quan, N. T. and A. Y. C. Koo. 1985. ― Concentration of Land Holdings: An Empirical 
Exploration of Kuznets‘Conjecture‖. Journal of Development Economics 18(1): 101-117. 
Quibria, M. G. 2002. ― Growth and Poverty: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle Revisited‖. 
Research Paper 33. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Ramesh M. 2000. Welfare Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Social Security, Health and 
Education Policies: 91. New York: Palgrave. 
Rao, M.G. 2005. ― Poverty Alleviation under Fiscal Decentralization‖, World Bank Learning 
Program paper, http://www1.worldbank.org/ publicsector/ LearningProgram/ 
Decentralization/ PovertyAlleviation.pdf. Accessed April 2010. 
Rob, R. 1990. The Evolution of Markets under Demand Uncertainty. Philadelphia, Pa: 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Rodrik, D. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
—. 2008. ―T he New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We 
Learn?‖ Working Paper 2008-0142, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University, 
Rodrik. D, G. Grossman and V. Norman. 1995. ― Getting Interventions Right: How South 
Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich‖. Economic Policy 10(20): 55-107. 
Sato, H. 2006. ― Housing Inequality and Housing Poverty in Urban China in the late 1990s‖. 
China Economic Review 17(1): 37-50. 
Sciortino, R. and S. Punpuing. 2009. International Migration in Thailand. Bangkok: 312 
 
International Organization for Migration.   
Scitovsky, T. 1953. Two Concepts of External Economic Growth and Structural Change in 
Taiwan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Setiana. A.2005. ― Social health insurance development as an integral part of the national 
health policy: recent reform in Indonesian health insurance‖. Paper presentation at the 
Conference of the GTZ-ILO-WHO Consortium on Social Health Protection in 
Developing Countries, 05-07 December, Berlin, Germany.   
Sicular, T., X. M.Yue, G. Bjorn and S. Li. 2007. ― The Urban-Rural Income Gap and 
Inequality in China‖. Review of Income and Wealth 53(1): 93-126. 
Solow  R.M.  1974.  ― Intergenerational  Equity  and  Exhaustible  Resources‖,  The  Review  of 
Economic Studies 41: 29-45. 
—. 1991. ― Sustainability: An Economist's Perspective”. Paper presented as the Eighteenth J. 
Seward Johnson Lecture to the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution, at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, on June 14, 1991, 179-187. 
—.  1993.  ― Sustainability:  An  Economist‘  s  Perspective‖. 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic203569.files/Solow.Sustainability_An_Economi
sts_Perspective._1993.pdf. Accessed April 2010. 
Sonnenfeld D. A. and A. P. J. Mol. 2006. Environmental Reform in Asia Comparisons, 
Challenges, Next Steps. The Journal of Environment & Development June 2006 15: 
112-137. 
Stavins, R.N. 1997. Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments 
Address  a  Global  Problem?  294,  Discussion  Paper  E-96-03,  Kennedy  School  of 313 
 
Government, Harvard University 
Streeten P. 1994. ― Human Development:Means and Ends‖. American Economic Review, Vol. 
84, No. 2, 1994. 
Tambunan, T. 2008. ― SME Development in Indonesia with Reference to Networking, 
Innovativeness, Market Expansion and Government Policy‖. In Hank Lim. Chiba(Eds), 
ASEAN SMEs and Globalization. ERIA Research Project Report 2007 No. 5, Japan: 
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)-JETRO. 
The Ministry of Finance PRC, UNICIF and CHEDS.2008. ― Study on Public Financing for 
Universal Access to Essential Maternal and Child Health Services‖, Study Report.   
Tietenberg, T.H. 1985. Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy: 14-16. 
Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
Turk, C. 2001. ― Linking Participatory Poverty Assessment to Policy and Policy Making: 
Experience from Vietnam‖. World Bank working paper. Washington DC: The World 
Bank. 
UNDP. 1990. Human Development Report1990. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1991. Human Development Report1991. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1992. Human Development Report1992. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1993. Human Development Report1993. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1994. Human Development Report1994. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1995. Human Development Report1995. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1996. Human Development Report1996. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1997. Human Development Report1997. New York: Oxford University Press. 314 
 
—. 1998. Human Development Report1998. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1999. Human Development Report1999. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2000. Human Development Report2000. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2001. Human Development Report2001 New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2002. Human Development Report2002. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2003. Human Development Report2003. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2004. Human Development Report2004. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2005. Human Development Report2005. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2006. Human Development Report2006. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2007. Human Development Report2007/2008. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2008. TACKLING CORRUPTION, TRANSFORMING LIVES: Accelerating Human 
Development in Asia and the Pacific. Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd. 
—. 2009. Human Development Report2009. New York: Oxford University Press. 
UNDP and China Institute for Reform and Development. 2005. China Human 
Development Report 2005: Development with Equity, 
http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&catid=18
&topic=8&sid=242&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0. Accessed April 2010. 
—. 2008. China Human Development Report 2007/2008: Access for all: Basic public services 
for 1.3 billion people. 
http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&catid=18
&topic=8&sid=4372&mode=nocomments&order=0&thold=0. Accessed April 2010. 315 
 
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2000. Global Environment Outlook. 
Malta: Interprint Ltd. 
UNESC. 2005. ― Decentralization for Poverty Reduction‖, Policy Dialogue of UNESC for 
Asia and the Pacific Committee on Poverty Reduction, second session. Bangkok. 
UN-Habitat, 2003. ― The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003‖. 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. London and Sterling, VA: United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme. 
United  Nations  Economic  and  Social  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Statistic 
Division.2009.  ― Data  Centre‖.  http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/index.asp.  Accessed 
April 2010. 
Uzuhashi, T. and B. G. Yoon. 2007. ― A Comparative Study of Welfare Development: Japan 
and Korea‖. Paper delivered at the 2nd International Social Policy Forum. Beijing. 
Walford, V. et al. 2006. ― Future Policy Choices for the Health Sector in Asia‖, Asia 2015 
conference paper, http://www.eldis.org/ vfile/ upload/1/document/ 0708/ DOC21183. pdf. 
Accessed April 2010. 
Wang, J., N. Chen, B. Yao and J. Liu. 2007. ― Environmental NGOs: A New Source of 
Strength  of  China's  Environmental  Protection  Enterprise‖.  Journal  of  Guangzhou 
University (Social Science Edition) 6 (2): 35-38. 
Wang, Q. and M. Liu. 2005. ― The Value of Health and Some of Its Determinants: A 
Literature Survey‖, China Economic Quarterly.5(1): 1-52. 
WCED(World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development).  1987.  Our  Common 
Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 316 
 
WHO. 2001. ― Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development‖, 
Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 
WHO. 2004. Regional Macroeconomics and Health Framework. World Health Organization 
Regional Office for South-East Asia. http:// whqlibdoc.who.int/ 
searo/2004/SEA_Econ_20_eng.pdf. Accessed April 2010. 
—. 2008a. Health in Asia and the Pacific, Manila: World Health Organization Regional 
Offices for South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.   
—. 2008b. ― WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS)‖. http://www.who.int/whosis/en/. 
Accessed April 2010. 
—. 2009. World Health Statistics 2009. France: World Health Organization. 
World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. World Bank 
Policy Research Reports. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1995. World Development Report 1995. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 1998. World Development Indicators 1998. 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/03/0
1/000009265_3980624090709/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Accessed June 2010. 
—. 2000. World Development Report 1999-2000: 21-24, Oxford, UK and New York, US: 
Oxford University Press. 
—. 2001. World Development Indicators 2001. 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/08/1
9/000009486_20040819135251/Rendered/PDF/220990see0cat0info0in0IRAMs.pdf. 
Accessed June 2010. 317 
 
—. 2003. World Bank Policy Research Report 2003. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2005. World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, Washington DC: The 
World Bank. 
—. 2006. World Development Indicators 2006. 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/index2.htm. Accessed June 2010. 
—. 2008. International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal, and Institutional 
Perspectives. Washington, DC: World Bank.   
—. 2009a. Reshaping Economic Geography in East Asia. New York: Oxford University Press. 
—. 2009b. China From Poor Areas to Poor People: China’s Evolving Poverty Reduction 
Agenda, Washington DC: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department 
East Asia and Pacific Region, The World Bank. 




—. 2010a. ― Edstats Database‖ 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/EXTDAT
ASTATISTICS/EXTEDSTATS/0,,menuPK:3232818~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435
~theSitePK:3232764,00.html. Accessed April 2010. 




PK:64168435~theSitePK:5280443,00.html. Accessed April 2010. 
Xu, K. et al. 2003. ― Household Catastrophic Health Expenditure: A Multi-country Analysis‖. 
Lancet 362: 111-117. 
Xu, L., W. Tan and M. Liu. 2004. ― Technological Spillovers of Four Source Groups of FDI 
Firms in Guangdong: A Comparison‖, Management World (6): 14-25. 
Yamauchi, F., M. Muto, R. Dewina, and S. Sumaryanto. 2009. Spatial Networks, Incentives, 
and the Dynamics of Village Economies: Evidence from Indonesia, In Yukon Huang and 
Alessandro Magnoli Bocchi(Eds.), Reshaping Economic Geography in East Asia: 48-64. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Yang, D. and S. Shen. 2002. ―The Characteristics and the Existing Problems of Japanese 
Social Security System‖. Japan Studies.   
Yang, D., R. Gregory and X. Meng. 2006. ― Impact of the Guest Worker System on Poverty 
and Wellbeing of Migrant Workers in Urban China‖. 
http://people.anu.edu.au/xin.meng/poverty-migration-paper-new.pdf. Accessed April 
2010. 
Yardley, J. 2005. ― Rule by Law Seeking a Public Voice on China's 'Angry River'‖. New York 
Times, December 26, 2005. 
Yoong-Deok Jeon. 2000. ― Land Reform, Income Redistribution, and Agricultural Production 
in Korea‖. Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(2): 253-268. 
Yu, H. and Y. Meng. 2009. ― The road of Empowerment to solve the problem of poverty of 
farmers‖. Economic Research Guide (9).   319 
 
Yu, J., M. Liu and Wang, J. 2007. ―SMEs Development and Poverty Reduction: A Case 
Study of Xiji County, China‖, CFED Project Research Report.   
Yu, K. 2008. China's Political Reform towards Good Governance, 1978-2008. Beijing: Social 
Science Academic Press. 
Yu, T.S. 1994. ―Does Taiwan‘s Industrialization Have Its Own Paradigm?‖ Occasional Paper 
Series No. 9404, Taipei: Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research. 
Zhao X. 2006. Lead to Green Innovation-Research of Innovation-oriented Environmental 
Policy. Beijing: Economic science Press. 
Zheng, B., D. Fang and H. Shi. 2002. Social Security Systems in Contemporary East-Asia. 
Beijing: Legal Publishing House. 
Zin, R.H.M., H.A. Lee and S. Abdul-Rahman. 2002. ― Social Protection in Malaysia‖. In A. 
Erfried, and M. von Hauff and J. Marei (Eds.), Social Protection in Southeast and East 
Asia: 133, Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 320 
 
 
Appendix 1: Growth with Equity in Taiwan and Korea 
Among  the  ESA  economies  that  experienced  rapid  economic  growth  and  structural 
transformations over the past decades, South Korea and Taiwan (China) have been considered 
as two successful examples of ― growth with equity‖ that challenges the Kuznets hypothesis. 
While having the top average growth rates from the 1960s to the 2000s in the ESA region 
(World Bank, 2003), South Korea and Taiwan managed to maintain relatively low inequalities 
during their economic take-offs, though in more recent years income inequalities have become 
worse due to economic liberalization policies since the 1990s (Jomo, 2006) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Household Income Distribution Gini Coefficients in Five High-Performing Asian 
Economies 1970-2002 
Economy  1970  1976  1980  1985  1999  2000  2002 
South Korea  0.332  0.391  0.389  0.357
d  0.3204  0.32  na 
Taiwan  0.294  0.28  0.277  0.29  0.325  na  0.345 
Indonesia  0.35  0.34  0.34
c  0.33  0.31  0.3  na 
Malaysia  0.506  0.529  0.493
a  0.474
c  0.4432  na  0.4607 
Thailand  na  0.451  0.473
b  0.5  0.444  0.43  0.428 
Notes: a, 1979; b, 1981; c, 1984; d, 1989; na – not available 
Source: Jomo, 2006, p.5. 
 
The balanced growth in South Korea and Taiwan can largely be attributed to the favorable 
― initial  conditions‖  that  they  were  bequeathed  under  their  unique  post-war  circumstances 
(Jomo, 2006), including highly equally distributed land and a high-quality human capital stock. 
In this Appendix, we will examine how these initial conditions came into being and how they 
helped South Korea and Taiwan achieve and maintain their balanced growth.   321 
 
1. Favorable Initial Conditions 
1.1 Land Reform 
The South Korean and Taiwanese land reforms in the late 1940s were the first important 
policy initiatives of the governments of these economies to reduce poverty and inequalities in 
the economies (see Hamilton, 1983; Hsiao, 1996). In 1945–1950, the South Korean authorities 
and  U.S.  military  administration  carried  out  a  land  reform  that  retained  the  institution  of 
private property. They confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese colonial 
government, Japanese companies, and individual Japanese colonists. An article on agricultural 
land reform was listed in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Based on that 
Constitution,  the  Agricultural  Land  Reform  Amendment  Act  (ALRAA)  was  drafted  and 
actually became effective on March 10, 1950. The ALRAA had three main features: First, any 
individual could own agricultural land but only if he or she cultivated or managed it for her- or 
himself. Second, one could own only three jungbo of land at maximum (7.35 acres). Third, 
tenancy arrangement and land-renting were legally prohibited. The land reform proceeded as 
follows. After surveying landlord-tenant relationships in June 1949, the government purchased 
the above-ceiling land from landlords with land securities. The land securities specified the 
compensation period (5 years) as well as the price of land as a percentage of the annual crop 
yield of the land. However, actual compensations were made by cash, and the compensation 
period was subsequently extended to more than 10 years for some of the land transferred. 
Generally  speaking,  land  reform  was  completed  at  the  beginning  of  the  1960s.  The 
government  then  sold  the  land  to  tenants  who  made  payments  with  rice.  In  fact,  the 322 
 
government very much acted as an arbitrageur between landlords and tenants (Jeon, 2000, 
p.254). Through the land reform, about 69 per cent of the total area of 833,000 chungbo, equal 
to 577,000 chungbo, was redistributed, and 50 per cent of the farm households were affected 
(Pak, 1956).   
 
In Taiwan, the Kuomintang government carried out its land reform in the early 1950s. Former 
Japanese  colonists  who  possessed  large  tracks  of  farm  land  as  well  as  commercial  and 
industrial properties had fled away. The land reform was carried out in three consecutive steps: 
first, land rents were reduced to 37.5 percent of the yields for major crops; second, sales were 
carried out of public land formerly owned by Japanese colonists to cultivators and tenants at 
low prices; third, the government exchanged with former owners shares in public companies 
for land, and then sold the land at favorable prices to tillers (Yu, 1994). A key factor ensuring 
the success of the land reform program was that the Kuomintang government was mostly from 
the Mainland and had few ties to indigenous landowners. According to the study of Deininger 
et al. (2007), 62.5% of the total rural households in Taiwan benefited from this reform even 
though only 26.9% of the total arable land was redistributed.   
 
Land  reform  programs  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  greatly  improved  equalities  in  land 
distribution, and in turn helped reduce the income inequalities in these two economies. Figure 
1 plots the Gini coefficients of income and land distributions around 1960 for 41 economies. 
South Korea and Taiwan are the two with the lowest overall inequalities (Rodrik, 1995, p.76).   
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Figure 1 Measures of income and land distributions in 41 economies around 1960 
 
Source: Dani Rodrik, 1995, p.76. 
 
1.2 Education and Human Capital 
Both South Korea and Taiwan have developed a highly educated labor force with the support 
from the government. Universal primary education since the 1960s has been complemented by 
high  enrolments  in  secondary and tertiary levels,  and a strong  emphasis  on technical  and 
engineering disciplines (Jomo, 2006). That is, the investments in human capital went well 
beyond the primary schooling limit as recommended by the World Bank, with government 
labor market interventions based on long-term considerations beyond current prices (Rodrik, 
1994). 
 
Rodrik et al. (1995, p.76) finds, through a regression method, that the primary and secondary 
level education attainments in South Korea and Taiwan in 1960 were much higher than those 
of the economies at similar income level. Table 2 shows the actual school enrolment and 324 
 
literacy rates in South Korea and Taiwan in 1960, as well as the rates expected on the basis of 
these  economies‘  per-capita  income  levels.  The  latter  are  derived  from  cross-sectional 
regressions of educational indicators on per-capita income and its square term. The study finds 
that both economies had virtually universal primary school enrolment, while the norm for 
countries at their income levels stood at only around 60%. South Korea had more than doubled 
the literacy rate compared to the norm, and Taiwan's literacy rate was 1.5 times as high. It is 
clear that both economies had a labor force that was considerably better educated than would 
be predicted from their income levels (Rodrik, 1995).   
 
Table2 Predicted and actual education indicators of Korea and Taiwan in 1960 
 
Source: Rodrik, 1995, p.76 
 
Exceptional primary and secondary education attainments provided South Korea and Taiwan 
with great advantages in generating ample supplies of technical labor that were crucial for 
their economic take-offs. In 1990, South Korea and Taiwan had, respectively, 2200 and 2100 
technologists  and  scientists  per  million  people,  as  compared  with  only  around  400  for 




The  expansion  of  education  not  only  helped  generate  technical  and  professional  human 
resources for industrial upgrading, but also enhanced opportunities for upward socio-economic 
mobility, including skill enhancement and higher remuneration (Deyo, 1989). 
1.3 Converting Favorable Initial Conditions into Greater Income Equality 
More equal land distribution and a higher-quality human capital stock contributed to rapid 
economic growth in both South Korea and Taiwan without widening the income gap. Below 
we consider the effects of these favorable conditions on the primary and secondary income 
distribution in these economies. 
1.4 Primary Distribution: Equal Access to Economic Opportunities   
To begin with, more equal land distribution ensured greater equality in the distribution of 
agricultural  income,  since  peasant  proprietors  now  gained  greater  benefits  from  the  same 
development of agriculture than tenants could have obtained. Agricultural development in both 
South Korea and Taiwan was spurred by the conversion of the farmers‘ status from tenants to 
proprietors as a result of the land reform, and the ensuing productivity improvements. For 
instance, according to one study (Han, 1994), the average number of work days by farmers in 
a  year  in  Taiwan  increased  from  110  before  the  reform  to  168  after.  Additionally,  the 
development  of  agriculture  in  Taiwan  and  South  Korea  was  also  the  outcome  of  other 
supportive agricultural policies taken by the government. For example, Taiwan took various 
additional  actions  to  promote  rural  development  following  the  land  reform.  The  most 
important one was the land consolidation programs carried out in the 1960s to 1990s (see 
subsection 4.3). Similar actions were launched in South Korea in the 1970s when the U.S. 326 
 
stopped its aids due to the oil crisis (Jomo, 2006). These included promotion of the adoption of 
advanced agricultural technologies and the cultivation of economic crops, and improvement of 
the rural environment. Although prices of agricultural products were under control in both 
economies in order to fuel industrialization, the incomes of farmers nevertheless saw increase 
in the early years of the economic take-off. Meanwhile, an equal distribution of the benefits 
generated by agricultural development was made possible by the highly equal land distribution 
thanks to land reforms, which in turn contributed to overall equal income distribution in the 
economies.   
 
Secondly,  during  their  economic  take-off  and  rapid  industrialization,  universal  primary 
education  contributed  to  making  opportunities  generated  by  economic  growth  equally 
accessible  to  all.  The  export-oriented  growth  in  both  economies  created  massive  jobs. 
Although there had been severe labor repressions in Korea and Taiwan until democratization 
in the late 1980s, wages were raised thanks to enhancements in labor productivity, product 
qualities, and competitiveness of firms（Jomo, 2006 p.6). In Korea, real wages grew at an 
average  annual  rate  of  10  per  cent  from  1970  to  1980,  and  8.2  per  cent  over  the  period 
1980-1992 (World Bank, 1995: 175). In Taiwan, real wages grew by 6.0 per cent (Deyo, 1989: 
93)  and  7.5  percent  (Lee,  1994:  16)  over  the  periods  of  1970-1980  and  1976-1986, 
respectively. With the universal primary education in both economies, people had equal access 
to industrial jobs as well as welfare improvements resulting from rising wages. 
 
Industrial employment is critical to the rises of farmers‘ incomes. Taiwan and Korea have 327 
 
been  fairly  successful  in  raising  rural  household  incomes  through  their  supports  to  rural 
off-farm employment. As a consequence, the proportion of rural household incomes derived 
from off-farm activities rose from 46 per cent  in 1971-1972 to 63 per cent in 1986-1987 
(Onchan, 1995).   
 
To sum up, the initial conditions of land distribution and universal primary education in South 
Korea and Taiwan both helped ensure equal access to economic opportunities in agriculture 
and industry for the population. They were the key to achieving favorable primary income 
distribution in these two economies.   
1.5 Social Safety Net 
With the rapid economic growth, South Korea and Taiwan built their social safety nets in order 
to narrow the gaps between the rich and poor through secondary distribution.   
 
Between 1980 and 1997, South Korea successively launched its universal health insurance 
scheme, the national pension plan, and the minimum wage and employment insurance system. 
The successive promulgations of the "National Health Insurance Act" and the "National Basic 
Livelihood Security Act" in 1997 symbolized a full-fledged social welfare system in South 
Korea. Taiwan passed three major social acts in 1980 with regard to the old-aged, disabled and 
children, respectively (Liu, 2006). In 1995, the well-known National Health Insurance (NHI) 
scheme was launched, through consolidating previous systems of medical care. It has coverage 
of 99% of its total population.   328 
 
 
It should be noted that the political democratization begun in South Korea and Taiwan in the 
late 1980s were also important to the building of the above social safety nets. In democratic 
societies, a relatively equal social structure may prevent public policy-making being hijacked 
by  interest  groups.  That  facilitated  the  passage  and  implementation  of  public  policies 
beneficial to the wide majority of the population. 
2. Summary 
The relatively narrow income gaps achieved by South Korea and Taiwan in their economic 
take-offs could be largely attributed to their favorable initial conditions of a highly equal land 
distribution  and  a  better  human  capital  stock,  and  the  subsequent  policies  emphasizing 
education  and  human  capital  investment.  Although  these  conditions  cannot  easily  be 
reproduced in other developing economies, some lessons can nevertheless be learned from the 
Korean and Taiwanese experiences. First of all, some government interventions are critical to 
an improvement of income distribution, as clearly demonstrated by the case of land reforms 
and agricultural development in both economies. Secondly, greater and widespread human 
capital accumulation can give rise to a more equalized distribution of incomes by raising the 
share  of  labor  income  in  total  incomes  and  by  giving  people  more  equal  access  to 
opportunities  generated  by  economic  growth.  Lastly,  it  appears  that  democratization  also 
helped ensure more equal income distributions by advancing certain equality promoting public 
policies. 